






The text centers on the issue of individual identity, its relationship to other 
individuals, its social value and ultimately the “self worth” as a criterion for 
evaluating all values and diverse societies. Nonetheless the problem of individual 
self identity is multi-layered and requires an investigation of diverse factors, 
such as the nature of cultural determinants, the specific social structure which 
might supress any kind of individual presence, or a social structure that promotes 
individual identity. Social structures and cultural factors lead to the question of 
civilizational contexts wherein such structures and factors find their limits. To 
reach such limits, the text offers methodological procedures that allow a disclosure 
of the “essential” aspects of societies and cultures, their inherence in civilizational 
logics, and the way that the latter provide qualitative differences for interpreting 
the meaning of identity. At the methodological level, the text offers arguments for 
the primacy of qualitative understanding over the modern Western quantitative 
procedures and their limitations. Finally, the question is adressed and articulated 
as to the civilizational conditions that permit individual identity to unfold, and 
the way such unfolding might take diverse routes either in one‘s own native land or 
in diaspora. The latter is quite significant for the Baltic nations, and specifically 
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This book is designed to investigate the given facts of daily life, 
then the cultural facts that are usually obfuscated by all sorts of explana-
tions, till we come to the global phenomena and the manner in which 
such phenomena comprise both, an access to other cultures, and a nar-
rowing down and flattening out of cultural innovations. For example, 
one such flattening may occur when the peoples, who liberated them-
selves from the Soviet Empire, were rushed into “the latest” and got 
stuck in the repeated cycle of accepting or inventing the latest. This is to 
say, there is an “eternal boredom” that has to be broken. It is also sig-
nificant that many writers on culture follow the old trend that humans 
are dominated by their cultures – some sort of cultural unconscious – 
from which no one can escape. In this context, there appear various 
efforts to abolish the subject as conscious being, and to replace it by all 
sorts of forces, psychological wishes, power confrontations, and hier-
archy of positions. Going through these invented factors we find that 
the essayists of these texts do not seem to be stuck and can levitate and 
tell us poor readers, that we are stuck, that underneath our conscious 
awareness we are being moved by all sorts of “nodes”, or body surface 
touches, and thus are completely intertwined in such nodes – of course 
our awareness is a simple node among nodes. If I know anything about 
these nodes, I must surrender any conscious being, because the latter is 
in no position to encompass all of them. 
The cultural syndrome has to be addressed from a position that 
cannot be a position. Our awareness of others in their difference from 
ours, cannot be sequencial, temporal, because we cannot “go back” to 
investigate what happened in the past or somewhere else. Our access 
requires signitive awareness, leading to the question what the others 
“meant” and not what they felt or endured. In brief, awareness is signi-
tive and must be taken as such, and if we shift to the experience of the 
others, we must ask “what they meant” by specific words or how they 
saw a specific thing. There is no need for time machine to transport us, 
6
Algis Mickunas. SOCIAL VALUE AND INDIVIDUAL WORTH
because at the outset awareness is meaningful or signitive. In brief, we 
must ask the question of meaning that is not some interior psychologi-
cal state of the subject, but points to, means something. I might disagree 
with someone on the grounds that certain perceptual meaning does not 
belong to a given fact, does not signify it in a specific way, and hence 
we can always ask “what do you really mean by that”. It could be that a 
fact will correct our signification, or a custom of a given time will reveal 
a mistake, but in any case experienced meaning is a fact and should be 
open to anyone.
The task of signifying, as a basic mode of awareness, allows us to 
be intersubjective, and present to others regardless of place and time. 
We used terms such as “atemporal” – between time and eternity, be-
tween yesterday and tomorrow, even between being and nothing. Our 
world is open and with globalization it is increasingly so, but we also 
must find room for local cultures, and above all for individuals. The 
text challenges Scientific and Political Enlightenment to the extent that 
it “forgot” the criterion for all the values that were based on an auton-
omous subject, without any ontological backing. In the text there are 
very close analyses that lead to the ontology of individual not as only 
socially valuable, but as having self worth for its own sake – the Kan-
tian thing in itself whose denial would be a contradiction. Meanwhile, 
a question is raised concerning an appropriate culture for the thriving 
of an individual. At issue is the very ontological principle that cannot 
be mediated by any social, mythological, empyreal powers that would 
account for individual worth. Any claim that would offer an explana-
tion, a mediation, would immediately shift the individual’s self worth 
toward some value, and thus would insert in the awareness that would 
be more important than self worth. The latter would lose its status as an 
individual, unique and irreplaceable. The text, in this sense is a move-





to say the least, our venture is complex, specifically in light of 
the already available literatures on globalization, national and ethnic 
identities, individualism and collectivism, the numerous sciences offer-
ing explanations of globalization in terms of economics, propagation 
of divine word, psychological impulses, competition for power, genetic 
“will” to survive, and many others. Then there are quests for cultural 
identity, individual chauvinism, historical destinies, clashes among civ-
ilizations, and all having no relationship one with the others. Indeed, if 
we were to ask concerning even a general definition of what it means to 
be human, we would be told that each culture, society, each science, de-
fines the human differently and hence it is of no use in looking for some 
human essence. Indeed, we are no different from other creatures that 
are part of evolution and human presence is only a momentary link in 
evolutionary “progress.” Obviously our task is not to present arguments 
for or against these various trends and scientific explanations, but to 
decipher the very principles on which such theories rest and hence to 
offer a common denominator that would help us in offering a frame-
work in which the diverse views could be located and thus allow us to 
propose what comprises globalization, national culture, individual self-
identity, and finally, the general struggle among the mentioned diverse 
views to resolve their own issues. But most of these views, while offering 
their particular analyses, do not tell us anything about the subject-mat-
ter being analyzed, in other words, there is no mention of a common 
methodology that would allow us an access to such analyses. Without a 
common access, it is impossible to adjudicate which among the many 
scientific or philosophical hypotheses can be counted as viable. Given 
this state of affairs, we must begin with an articulation of methodologi-
cal requirements.
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If our undertaking will count as objective and worthy of scientific 
status in the humanities, then it is essential to begin with the ways that 
human sciences should achieve accessibility and offer the latter to any-
one. Hence, we shall sketch out the basics of a method that will have 
to count as universal. We know that in any science the problem of the 
beginning is one of the most crucial ones to be investigated first. It pre-
sents itself in two ways. First, the neophyte is introduced to the vocabu-
lary and the practices now in force in the science which he wishes to 
help further. Secondly, researchers already familiar with and proficient 
in the sciences reflect upon the basic assumptions which have brought 
that science to its present state with a view to test these in the light of 
that present state and its portents for the future. These reflections upon 
the foundations of the science concerned address themselves to other 
researchers familiar with the field and their results find their way into 
basic texts only when they cause a major re-shuffling of basic premises 
and practices. A case in point is the development of new techniques for 
teaching mathematics based upon the work done in the last hundred 
years in the logical foundations of mathematics and in set-theory. Chil-
dren in elementary school are learning to deal with notions seemingly 
very abstract as a matter of course simply because it has been discovered 
that only a mistaken tradition stood in the way of a proper classifica-
tion of the notions involved. Theories unavoidably have a deforming 
effect. On the basis of the assumptions they make educated guesses are 
made as to the most plausible direction research should take, and only 
very destructive infirming evidence causes a re-examination of these 
assumptions. Even then, as testified by the epic battles around the ques-
tion of the Copernican system, or that of the phlogiston, or spontane-
ous generation, relativity physics or the quantum theory, scientists will 
go to any length to preserve what they deem established. This is not 
put here as a reproof, merely as a statement of fact. Perhaps one of the 
reasons scientists cling in this manner to what they think of as estab-
lished is that it provides the frame within which they map their work 
and their contribution to the summa of human knowledge. Moreover, 
no genuinely scientific procedure has up until recently been provided 
for the kind of critical review that concerns itself solely with basic as-
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sumptions. Some philosophers have given the results of their critical 
review (Descartes, Locke, Hume, Kant, to name some) but they have 
felt called upon to do so in the form of alternative system. Others (the 
positivists of all hue) have thought it simpler to peg their philosophy 
to the contemporary state of some sciences in order to keep abreast of 
these developments. In so doing, they abandoned the role of critic that 
philosophers should play by dint of their own avocation. The only at-
tempt of description of a genuinely scientific procedure for the testing 
of assumptions in any field, the only modern acceptance of the claim of 
philosophy to be the first and the ruler of the sciences, were made by 
Edmund Husserl (1859-1938) who picked up the challenge of a presup-
positionless and strictly scientific philosophy. Such a philosophy would 
be a “phenomenology”, that is to say a discourse about the manner in 
which “the things themselves” present themselves to consciousness. Let 
us examine briefly what this is all about. 
We know that sciences place emphasis on fact, but what is a “fact”? 
A fact is a state of affairs the public description of which is not solely 
dependent upon the unique circumstances of a single individual. The 
occurrence of this description may be so dependent, the subject-matter 
of the description may be so dependent, the description itself as an act 
performed may be dependent thus, the description as an object, how-
ever, must be public and, as representative of the described, must focus 
primarily if not outright exclusively on these aspects of the described 
deemed exemplary – i.e. independent from the historical and psycho-
logical uniqueness of the circumstances described. This independence 
may seem ambiguous in that it involves not only (1) the independence 
of the description itself, as a new public “object”; but also (2) the inde-
pendence and transferability of some of the features described, as cho-
sen because of this “transferability”. Any “description” may be public 
in the way mentioned by virtue of (1) even when what is described is 
itself not amenable to independence in sense (2) to establish a matter of 
fact, however, we would maintain that independence of (1) and (2) have 
to be achieved in one and the same description. The case mentioned 
above, where (1) is achieved but not (2) is the case characterized as that 
of “proper sense” (as against “common” sense). It resembles the “pri-
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vate language” thesis, but differs from it in that no “private” language 
is developed here; the common words are used in their usual way, only 
their concatenation is unusual. Under this heading, “duplicity drinks 
procrastination” would find a place, and the peculiar “sense” its use had 
for Russell at the time would be and example of the lack of independ-
ence in sense (2) for this expression. One might call it a poetic usage, 
and with it list paradox, metaphor, analogy, allegory and obvious self-
contradiction as the methods of such expression. The problem of bring-
ing independence (1) and (2), both, “events” which usually achieve only 
independence (1) through description is a continuing challenge to the 
sciences of man, one which a phenomenological anthropology will have 
to meet. But more on this later. When an individual wishes to transform 
a private occurrence into a “matter of fact”, he has to resort to a descrip-
tion which can be “fleshed” with the appropriate private experience oc-
curring in any other individual’s private adventure. Only when such a 
description has been obtained will a “matter of fact” be established. 
to arrive at such a description is the role lawyers and investigative 
officers assume as they compile and compare the accounts of diverse 
witnesses to a particular event. All factors indicating that some element 
in the description attaches solely to the unique circumstances of a sin-
gle individual (drunkenness, myopia, psychological disturbances either 
pathological and prolonged or momentary, and the like) are sifted and 
their bearing on anyone description evaluated. Critical questions of es-
sence are answered on the basis of these evaluations and eventually law-
yers, judge and jury come to the final confrontation with the “evidence” 
and decide whether or not the event in its public description essentially 
fits as an example of “premeditated murder”, “accidental homicide”, or 
whatever, as the case may be. First the testimony is sifted, then the final 
picture is tested to see if, on the basis of the “facts”, what looked like 
premeditated murder still fits the essential features of such or whether, 
in the sorting process some essential features have disappeared, the lack 
of which transforms the “matter of fact” into a case of (an example of) 
accidental homicide. 
I call “abstractive description” the process according to which an 
event occurring in the stream of lived experiences of a subject is made 
intersubjectively valid by the process outlined and illustrated above. 
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Although the example chosen is the co-operative effort of a crimi-
nal trial toward “matters of fact”, the example should not stand in the 
way of understanding. I am not unaware that errors of justice are made 
often enough for disquiet concerning the genuine independence of the 
matters of fact from the unique circumstances of some single individual. 
All too often what is taken as such is not really such in the actual case. 
But this only reinforces the point made by giving an example of a failure 
to fulfill the requirements specified: miscarriages of justice occur when – 
unknown to judge and jury (one would hope!) – some single individual 
succeeds in presenting as independent from his volition a description in-
timately subservient to it. Nor should the illustration given suggest that 
only in this kind of cooperative effort are “matters of fact” properly de-
scribed. A closer look at the procedures of such a trial reveal that each in-
dividual participant (witnesses, lawyers, jury, judge and defendant alike) 
are asked by the situation to test for themselves each individually the 
descriptions they hear against previous descriptions and, for the witness 
and possibly the defendant too against their rememorated lived experi-
ence of the event. 
Hence, everyone must individually sift and test and attempt to 
fulfill the overall aim of making the description itself independent of 
private circumstances. Eventually each juror will have to pit unaided 
his own “model description” against those of his cojurors not (ideally) 
on the basis of pride of authorship, but on the basis of its independ-
ence from himself. That is why prospective jurors whose beliefs would 
render them unable in principle to fulfill this ideal, are sorted out and 
disqualified or should be. A better analysis of this example shows each 
individual singly in the privacy of his own subjectivity, performing for 
himself the “abstractive description”. 
A further comment to be made here concerns the next step to be 
taken by each juror in exclusive communion with himself: “exemplary 
universalization”. Once the “matters of fact” have been established to 
his satisfaction, the juror must look upon the individual and particular 
case thus pinpointed as a member of a well-defined, infinite or open 
group comprising all lived-events which differ from one another only 
in the specificity of the circumstances of their occurrence, and not at 
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all in some basic features deemed essential. The case is now tested for 
such basic features, it is looked upon as a purported example of “pre-
meditated murder” or “accidental homicide” and as such it presents it-
self as fulfilling or not fulfilling in whole or in parts the requirements 
prescribed by such a role. “taking something as an example” and “ab-
stracting essential features” are synonymous expressions describing the 
act of “abstractive generalization” or “exemplary universalization”, two 
nearly synonymous expressions. “Abstractive generalization” points to 
the removal of the unique and private circumstances or features from 
the matter of fact; thus described as the representative of a complete 
group (whether finite or infinite) 
At this point some may feel tempted to reinforce the “objectivity” 
of exemplary universalization by some sort of statistical corroboration 
or some other form of quantitative inductive generalization. Or one 
may be tempted to circumvent it altogether in order to avoid accusa-
tions of solipsism and of subjectivism. But the problem is that there 
can be no quantitative inductive generalization except on the basis of 
all three moves described above. One has first to achieve the public de-
scription of a state of affairs in order to have the matter of fact with 
which to begin a collection of instances and one has to do this not just 
in the first case, in each and everyone: before one can collect any kind 
of sample grouping, or even specify the conditions governing such a 
collection as well as the recognition of control groups, both abstractive 
description, abstractive generalization and exemplary universalization 
will have to have been performed. They will confer on the statistical 
sampling and the quantitative induction the frame which gives them 
continuity; the intentions to which they correspond will form the initial 
step and the final arbiter in the classification of any specific matter of 
fact, and hence preside over the performance of the whole experiment. 
Men should not be judged guilty presumably based on statistics, 
but on the basis of the circumstances of the one unique case in which 
they are involved. I am not unaware of the fact that (1) some criminal 
laws specifically differentiate between a first offender and someone who 
has already been proven guilty of a similar crime before; (2) in some 
cases the possession of a criminal record is counted as a presumption of 
13
Chapter I. Fact and Method
guilt or circumstantial evidence; it seems to me that (1) ought not enter 
into consideration prior to the demonstration of guilt in the particular 
case involved, and that (2) can easily be demonstrated to offer no specif-
ic information in the particular case involved, with arguments similar 
to the ones used in its favor: statistical evidence. After all, statistics may 
predict the chances for and against some particular occurrence, they 
cannot say beforehand whether this one instance actually falls on this 
or that side of the statistical graph. The specific instance depends for its 
recognition and classification solely upon the three moves described: 
(1) abstractive description, (2) abstractive generalization, (3) exemplary 
universalization. All three moves constitute formal generalizations, as 
against quantitative generalization which the positivists and the tradi-
tional empiricists take as the only valid form. I have attempted to show 
how quantitative generalization is wholly dependent upon the first two 
steps in formal generalization as preliminaries, and how the third step 
is used in the actual gathering of the few samples upon which the quan-
titative induction will rest. It remains to be shown that in selected cases 
formal generalization needs no help from its quantitative counterpart, 
in order to establish formal generalization as a bona fide scientific tool 
in its own right. 
Here too, the example of the trial serves us in good stead. The 
classification of a particular instance within a specific group, as we 
have seen, involves the recognition in the specific instance of features 
deemed essential to it, – i.e. features without which the instance would 
change completely. For instance, in the vernacular, homicide involves 
by essence the death of a human being. If there is no human victim ac-
tual or intended the act of killing cannot be called homicide. Murder is 
a special kind of killing involving the will to kill. Homicide, on the other 
hand, can be accidental, i.e. no will to kill was present when the act was 
committed. If the essential features of a case involve on the part of the 
defendant the independent description of a will to kill, to remove this 
essential feature would transform the case altogether from murder to, 
let us say, accidental homicide. 
Notice that no specific case has been as yet presented, and any 
number of specific cases could fit. I could ask at this point that the read-
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er recalls specific instances of murder and homicide and each one, with-
in his own lived experiences would go to some news story or another 
or, more vividly still, whenever possible to some personal instances in 
which he/she was witness to, accessory to, or participant in some such 
act. But I was able to talk to this general level only because the recogni-
tion of essential features had been performed already at some time past 
on the basis of instances similar to the ones recalled at my bidding a 
moment ago. We not only perform this formal generalization as a mat-
ter of course, we use it and communicate at that level also as a matter 
of course. Historically, and psychologically, the genesis of each specific 
generalization may have involved a continuous retouching of original 
abstractions: this retouching is neither excluded a priori nor a priori 
mandatory. It belongs to a private history, not to a public description. 
All the public description needs retain is that what governs the 
retouching is the same as what governs the original abstractions: the 
intent to uncover in the uniqueness of a single happening of those fea-
tures which may change without essentially changing the nature of the 
event, and those which cannot. The recognition of such features – the 
intuition of essences – is a special mode of awareness to which a special 
object corresponds: the eidos. Ideally, this object fulfills the intention 
when it presents itself to it “with evidence”. In any case, the intention 
mayor may not be fulfilled. It is not fulfilled when the object announc-
es “with evidence” that it does not fit. It is not an essential feature of 
premeditated murder that it be performed by Lizzie Borden, otherwise 
there would not have been any other premeditated murder since she 
wielded her trusty axe. This is immediately obvious “with evidence”, 
as it is immediately obvious “with evidence” that the attempted killing 
of a human being is an essential part of premeditated murder. Neither 
of these depend upon a graph or a statistical evaluation. The argument 
against Lizzie being essentially to murder is not that others have com-
mitted such an act, but that the physical requirements for such an act 
involve a “human being” acting as aggressor, not anyone specific hu-
man being. “Theoretically” the agent can be varied as to sex, age, race, 
color, creed and national origin. Without budging from my chair, I 
can “vary in my imagination” some of the concrete features and in this 
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manner test them for “essentiality”, as it were. In so doing, I observe 
those features which, when I vary them and they disappear, cause by 
their disappearance the disappearance of the object I was observing. 
Without agent there is no murder; without intended victim – there is no 
need for a real one – there is no intended murder either. 
The “object” obtained by public or independent description, ab-
stractive generalization and exemplary universalization “transcends” 
by essence the concrete individual circumstances within which it is pre-
sented. The lived occurrence: a car almost ran over me, becomes the 
sentence “a car almost ran over me” which fits but does not belong to, 
the particular event it describes since this is ~ event and the sentence 
could serve as well for your event as for anyone else’s exhibiting the 
same essential features. Hence the sentence “a car almost ran over me” 
has a “reality” other than (1) that of the event it describes, (2) that of the 
instance of its being uttered, or written, or read, or heard, (3) its specific 
occurrence in any of those forms in anyone or any many streams of 
lived experiences – by being independent from anyone stream of lived 
experiences. 
This realm may indeed have “representatives” in a specific stream 
of lived experiences – in this case the actual marks on paper or sound 
waves – but it is not in these representatives, rather they point to it as 
other than they. This realm transcends its representatives. It is ideal 
rather than real: it is the transcendental level, the level properly reached 
by formal generalization. to reach this level is the sine qua non for a 
science and although sciences may differ in subject-matter, principles 
and heuristic methods, they all have at least this in common that the 
matters of fact on which they base their findings have all undergone at 
least the full formal generalizations described here and often they have 
undergone a further transformation or further selection as required by 
the specific theoretical precepts of the science in question. 
Classical Physics, for example, requires of all its “facts” that they 
be pared down to an independent description in terms of magnitude 
and magnitude alone. This requirement is over and above the more fun-
damental one with which we began which demands only an independ-
ent description. There is no essential move from the initial fundamental 
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requirement to the more specific one limiting the tools of description to 
“magnitude” only. The descriptions given here did not involve magni-
tude, yet they did involve “matters of facts” as well as universality. We 
were able to arrive at descriptions independent of anyone single indi-
vidual, ranging universally and unequivocally, over all possible similar 
instances, and providing as well the definite conditions under which 
they wouldn’t apply in anyone single case. These are the basic require-
ments – by essence – of any science. These requirements are fulfilled 
by the limitation to magnitude but it is wrong to assert that only the 
description of magnitude can guarantee their fulfillment. Hence there 
can be science when the fundamental demand for independent descrip-
tion and formal generalization is met, whether or not it is met by the 
description of magnitudes. This fundamental demand is therefore both 
necessary and sufficient as the fundamental rule for the elaboration of 
scientific knowledge. Any further demand must therefore be warranted 
on the basis of descriptions satisfying the fundamental rule. Hence any 
science will have its grounding in the one elaborated by attempting to 
meet the one fundamental demand and no more. 
Phenomenology in Husserl’s sense is an attempt to establish just 
such a fundamental science. Its sole requirements are (1) the independ-
ent description of “what is given” or “appears” in a “stream of lived 
experience” as it is given or as it appears – whence the dictum: “to the 
things themselves” and its peculiar meaning; (2) the careful formal gen-
eralization from the actually lived to the transcendental by way of (2a) 
abstractive generalization and of (2b) exemplary universalization. His-
torically, Husserl’s progress from (1) to (2a) is the progress from Phi-
losophie der Arithmetik to Logische Untersuchugen; his path from (2a) 
to (2b) is the path from the so-called Gottingen Phase to Fuenf Vor-
lesungen and Ideen I. The phenomenological description of this path 
is announced in Formale und transzendentale Logik and published in 
Erfahrung und Urteil. These results are used by Husserl in countless 
studies contained in all work subsequent to Ideen I where they serve 
to prescribe rules of description for the writer and rules of interpreta-
tion for the reader: all phenomenological texts stemming from the Hus-
serlian school and claiming obedience to his epistemological doctrines 
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are to be read as exemplary universalizations placed by independent 
description and abstractive generalizations at the transcendental level. 
This holds even when the subject-matter of the description is not 
itself eidetic or transcendental in nature. take for example the above 
discussion on the sentence “a car almost ran over me”: there is nothing 
transcendental about being “almost run over”, yet this sentence is uni-
versally representative for any and all specific such instances no matter 
what the actual circumstances might be. The lived event the sentence 
denotes furnishes the essential features the sentence expresses; these es-
sential features are lifted out of the particular experience by an abstrac-
tive generalization. An independent but not abstractive description 
would include many particular details which would prevent the para-
graphs expressing them from being representative of anything but this 
one uniquely lived instance. This would not be a transcendental phe-
nomenological description in the sense used here. On the other hand, 
a far richer description than the one obtained with the sentence “a car 
almost ran over me” could be given, involving as many of the essential 
features such an experience possesses “for anyone”: such a description, 
although its “lived” subject-matter would be neither “eidetic” nor “tran-
scendental” from addressing to it “questions concerning its essence” 
and hence would place itself and the object it expresses – the essence 
sought – at the eidetic or transcendental level. Such a description would 
be the eidetic description of the essence or eidos of a non-eidetic object. 
The universality of the descriptive method thus guaranteed inde-
pendently of the lived-experience to which it is applied we can now give 
a closer scrutiny to “the things themselves” to which our description 
must turn and ask ourselves if further general guidelines may not be 
gained by a closer observation of the essential features of both the de-
scribing and the described. If we take up again the example of the use of 
the sentence “a car almost ran over me” given above we find that there 
are very many situations in which it could conceivably be properly ap-
plied. We find also that each of these situations could be described in 
itself in such a manner that it would be exemplary (i.e. define an open 
or infinite group of possible such instances). That is to say: the factors 
closing the group have nothing to do with the particular structure of the 
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group itself, but depend rather upon essential laws governing the group 
within which this group may fit. The group “I was almost run over by 
a Cadillac” will appear as a closed group on the empirical basis of what 
we know about Cadillacs and Cadillac-making. This has nothing to do 
with the actual structure of the example which says nothing concerning 
empirical limitations. “I” can be almost run over by countless imagi-
nary Cadillacs countless times: the group thus defined is infinite solely 
because its essential structure says nothing as to number. 
If I were to talk about the fingers on the hand of a five-fingered 
animal, although the number of such animals is left open, the number 
of fingers per hand is not and anyone hand could produce only five 
exemplars of such a group – member the group of which would then 
close itself of itself. That is why six fingered animals belong either to a 
different species or are construed as “monsters” whose odd hand-con-
figuration has to be “explained” by an appeal to a different grouping: 
the group of genetically damaged five-fingered animals, i.e. group so-
defined that the number of fingers it might exhibit ideally is unlimited 
in the structure of the group either in less or in more. Or, to put this in 
a different way, we have removed from the example an essential feature 
without which the example is no longer an example of what it was sup-
posed to represent. Other respects have remained equal, obviously, and 
so we still want to talk about five-fingered animals, but we have to do 
so in a negative or limited way. The “monster is a five-fingered animal 
who does not fit the example in the one specific instance in which he 
is meant to fit: five-fingeredness, but who should, according to other 
indices. And I know that he should on the basis of the closed-group 
of fingers deemed exemplary. Hence the exemplary group of fingers is 
limited as to number in its essential structure, although this in no way 
limits the group of five-fingered animals the structure of which contains 
no specification as to number at all. 
This distinction, between groups the essential structure of which 
is limiting as to number and groups the essential structure of which has 
no such explicit limit, is fundamental to all we have to say here. 
It is based on the distinction between the eidetic level and the 
empirical, the distinction between formal generalization and quantita-
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tive generalization. Quantitative generalization goes beyond the finite 
group of samples quantified only by statistical projection. It is therefore 
at the mercy of the specific state of affairs in anyone single case not as 
yet collected, or any wider group of cases not as yet collected which 
may cause the statistical projection to be revised. This is both its defect 
and its strength: quantitative generalization presents itself as tentative 
and open to revisions according to specific empirical procedures usu-
ally grouped under the heading “scientific” or “empirical” methods. We 
have seen in the previous section that the traditional analysis of these 
methods was not precise enough in that it overlooked the crucial step we 
called “formal generalization”. This step we found to have a use beyond 
that of a preliminary to quantitative generalization in all those cases in 
which formal generalization is preformed on essential structures defin-
ing an open group. Quantitative generalization was found to be a more 
restricted (and within its restrictions possibly more powerful) heuristic 
device which could not be described as the only universally acceptable 
instrument of knowledge. 
It was shown to depend for its adoption on the arbitrary prelimi-
nary selection of specific essential features to be found “in the things 
themselves”: to wit, magnitudes. The step leading to this selection was 
left undescribed and remains obscure even in the works of those who 
advocate it, for obvious logical reasons: it belongs to the realm of for-
mal generalization, not to the lesser realm of quantitative generaliza-
tion. Put in another way, the well known difficulties of Logical Positiv-
ists with the Verifiability Principle stem from the fact that the Principle 
is itself unverifiable per its own cannons and must depend on a higher 
order of concern for its justification. Since this higher order of concerns 
deals not with empirical and statistical corroboration but with an intui-
tion and description of essences it is beyond the realm of quantitative 
generalization. The objects it presents are exemplary in an unlimited 
and essential way: they govern open or infinite groups; they are eidetic. 
In our study of the things themselves, of the describing and the de-
scribed, we place ourselves in that realm beyond. Our descriptions are 
all descriptions of essences, prior to any quantitative generalization and 
in need of none. This clearly in mind let us proceed with the example 
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above, to show in what way the described depends upon the intent of 
the describer, and what this means concerning the true nature of “the 
things themselves” to which Husserl advocated that we should turn. 
Given, the remembered situation in which I can say to myself: “I 
was almost run over by a car”. This happened at the corner of W. 46th 
St. and 6th Ave., at dusk, as I was crossing the avenue with the light 
on my side. Some idiot in a hurry didn’t see me running towards the 
sidewalk on his right side started full-speed ahead into his right arm 
turn. He bumped me in the leg as he was braking to a full stop, and, al-
though he pushed me for a couple of feet, I escaped unscathed with only 
a momentary limp. I was in a hurry trying to get to a bookshop before it 
closed, as this was payday and I now had money to buy a book I wanted 
very badly then although now I cannot even think of the title. Some 
people hollered at me as I ran along “Get his number!” and “Sue him!”, 
but I had better things to do. The man in the black limousine – was it a 
Cadillac or a Lincoln Continental? – was stopped now but I can’t say I 
noticed for how long, nor did I see whether there were people with him 
in the car. I don’t think he was a chauffeur. I remember thinking: “If 
that’s the way you’ve got to go, might as well do it in style; still, I would 
have preferred a Rolls.” 
Given the above description, I have thoroughly limited the num-
ber of people to whom it might apply in actuality. I might even limit it 
further by specifying who this “I” is who is speaking, give the date as I 
did, the place, and the like. There is no need of that for what I want to 
do here. Limited though the group of actual instances of incidents fol-
lowing this general pattern might be, it is still an infinite group since no 
limitation as to number has been specified in the account given here. 
I haven’t even given an explicit limitation to the actual; even if I had, 
there have been many dusks at the corner of W. 46th St. and 6th Ave., 
and one might imagine a particularly dangerous Cadillac driver repeat-
edly going home from work in a hurry and being a habitual traffic haz-
ard there. The first thing I want to do here is to point to this possibility. 
Another possibility is that of an imaginary reduplication of the instance 
described. My description, as given here, is ambiguous in this way. It is 
ambiguous in a different manner as well. 
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Although most people would take it for granted that all I wanted 
to do here was to recount one particular incident of my personal his-
tory, according as I might accent my tale, my account might take on 
different meanings. It might be an instance of carelessness. It might be 
an example of independent lines of causation crossing to create an in-
determined or chance happening. It might be the beginning of a highly 
personal encounter with “fate” introducing a meditation on singular 
divine intervention leading to a religious conversion, a “privileged mo-
ment” affecting the whole subsequent course of a lifetime – such as was 
experienced by Paul Claudel, for example, or Pascal. Hence, while my 
story may be taken as exemplary of a small traffic incident, or as an 
instance in my own personal life without such exemplary dimensions, 
it may also receive other meanings without any change in the basic fea-
tures of the happening itself. As a matter of fact, the “happening itself” 
appears to be one more possible meaning from a series I may intend on 
the basis of what actually took place. One and the same object may be 
the basis for widely different descriptions depending upon the essential 
features selected.
Hence to choose one particular description and to accord it right 
of privilege over all the others is a self-warranting action only in the 
light of what is intended by such a choice. If I want to give the edifying 
instance which has transformed me from the miscreant I was into the 
bigot I now am, and proceed to talk merely in terms of an example of 
carelessness in crossing a street or in driving a car, my audience will 
rightfully ask themselves what the one has to do with the other. Only 
when I begin to introduce in my story elements interpreted by me as in-
dicative of the personal attention of an irrate divinity will the tale fulfill 
the intention attributed to my recounting of it. Some may still quarrel 
with its appropriateness, but they will have to do so on the terms of my 
account, given my intention in telling it, and not because my account 
did not provide for the requirements of the intention I specified I had, 
i.e. in both cases the discussion centers on the appropriateness of the 
tale to the intention. 
The same dependence upon an intention of signification may be 
demonstrated to hold in every instance of descriptions of a matter of 
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fact. If all I want to talk about is an example of a “close call” due to 
someone’s hurry, and I add to my account musings upon “independ-
ent lines of causation” and “indeterminism versus determinism”, these 
addenda will rightly be judged superfluous. If all I am asked is what is 
needed for a police report, mentions of “the Lord” or of “determinism” 
will not be retained by the traffic cop. The incident itself may support all 
of these significations as well as many others too numerous to mention, 
too esoteric to think of such as, for example, the philosophic use I am 
making of it right now. 
Any one “matter of fact” can be the objective referent of an infin-
ity of radiating intentions each offering a different perspective upon the 
particular matter of fact, each with meaning in its own different way, 
(one is reminded here of the old Winner at Jena, Vanquished at Water-
loo, textbook examples) each therefore presenting its own aspect of that 
matter of fact, each doing so more or less felicitously – as per its own 
terms. Between the signification, the meaning, and the objective refer-
ent or matter of fact which “fulfills” or “supports” it, a distinction has to 
be made which is different from the distinction between the actual state 
of affairs and the essential features of the matter of fact. There are here 
four terms: the intention of signification, that signification, the actual 
state of affairs and the essential features of that state of affairs publicly 
described or as a matter of fact. The essential features of the “matter of 
fact” are the “reason” of the series of possible significations the matter of 
fact supports: they “appear” through every member of the series – that 
is how a member of the series is recognized – but they are not anyone 
particular series-member: if they were this one member, there would be 
no series because what binds the series together is the ghostly presence 
of its ratio of the series itself, its specific differences from every other 
purported member would become essential (exemplary or defining) 
distinctions which would prevent us from assimilating them the one 
with the others. The imaginary variations which enable us to recognize 
similitude among purported series-members do so because they aim 
at an ideal identity of essential structures apprehensible when specific 
features of each series-member are imaginatively removed – though in 
reality they remain untouched – and by their removal lead from one 
member to the next. 
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Thus the convert, the policeman, the indeterminist and the phi-
losopher may all agree that they are talking about a traffic incident 
when each is willing to remove from his view of the event those features 
which the others do not share; this does not make this particular view 
privileged over others: it is only what they have in common, i.e. what is 
visible through each but belongs exclusively to none in particular. (Bear 
in mind that for the policeman or the insurance man a traffic incident 
comprises features to which neither convert, nor indeterminist nor phi-
losopher need be sensitive): it is apprehended through each, embodied 
in none. The ratio is not itself a series-member and requires a particular 
view (formal generalization) of a series-member for its apprehension: a 
particular view, that is to say a particular intention, one whose object 
is an essence, an eidetic intuition. The series-member then appear as 
one possibility among many; some of its features appear removable not 
simply because they are mired in particularity but because they are de-
pendent upon an intention of signification other than the one intuiting 
essences. The ordinary intention of signification fulfilled (or answered) 
by a particular series-member must be replaced by another intention 
which tests both the previous intention of signification and the object 
fulfilling it together for features dependent upon the previous intention 
specifically and not transposable to the object of any other intention. 
The previous intention is said to be “suspended”, no longer en-
acted, not yet altogether dismissed, simply held for inspection; its ob-
ject is “put” in “parenthesis”, i.e. no longer taken as “fulfilling”, as “ob-
jective”, as “the only objectivity”, the “only reality” and the like, but 
viewed as a particular answer to a particular question, as the object of 
awareness corresponding to a particular mode or structure of aware-
ness. This “suspension”, this “putting in parenthesis” are the two paral-
lel moves towards the intuition of essences; Husserl calls these parallel 
moves the epoche or the “phenomenological reduction”. The objects 
of such a move are the essential features – those features transposable 
from one series-member to the next and to all – of the thing itself taken 
now as exemplary by the new intention which upon enactment raises 
the question of essences. The “thing itself” is not simply the matter of 
fact which fulfilled the previous intention, it is both that matter of fact 
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in its essential features together with its signification and the previous 
intention in its essential features. Hence “describing” at this level is a 
particular act of signification consisting in the enactment of the particu-
lar intention asking about essences; the “described” as the object fulfill-
ing this intention is a “matter of fact” consisting of both the intentional 
features (structures of awareness) and the fulfilling objective features 
corresponding to them (objects of awareness) which together make up 
the essential aspects of the “thing itself” that is the object of inquiry. 
Because the question here is about “matters of fact” and the de-
scription is to be “public”, the agent engaged in the activity of describ-
ing is nothing more than an accident in an epistemological chain the 
anchor point of which is the ideal invariant to be described publicly i.e. 
independently of purely individual concerns, as explained previously. 
Hence, an essential description of the activity of any agent – an eidetic 
intention purporting to describe the essential features of the tandem 
“enacted eidetic intention – fulfilling objectivity” – will result in the ap-
prehension of features valid for any such agents no matter how inad-
equate performers they may be, and for all matters of fact described no 
matter how wanting the description may have been – i.e. independently 
of any removable particular or singular circumstances. Such a descrip-
tion is perforce reflexive and has for paradigm the Cartesian move from 
methodical doubt to the indubitable evidence of a cogitatio albeit trans-
formed almost beyond recognition by the removal of the ambiguous 
concreteness Descartes’ phrasing possesses which mixes with this recog-
nition of intentionality by itself the ontological recognition by Descartes 
of his own existence (“cogito ergo sum”: I think therefore I am). 
Clearly, the move is performable by reason of the essence of inten-
tionality alone, whether or not there ever is (actually existing) anyone 
ready to perform it actually. The reflective move derives its legitimacy 
from essential possibility and not from actual performance. Hence, 
what the eidetic intention reveals is its own ideal possibility (on the ba-
sis of its own essence) to relate itself in any way to any object whatever 
in a continuing concretion of ever more particular and specific tandems 
“intention-intentional object”. This is the essence of consciousness (or 
awareness) and as such the “ratio” of the series comprising all actual 
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forms of awareness, visible through each, enacted by each, not in any-
one. Husserl calls this structure the “transcendental Ego” to mark its 
eidetic status, and its difference from its concrete and its psychological 
representatives. 
The transcendental Ego in the apodictic evidence with which it is 
apprehended is the locus of all purely eidetic structures of awareness to 
which correspond all purely eidetic objects each to its respective struc-
ture or structures of awareness. These structures of awareness are called 
“noesis”, these objects of awareness are called “noemata”. Phenomeno-
logical description is the description of noemata and the corresponding 
noeses which “constitute” each noema. Just as non-eidetic objects may 
receive eidetic descriptions if they are taken as exemplary, so will noeses 
which do not constitute essences be amenable to eidetic descriptions 
under the same conditions – in both cases the move will be to a public 
description in the sense specified in section 2 above. Phenomenologi-
cal description can range, therefore, over the full span of states of af-
fairs from the transcendental level to the most concrete and private, 
the “lived” level as it is actually lived. The described will fall in different 
categories according as it belongs solely to the eidetic level in its essence 
as well as in its description, or as it belongs to more specific levels: the 
sociological or cultural, the psychological or even the concrete particu-
lar in its essence though not in its description. 
4. Some subsequent topics. 
The transcendental level, therefore, through the language-rules 
used in describing it, is the scientific level, albeit in the sense of formal 
rather than quantitative generalization, which we have outlined previ-
ously. It is the epistemic level at which all truths of essence have their 
place though they may be truths of essence about non-eidetic subject-
matters. If a distinction be made within this level, it must be the one 
Husserl makes between the universal and the general particular in Er-
fahrung und Urteil. The universal answers to the intuition of essences 
which transform the example taken in its particularity and tested for 
generalizable features into the index of an infinite group. The general 
particular is viewed in and for itself as an example upon which spe-
cific features may be varied in the way mentioned previously not merely 
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for the public description of a state of affairs, but rather for the repre-
sentativeness of the item thus described which is still taken as a singular 
item in its specificity. This specificity is representative in its distinct-
ness from other different specific items, and hence “general” in its de-
tachment from the actual concrete and its specificities. But it is not yet 
looked upon as the essential characteristic of a group whose essential 
structures it divulges. A “switch of the glance” – a change of intention – 
is necessary to bring on the view of the general particular as a universal 
essence. 
Below the transcendental or epistemic level (episteme=science) is 
the doxic (doxa=opinion) level at which states of affairs are accepted as 
they present themselves in their concreteness and their particularity so 
long as they fulfill the particular intention enacted, without any super-
venient intention concerning either general or essential characteristics. 
“Things” are taken for “granted” in the unity of their individual mean-
ing upon encounter, and not in the superior unity of the essence which 
they exemplify. Intentions of signification are enacted and fulfilled (ful-
ly, partially or not at all, as the actual case may be) in a continuing actual 
involvement in which no questions of genuine knowledge or scientific 
sign or universality are asked, only the still very sophisticated questions 
about the recognition of specific states of affairs as warranting specific 
linguistic representation. The unitary, the singular, the individual are 
constituted at this level by these intentions with the continuing use of 
symbols (most of which are verbal). 
These “objects” are constituted each in its particularity, but this 
particularity is not yet “general”, it is “singular”. I unite the welter of 
colors in front of me into a single item involving many potential and 
actual experience: a lamp. Or I unite these other objects here on the ta-
ble as: this bunch of pens and pencils. In neither case am I interested in 
the generalized particular: a lamp, or a bunch nor even a pen or pencil. 
I am interested in the individual particular: this lamp, this bunch, these 
pens and pencils. The use of these here may cause some to pause and 
question; it is rather a case in point: I am so little interested in the gener-
alized particular that no abstraction is performed upon any individual 
pen or pencil, all of which are united individually by their contiguity in 
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place rather than by any “essential” characteristics. Each is apprehend-
ed as a member of the group “pens and pencils on this table” through 
the figurative aspects of the group (Gestalt qualities) as it is here en-
countered, and not vice versa: it is not the case that I first abstract from 
each pen and pencil universal aspects and then, on the basis of these 
aspects, define a group – as would be the case in the introduction of 
essences. On the other hand, the doxic level does involve the symbolic 
expression of unities of meaning usually best represented by language 
as the most common symbolic vehicle. These unities of meaning are 
already “constituted”, they are memorated and re-used within a stream 
of lived experiences and form a “vocabulary” (by this let it be under-
stood: “a repertory of unities of meaning” if I am allowed the extension 
of the meaning of this word to include all types of unities of meaning 
whether they are verbal or not: a “gesture” or a “facial expression”, a 
“gait” or a “choice” are all “expressive” in the way vocabulary items are, 
even though in the usual sense of this term, they would not be includ-
ed under it). Hence the doxic level includes not just “opinions” but all 
lived states of affairs in which already recognized “unities of meaning” 
are used, re-used and improved upon without a critical glance. I could 
describe eidetically the intention involved in looking for a pen and the 
essential structures of the fulfilling object in much the same way as was 
outlined in the example of the trial case or in the example of the sen-
tence “I was almost run over by a car”. 
But one might note as well that these particular intentions have 
all in common specific eidetic features which when described in them-
selves correspond to eidetic structures common to the diverse objects of 
each. A deeper, or wider (using this term in the traditional logical habit 
according to which a term has a wider extension when its intention 
is narrower or less specific) intention precedes structurally the more 
specific one as the genus does the species. Behind the “static” constitu-
tion lurks a genetic one involving an ever widening group of sequential 
intentionalities all leading back to the widest possible intentionality, the 
relatedness to an object revealed by the direct intuition of the essence 
of awareness in the confrontation with the transcendental Ego through 
the phenomenological reduction. The terms “relatedness to an object” 
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are purposely left as undifferentiated as possible, the first one thus re-
vealing a mere openness toll any state of affairs whatever in any manner 
whatever as the fundamental law of essence of intentionality, i.e. as the 
widest possible intention of the genus intentionality, all other inten-
tions being specifications (in the etymological sense) of the widest one. 
to the static phenomenological description one must add there-
fore a genetic phenomenological description which alone provides the 
necessary grounding in the apodicticity of the transcendental Ego of 
the discrete tide uncovered by the intuition of essences. Thus, under 
the very specific intention which is only fulfilled by something that an-
nounces itself as universal, the wider intention satisfied by the appear-
ance of a general particular object lurks the universal appearing as a 
species of the general (the general can range over an unspecified num-
ber of objects the universal must range over all the objects of a group). 
Under the general particular lurks the singular particular~ the indi-
vidual which merely announces itself as “an unitary object of aware-
ness” with its particular unity in answer to the wider intention seeking 
out such “objectivities” in and for themselves without any concern as 
to range or comprehensiveness. Clearly numerical groups, general ob-
jects, generalized objects, and universals are “objectivities” in the sense 
of unities of meaning, but they are “special”, i. e. specifications of the 
genre with group characteristics all their own answering to intention-
alities subsumed under the wider one and the ones under the others. 
Nor is the intentionality fulfilled by “unities of meaning” (doxic or 
epistemic) identical with the widest possible intention which we recog-
nized as the “openness to an object”. Between the intentionality which 
generates the doxic level and the most fundamental intentionality there 
is a gap which genetic phenomenology must describe eidetically if it is 
to fulfill its promise of a “strict science” of the foundations. The move 
back towards the ultimate beginning leads below the doxic level – at 
which some quantitative consideration might seem still possible, since 
it is the level of common sense and of the vernacular so dear to ordinary 
language philosophers – to levels termed by Husserl as “proto-doxic” 
the better to underline their genetic function. 
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Paradoxically, the proto-doxic level as the most concrete level is 
the one in which the philosophizing philosopher (or the “psychological 
agent” of Brentano, or the “concrete particular” of Kant and the “man 
of flesh and bones” of Unamuno) in his concreteness “embodies” the 
undifferentiated openness to “an object” recognized as the eidetic struc-
ture of all awareness. This “openness” in its concrete enactment must 
not be confused with the psychological ego which is itself a “unity of 
meaning” of a special kind, having its own essential laws and its own 
“doxic” presence. Whereas the psychological ego (or the “philosophiz-
ing philosopher”, or the “psychological agent” of Brentano, or the “con-
crete particular” of Kant or the “man of flesh and bones” of Unamuno) 
all have specific “human” characteristics and the essential limitations of 
man in their faculties and as epistemological foundations, the enacted 
openness of the widest awareness to what comes is strictly the tandem 
“live-awareness – lived experiences” upon which lesser intentionalities 
constitute the unities of meaning upon which, other still narrower in-
tentionalies eventually constitute the doxic judgement: “I am a man of 
this and such temperament.” 
to the eidetic transcendence of the Ego, therefore, corresponds 
in the concrete, the concrete transcendence of subjectivity beneath its 
doxic concretions. The rock foundation upon which all genetic descrip-
tion must rest is the pre-doxic, pre-egological level of conscious life 
upon which all other levels are built. This level too is amenable to eidetic 
description, although it is clearly not eidetic in the slightest. Through 
this eidetic description, it can achieve the epistemic status of all essenc-
es. There is no danger here of a circle, since the legitimizing founda-
tion is the essence, not the concrete, and since the phenomenological 
reduction is performable by law of essence upon any level whatever. 
The phenomenological method guaranties the vision of the essence of 
the concrete, and it is itself guaranteed by its fulfillment of the ideal re-
quirements of knowledge in the direct confrontation with the apodictic 
essence of consciousness (or of consciousness with itself) described by 
Husserl in Ideen I. 
The problem is one of strict application. We have now reached the 
true beginning about which we were asking earlier. This is not simply 
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the beginning of this or that science, this is the beginning of any and 
all sciences, their true foundation transcendental subjectivity. Our de-
scription must begin here, bearing in mind that the described answers 
the describing, that the object announces itself as what it is because it 
fulfills an intentionality, and not vice versa. Hence we shall have to turn 
from the object to the intention it fulfills and, by careful testing, from 
this tandem to the series of which it is a member, in a continuing retro-
grade progression towards transcendental subjectivity, bearing in mind 
that, the farther back we go, the more the descriptions we will have 
performed will take on new meaning and may have to be retouched. 
Philosophy, phenomenology, is an askesis, the climbing of the Petrar-
can mountain in the course of which familiar landscapes distantiate 
themselves from us as they reveal interrelations we might never have 
suspected them to have. to enact this, or any other intention, is still to 
dance and be danced by the music of the universe. Let each one follow 
his own figure in this, our Brownian ballet. 
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chAPTER II
GLOBALIZATION ANd  
ONTOLOGIcAL FAcTS
INTROdUcTION
Following our brief discussion of methodological requirements to 
access facts, the basic philosophical issue must still be answered con-
cerning facts that are the very arche of our understanding and ontologi-
cal being of the world. The giants of philosophy, all the way to Aristo-
tle contended that all thinking requires principles – archai – by whose 
presence an entire region is delimited for explication. The delimitation 
allows everything in a region to be seen in its essential configuration. 
The most astounding result in their exhausting efforts to justify such 
principles is that they are not only unjustifiable, but that any justifica-
tion is based on these principles. Their knowledge is very different from 
knowledge that requires justification. It is to be noted that they are not 
identical to axioms which compel assent from themselves; but in turn 
they are not groundless, since they are not arbitrary; after all, justifi-
cations necessarily rest on them. They have a necessity that is distinct 
from the necessity of any other justification. They must be, then, self 
warranted to such an extent that every truth claim is based on them. 
Such archai determines the range and the limits of what sort of identity 
will be accorded to an individual, what sort of account can be given of 
culture, and what comprises a social world. Moreover, a given arche 
as an ontological fact is at the base of globalization, multi-culturalism, 
multi-discursivity, death of the subject, individual, even meaning. In 
this sense, we shall have to move through the variety of claims and po-
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sitions to make certain that no accusations could be launched against 
the efforts to disclose unconditional foundations of individual, nation 
and culture. It is also important to note that an arche, as an ontological 
fact, requires a disclosure that moves through strict logical arguments 
and demonstrates that all arguments are founded on the ontological 
archai. too many writings on culture, science, disciplines, cultural di-
versity, technology, and globalization are touching the surface, but not 
the ontological essence that carries these surface phenomena. yet while 
usually overlooked, the archai are ever present and in our quest, will 
provide a background for all critiques of the most diverse theses.
Even a cursory glance at the proliferation of texts raising the ques-
tion of cultural/national identity suggests an issue that has been elic-
ited by globalization, associated with modern western colonialisms and 
technological standardization. There is even a two volume Encyclope-
dia of Identity, replete with contributions on cultural, ethnic, race, re-
ligious, etc. identities. In this chapter the question of national and/or 
ethnic identity will be analyzed in terms of globalization as a mode of 
creation of “technical” (even if changing) standards, be they computer 
systems, internet, medical, attire or the “look.” Various postmodern 
“thinkers” even suggest that despite multi-culturalism, there is a stand-
ardized Western culture both accepted and resisted by the “others”, to 
speak in extreme, although metaphorical terms, the tension between 
“Jihadization” and “McDonalization”. This tension is very much expe-
rienced in Central Europe, among the nationalities that either belonged 
to or were “satellites” of the Soviet Union. Having been liberated from 
the latter, they joined the West, with all of its “advanced” inventions 
and lifestyles. As some writers of that region suggest, the populations of 
this area found themselves “between a plow and a computer”. Having 
rushed into the “computer” world, they found that they have lost their 
national/ethnic and even individual identities: became Americanized 
or at least “standardized” by the European Union. While this region 
will be used as an example, the same process is occurring globally, and 
examples can be found readily in China, India, and Middle East. 
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The development of modern trends of thought, starting, with 
such figures as Descartes, Galileo, Bacon, the empiricists and rational-
ists would require the deciphering of the principles on which modern 
“philosophy” rests. Moreover, the extrication of such principles might 
even shed light on other domains, such as ethics, social systems and 
even conceptions of political orders. A cursory survey of philosophical 
texts dealing with the history of the emergence of modern thought re-
veals a lacuna of the way that a specific ontology and metaphysics were 
established that reasserted the preeminence of power and ultimately 
opened up the irrational metaphysics of modern will. The latter appears 
in numerous expressions, from Descartes’ conception of science as a 
means for the practical controls of “nature” through Bacon’s unabashed 
pronouncements of science as an instrument of human domination of 
nature, through Kant’s notion of Will as “working” in accordance with 
the ideas of reason. Hegel was not far behind when he announced that 
the Absolute “works” itself through history, and Marx called for the 
total “humanization” of nature and the human through human labor 
and technological mastery. The terms “mastery”, “control”, “work”, 
etc., comprise a syndrome dominating what could be called “the un-
derside” of modern trends of thought. At times, the will to dominate, 
to be a total master over nature, and resultantly to be a law giver to all 
events, reaches from Bacon’s conceptions of De regno hominis (human 
rule) where the human must subordinate all nature under human will 
and needs, through Fichte’s and Schelling’s almost lyric calls for total 
human domination over everything. According to Bacon, if there is still 
something that escapes human understanding and power, then the hu-
man is still in an inferior position to nature. Only when all the secrets 
will be deciphered and ruled by humans, then he will be totally autono-
mous and all his surroundings will be remade in accordance with hu-
man wants and ultimately will. It is important to note that for Bacon the 
“secrets” of nature will not be disclosed by close and direct perception, 
but will be “tortured” out of nature by using the instruments of inquisi-
tion. Be that as it may, we still are in the dark as to the arche of modern 
thought without which all these “joyous” proclamations and promises 
make no sense. Thus, the next task is to disclose this arche.
34
Algis Mickunas. SOCIAL VALUE AND INDIVIDUAL WORTH
PARTS ANd WhOLES
Up to date, there are most diverse disciplines that wrestle with the 
problem of “emergent properties” or supervening qualities, dialectical 
syntheses of antitheses, without offering an explanation as to the source 
of such properties. This issue is at the base of modern Western civiliza-
tion and its scientific/technological power. No doubt, historians have 
romanticized other times and other civilizations for having produced 
great technical wonders, but such wonders had very little impact on the 
global arena. West, meanwhile, has opened a fundamental theoretical 
problem whose solution led to modern Western civilization and both, 
to its power and attraction. Hence it is relevant to briefly outline this 
problem and then forge ahead with the current issues of national identi-
ties and globalization.
A cursory survey of philosophical texts dealing with the history 
of the emergence of modern thought reveals a lacuna of the way that 
a specific ontology and metaphysics were established that led to the 
preeminence of modern West. This preeminence appears in numer-
ous expressions, from Descartes’ conception of science as a means for 
the practical controls of nature through Bacon’s unabashed exultation 
of science as an instrument of human domination of nature, through 
Kant’s notion of Will as “working” in accordance with the ideas of rea-
son. Hegel was not far behind when he announced that the Absolute 
works itself through history, and Marx called for the total humanization 
of nature and the human through human labor and technological mas-
tery. Pragmatism is one more variant of this trend. The terms “mastery”, 
“control”, “work”, etc., comprise a syndrome dominating what could be 
called “the underside” of modern reason as “instrumental”. Given this 
pervasive and unmatched claim in history, we must decipher the rea-
sons for the emergence of this type of rationality. The latter is a result 
of a classical debate concerning the priority given either to the holistic-
qualitative conception of reality, where things are experienced within 
the limits of their essential differences, or to the atomistic-quantitative 
ground where all things are aggregates of “smallest” material parts. 
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The problem of the whole and parts is concerned with the ques-
tion of the ontological priority of the whole over the parts, or of the 
parts over the whole. This question includes the issue of the attributes of 
the parts and the whole: does the whole possess attributes of its own, as 
a whole, or do its attributes equal the sum of the attributes of the parts? 
The modern resolution of this issue comprises the ground of instru-
mental reason and indeed of technological conception of the environ-
ment and – finally – of the human. What then is the issue? The classical 
notion of a substance requires that a whole must possess its own at-
tributes, beyond those of the attributes of the parts of which the whole 
is composed. This can be regarded as the natural awareness of things in 
our environment, each with its own essential characteristics that define 
the limits of what something is. yet there is a fundamental ontological 
issue concerning a substantial entity; such an entity can be either an ag-
gregate of parts, like barley and wheat in a barrel, or it can form a unity. 
If the substance is an aggregate, then it cannot possess characteristics 
apart from those of the parts. If it is a unity, then the substance as a 
whole must possess attributes qua the whole. The attributes of the latter 
must be more than the sum of the attributes of the parts. For example, 
water, as a substance, possesses a qualitative attribute of being wet; the 
parts of which water is composed, hydrogen and oxygen, are not wet. 
They possess their own attributes. The aggregation of the parts should 
then be equal to the whole, and the latter should be equal to the sum of 
the parts and their attributes. Since these elements do not possess the 
attribute of wetness, then their aggregation, to form water, should not 
possess wetness. In this case the whole is equal to the sum of its parts 
and their attributes. This means that the basic ontological component 
of the universe would be the part and all things would be equal to the 
sum of the parts. But in this sense, the attribute of wetness of water is an 
ontological mistake. Wetness would have to be attributed to the “mis-
take of the senses”. If one had a keen sight of Lynkeus, one could see 
right through wetness and recognize the basic reality as hydrogen and 
oxygen without any trace of wetness.
If the parts retain their specific properties, then there is no unity of 
the whole. On the other hand, if perceptual experience tells us that the 
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parts are unified into a whole and that we see its characteristics, then the 
parts cannot retain their individual attributes. If they were to retain such 
attributes, the result would not be a whole with its own attributes, but an 
aggregate, a sum of discrete parts. to form a whole, the parts must vanish 
as individual components into the whole in order for the latter to possess 
its own attributes. But if this were the case, argues Aristotle, then there 
would be a destruction of one kind of entity, the part, and a creation of an 
entirely new entity, the whole. This is to say, there would be no unifica-
tion of parts into a whole, but a destruction of one set of substances and 
a creation of an entirely new substance. For philosophy this makes no 
sense, because in such a case there would appear some magical being who 
could pronounce a secret word and a new thing would come into being. 
After all, we are in philosophy and not the world populated by beings 
with magic powers. to make sense, the following points are proposed: (i) 
sense experience testifies that things are substantial wholes and therefore 
there must be a natural unification of parts into a whole; (ii) the unifica-
tion cannot be a mere aggregation, since in such a case there would not 
be a whole with its own attributes, but a sum of attributes of the parts; and 
(iii) the parts and their attributes cannot be completely destroyed and a 
new substance generated, since in that case there would be a creation of 
something from nothing. It is absurd that something could come from 
nothing, although unphilosophical trends seem to offer such nonsense as 
if it were an obvious truth.
Hence the parts can neither maintain their individuality and at-
tributes, nor can they vanish as individual entities. The classical, Aristo-
telian solution to this dilemma is the famous theory of potentiality. This 
theory is designed to resolve the following problem: how is it possible 
for parts to exist in the whole without losing their individual substanti-
ality, and how is it possible for them to retain their individual character-
istics without the whole being an aggregate and not a unity? If the latter 
case were true, then the attributes of the whole would be mere appear-
ances. As one can readily see, this prefigures the modern distinction be-
tween secondary and primary characteristics, and, by implication, the 
subject-object division. Aristotelian solution to this dilemma rests on a 
distinction between potential and actual existence. Since some things 
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are potential while others are actual, the parts, combined in a whole, can 
in a sense be and yet not be. The whole can actually be other than the 
parts from which it had resulted, yet the parts can remain potentially 
what they were before they became combined into the whole. In turn, 
the attributes of the whole are potentially in the parts. Those attributes 
become actualized when the parts are unified into a whole. With the 
unification, the attributes of the parts become potential. These argu-
ments led to a claim that a whole composed of parts can have its specific 
attributes and be regarded as a basic ontological unit of the world. Most 
importantly, nor every part can be combined with any other part to 
form a natural thing. One cannot take grains of sand and mix it with 
particles of oxygen to form nourishing bread. The parts do not have the 
potential characteristics for making bread. In brief, they are limited to 
what wholes they can actualize. 
We must intersect, at this juncture, to point out an arche as an on-
tological fact that is disclosed in this classical solution of the problem. 
The parts become actualized only when they can unite in accordance 
with the essence – or form – of the whole. The potential of the parts, in 
turn, are potential for a specific form and not just for any form or es-
sence. The latter, being more than the sum of the parts is also the “aim, 
or telos of the parts, their “good”. In this sense each thing as an actual-
ized potency, also possesses an inherent value that need not obtain it 
from another. All things, unfolding or actualizing their potential have a 
form that is identical with its good, and both comprise a limit of a given 
thing. The latter is a designation that distinguishes one type of being 
from another, a tree from a tiger, a human from a monkey or angel, yet 
the individual can neither reach the perfect form nor can its potential 
be fully defined: it is always “more” and thus each individual is unique 
in its self-development. Another aspect, relevant for the understanding 
of a culture is as follows: a society and indeed a culture, is more than the 
sum of individuals, since taken together as cultural parts, they unfold 
their potential that is manifest as a characteristic of a whole society, 
and is irreducible to the actualized potential of a single individual. In 
this sense, a culture is an actualized potential of various individuals. 
Each culture as a whole, is a unique unfolding of the potential given in 
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a specific society, and such unfolding has an inherent value and even a 
purpose as aspects of the essence of what a culture is in its own right. In-
deed, we can reverse the claim and point out that cultural purpose and 
value may comprise a symbolic design for the lifeworld of given people. 
This is to say neither values nor purposes are added from some external 
source. We shall return to this issue after explicating the problems and 
the appearance of a different arche, claimed by modern West.
While the solution to the parts-wholes offered by classical think-
ers lasted throughout the medieval period, it was already challenged by 
Arab philosophers who followed Aristotle. The challenge points to a 
difficulty of the potential existence of the parts in a whole. The debate 
continues as follows: if the parts and their attributes in the whole be-
come potential, then it can be concluded that the whole is composed 
of potential parts. yet it makes no sense to claim that an actual thing is 
composed of potential parts. If the whole is actual, then the parts must 
be actual. yet if the parts remain actual, then inevitably the whole is an 
aggregate, leading to the conclusion that the perceived qualities of the 
whole do not belong to the “things themselves” but must be illusions or 
appearances – mere phenomena. If the parts remain actual and main-
tain their attributes, then the perceived attributes of the whole are not 
identical to the attributes of the parts. Ontologically speaking the world 
is a sum of “smallest” parts. In this case the perceived whole, to say once 
again, is a “mistake of the senses”. Given this irresolvable dilemma, the 
thesis of the ontological priority of the whole was rejected, and a theory 
of the parts – atomistic – was accepted. It was granted that the basic 
ontological unity is a material part that cannot be altered or destroyed 
in the whole. This suggests that if the whole is a sum of parts, then there 
is no unity of a whole; everything is an aggregate of material parts in 
space and time. The visible whole and its perceived attributes have no 
objective basis; they do not belong to the “things themselves” but to 
the perceiver. What is perceived directly must have a “place”, and this 
place was designated to be a subject, containing the secondary qualities, 
while the real objective world, was composed of primary, quantitative 
particles. At this juncture there is the birth of the modern subject, a 
container of appearances that have neither status nor place in “real-
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ity”. Everything is an aggregate of atomic or “smallest” parts which, in 
contemporary jargon are called “the building blocks of the universe” 
while the perceived characteristics of the whole have no objective ba-
sis. This means that the ontological constituents of the world cannot 
be experienced, and all experienced qualities offer no access to the fun-
damental reality. Thus, one needs to devise an access to this reality by 
other means. What is accessible to experience does not belong to the 
world but only to the “mind”. This mind does not know the world but 
creates all sorts of “representations” from which the world is reached 
by “inferences”. For our disclosing of the basic modern understand-
ing, this newly invented mind thinks its own thoughts and decides what 
thoughts shall count as relevant for science. 
While the modern choice of nature as a sum of material parts has 
been a dominant trend, sciences and indeed human sciences are in a 
constant quandary to understand characteristics of things that are dif-
ferent from the characteristics of the parts. All that scholars in vari-
ous disciplines can come up with is a thesis of emergent properties at-
tributed to an anonymous master called “evolution” or to “dialectical 
leaps” in nature. As is well known, this thesis dominated the dialectical 
thought of the 19th century, while evolutionism appeared again in biol-
ogy, genetics, and even social and political sciences to “explain” the ex-
perienced phenomena of things. Hence, the modern Western scientific 
thinking is constantly facing its own limitations. It cannot derive the 
more in nature and experience than the thesis of a sum of parts would 
allow and at the same time must accept, due to their own theories, the 
appearance of “new qualities”. As if by unexplicated philosophical intu-
ition they insist on the priority of perceived things as the most obvious 
presence to awareness. yet the preeminence of modern arche – homo-
geneous material world – is never surrendered, leading to the already 
mentioned power over nature.
This “intention” to dominate through violence, dissection, frag-
mentation, is the underlying modern theme. In the German tradition 
this “intention” is quite obvious not only among the “idealists” but also 
among the “materialists”. For example, Fichte claims that nature is a 
human servant. Everything must correspond to human thinking and 
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will. The will masters the “inner” human nature through which the ex-
ternal world is established. While serving the will, all human powers 
are disposed to intervene in, and dominate nature. The human is secure 
and autonomous only when he subordinates nature under his laws and 
powers. Using different terms, Schelling proposes the same process: 
strive to attain such a state of freedom wherein you could subordinate 
every heterogeneous power under your homogeneous autonomy, and 
through it to extend your freedom toward an absolute and unlimited 
power. Nature would become a reflection of the self-development of 
the human. And the leading motive in the Marxian materialism is the 
attainment of technological-material conditions which would allow the 
human transform all, to make all into a reflection of human fulfillment, 
thus releasing the human from dependence on blind events, from ne-
cessities, and establishment of human autonomy and self-creativity.
Such a state requires a total mastery of nature, i.e., where nature would 
become a direct reflection of human activity and powers; humanized 
nature and humanized humanity. But again we must remind ourselves 
why such pronouncements are unphilosophical; for one, we do not 
know what is the standard called “human” in modern writings, since 
the human is also what “we make of ourselves” without any essential 
standard. Second, if the world is encounter in terms of what we make 
of it, then “man is the measure of all things” and yet we do not know 
what this measure is. Third, how can we humanize nature when we have 
discarded any semblance of recognizable environment that for classical 
philosophy was composed of natural things unfolding within their es-
sential limits. In brief, we have no idea what is nature that has to be hu-
manized. Thus we are left once again with naked power of arbitrary will. 
It should be mentioned that for out thesis it is irrelevant whether such 
power is expressed in personality cults or in scientific formulations.
Apart from the conceptions of power and control over nature, 
there appear claims that the human is the source of law, that the laws of 
the state stem from the agreements of individuals. While there are all 
sorts of variants to this conception, from laws stemming from no longer 
understood human nature and rational self-interest, to laws posited by 
the will, nonetheless there is a common presumption that the source of 
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law in society is the individual forming a covenant with other individu-
als. As will be argued later, the initial conception of the individual as 
the source of law within the social context, is extended, due to modern 
ontology and metaphysics, to include nature, i.e., the human as a law-
giver to nature. Needless to say, attendant upon these claims to power 
and control over nature and to the ability to be a law-giver to society 
and subsequently to nature, is a claim to progress. While theologians 
such as Langdon Gilkey would claim that progress is a concept derived 
from Christian thought, the arguments presented subsequently should 
cast some doubts on the theological claim. This is not to say that there 
is no conception of progress in Christian personality cult, specifically 
since Augustine’s announcement of the human journey from the city 
of Rome to the heavenly city; rather it will be argued that the modern 
concept of progress has an entirely different ontological base from that 
of Jesuist personality cult, although both might accept the metaphysics 
of the will.
It must be noted that the discussion of modern understanding of 
metaphysics of will need not include the various views on the nature of 
science, the testing of hypotheses and the resolution of opposing theo-
retical paradigms. Rather, it is designed to account for the foundations 
of the various claims of the underside of the modern tradition, the side 
which offers human salvation, human utopian state, enhancement of 
human well-being, liberation from want, and even of “remaking” the 
human into a more desirable creature. This underside could be initial-
ly regarded as the banal thesis, rejected by classical Greek thought, as 
“man is the measure of all things”. After all, if modern writers keep 
extolling power and control over nature to serve human “needs” then 
such thinking cannot be akin to the classical “unconcerned” engage-
ment with the world of things. The offers to serve human needs are, 
after all, proposed from geneticists through social engineers and even 
to Marxists-Leninists proclaiming the birth of a “new man”. All this 
presumes that the human, at least his arbitrary will, is the measure of 
all things. This means that we are too late to appeal for any other cri-
teria apart from those we ourselves invent and either impose on others 
through material power or submit ourselves to the very inventions we 
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posit as objective. It will not do to argue, as do the Marxists, that the 
reason for the elevation of the paternal image to unreachable heights 
is an ideological ploy by the ruling class, capable of keeping the lower 
classes in fear of the “unknown” and infinite power. Such an argument 
presumes that only some select elite can see through the facade of the 
ruling class, while the population is subsumed under its spell. If it is a 
facade that dominates a particular age, then no one can escape its spell, 
since there is no recourse, no vantage point from which to regard such 
a facade. But if someone can escape such a domination, then it would 
seem that the very system offers some recourse from which anyone can 
survey the system and be capable to be a willful master of it – as were 
the Marxists and capitalists. This is to say, the mastery of a system sug-
gests a reflexive domain capable of surveying the determinant factors 
of any system. It should not be a surprise that Marxism, in the form of 
Leninism, already accepted an arbitrary construction of the environ-
ment and the human not premised on any “causal necessity” but on a 
pure projection of a will deciding what the future world ought to be. In 
principle there is a recognition that all the claims to necessity can be 
disregarded and other necessities can be constructed by the will. But 
this is modernity open to all. 
First syndrome of arbitrary power over nature appears in the guise 
of the subject who is “everyman”. Any individual is in a position to be 
the maker and master of his own destiny by his own thought, will and 
ability to shape the surroundings into his own “image”. He neither has 
a nature, nor a nature to settle; he can become, with respect to the en-
vironment, “nomadic”. This is to say, he is “free” from any place and 
can remake nature in his own image anywhere he decides to settle – an 
image of the rape of Gaia has here become a reality. yet here the thesis 
of the difference between the despotic East and the democratic West 
finds an equivalence: the modern “philosophies” of the West become 
the ground of the nomadic power of the unchained rule over nature, 
appearing both in the guises of capitalism and Marxism, more recently 
called “globalization”. The land of the peasant, the endurer of seasons 
and of natural rhythms, and the peasant attuned to them, are now ex-
posed to become raw material and labor power for the technological 
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edicts controlled by the will of unknown emperors located in luxuri-
ous towers of commerce. Although such emperors might be interesting 
insofar as they seem to possess what the current designation would call 
“economic power”, the more interesting factor is this equivalence. It has 
broken down the traditional legitimation of power by birthright, the 
aristocratic elitism that allowed edicts to be imposed form above, and 
demanded legitimation by “the people”. But the latter are either “labor 
power” to be constructed in accordance with the needs of anonymous 
production and market forces, or are mobile individuals capable of set-
tling where there are not yet exploited “raw materials” for production. 
We shall treat the ontology and metaphysics of “raw materials” and the 
metaphysics that rule such ontology in the next section. Suffice it to 
say that both are silent assumptions, hardly considered as relevant for 
discussion and taken as self evident, although they must be a matter of 
philosophical interest, essential to our modern and indeed post modern 
acceptance of the silent dominance of the metaphysics of the will and its 
resultant arbitrary power.
The appearance of the individual and his assumed right to be the 
master of his destiny, the ruling power, the government, whose in-
evitable centralization was triggered by equality under the law, led to 
what could be called “post-modernity”. One major issue that had to 
be resolved was legitimation. The reason that this issue did not appear 
with modernity rests on the assumption that the democratic revolution, 
i.e. the political enlightenment, will lead to the conception of power 
concentrated in the hands of the people. This would comprise the first 
modern history with the autonomous power of the subject as the de-
ciding factor. The dream of a completion of democratization by the 
second history, i.e. by scientific enlightenment and the establishment 
of a material power over nature and thus by the freeing of the human 
from any chains of established authority, turned out to be unattain-
able, and specifically due to the very scientific technologization of all 
processes in the social arena. As shall be noted, the technologization led 
to the establishment of vast bureaucratic machinery of experts compris-
ing a privileged elitism. No doubt, the establishment is not something 
that must be forced on the populations. In most cases it is accepted on 
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two counts: first, on the all pervasive ideology of scientific power, its 
magic, to fulfill human wants in the material domain and thus to fill 
the gap of insecurity, to offer guarantees of well being that could not be 
otherwise attained. Second, as is the case with mass opinion, the mate-
rial incrementation of well being demands, in its own right a submis-
sion of the population under the control of bureaucratic technocracies. 
The management of complexities created by the efforts to attain power 
over nature, creates its own material power that cannot be dislodged 
by political edicts established by members of the public. The popula-
tion’s demand for material fulfillment leads to a greater concentration 
of bureaucratic-technical power and hence to a continuous diminish-
ment of the importance of the once autonomous and free individual as 
a law giver. Thus we reach a material paradox: the more the individual 
strives to secure his material well being vis-a-vis the appointed or self 
appointed powers of the technocrats, the more he surrenders his power 
to have any say in the increasingly centralized fabric of bureaucracies. 
After all, the individual is not an “expert” and must defer all decisions 
to technocratic elites. We hardly need reminding that the former Soviet 
Union claimed to be built on “science” and therefore scientific experts – 
technocrats – are best equipped to handle all public needs and affairs 
without public participation. The party elites know best what is good 
equally for everyone.
Going under the terminology of “discursive practice”, educational 
institutions (and governments) are emphasizing the creation of tech-
nical disciplines in order to advance national economies, health care, 
competition with others and national prestige. In Central Europe, the 
teaching of humanities, and this includes national languages, cultures, 
histories, is pushed aside in favor of technical training in accordance 
with global standards. While this might seem trivial, yet national identi-
ties are premised on the understanding of local cultures and their dif-
ference from the globalized “culture”. If the latter becomes preeminent, 
then the former will vanish. In this chapter this logic of “vanishment” 
will be explored in detail, yet one of its major components consists of 
the “disattachment” of any specific technical discourse from its local 
culture. By virtue of gaining technical set of skills, be they medical, 
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computer, managerial, the members of a given nation/ethnicity become 
global and in their interests are more “at home” in the global commu-
nity of professionals in their area of expertise than with the members of 
their traditional cultures. They attend international conferences, form 
associations and common projects, and are accepted everywhere. It is to 
be noted that the proliferation of technical disciplines is without a limit. 
Chemistry, microchemistry, macrochemistry, biochemistry, genetic 
biochemistry, etc., all the way to the changing “latest” and “improved” 
medications. The very language of such communities is discipline spe-
cific and inaccessible to everyday discourses. 
The members of the communities of specific technical fields seek 
better conditions to engage in their craft and either find positions or are 
invited by institutions to do research away from their native areas. They 
move from place to place where they are needed and thus settle – for a 
while – in a different nation and among different ethnic groups – mean-
while maintaining close ties to their community of technical peers. In 
this sense they become nomadic, without any national cultural alle-
giance or even political commitments. What is significant is that the 
members of these global-nomadic communities comprise a contem-
porary elite, separated and living apart from general populations. Be-
ing part of the global elite, they tend to promote technical programs at 
pedagogical institutions, thus creating an increasing gap between the 
elites and the local, including their own cultural populations. 
While all this may sound normal, the migration of technical elites 
to “better” institutions or research facilities, to better paying positions, 
depletes the local nations of the best means of developing their local 
“brain trust” and the building of expanded economies. For example, 
among the former Soviet Union members, the liberated Baltic States 
have joined the European Union with its open door policy that imme-
diately began to deplete such states of the best talents. Lithuania alone, 
out of 3.7 mil. population, lost five hundred thousand to immigration – 
not all are of the highest technical quality, but the best have become 
global nomads with high positions in every part of the world. We shall 
address their cultural identities as members of diaspora, and specifically 
the efforts to connect them to their “home” cultures and nations, and 
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point to the prospects and activities required of them to remain global/
local. Some national governments even go so far as to enlist diaspora 
and promote “ethnic pride” abroad, while others argue that those who 
have left for “better life” abroad, should no longer be admitted to claim 
their national birthright. While such debates are significant, it is also 
significant to understand what sort of power and attraction globaliza-
tion offers that cannot be easily escaped. Thus, we shall begin with a the-
oretical problem of archai whose solution and irresolution comprises a 
context wherein all controversies are located.
AccESSING MOdERN FAcTS
While the “resolution” of the part-whole controversy led to atom-
ism as the presumed arche, and the subjectivation of perceptual experi-
ence, the concern is the access to the imperceptible reality of the atom-
ic parts as facts. There is no other avenue except through the subject 
who has to posit a method, and do so self-consciously and critically. 
Descartes, in his ultimate doubt, expresses this search for a method 
which is not derivable from the vagaries of perception, but must be cer-
tified by mind reflecting upon itself. Since phenomena, judged on the 
basis of perceptual awareness, offer no objective certitude, objectivity 
must be guaranteed by the mind in terms of clear and distinct ideas, a 
methodology which in its ideal structure excludes imprecise perceptual 
qualities These ideas and this methodology are quantitative, i.e. meta-
physical in the form of mathematics and, in accordance with modern 
ontology, must be mental and inevitably subjective. This is a reflective 
move of the modern thought which seeks within itself to offer the terms 
of what will be called and validated as reality. While classical philosophy 
understood vision and thought in terms of the visible, modern thought, 
turning back upon itself, understands the visible in terms of vision and 
thought. This subject has no other choice but to discover within itself 
what it will decide to call reality, and the latter will depend on which as-
pects of this novel “mind” will be selected as trustworthy to be objective.
The result is obvious: objectivity is relative to the powers of the 
subject; the world must be interpreted as accessible to the methods 
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which are guaranteed by reflective thought and to human controls. The 
subject has two modes of awareness: the perceptual, qualitative, and 
the thinkable, quantitative. Both are given equally to the reflecting sub-
ject and neither has any inherent criterion to indicate which is more 
appropriate to disclose reality. Obviously, the qualitative awareness is 
more direct and objective, more accessible to everyone than the quan-
titative-mathematical. For most persons the latter has to be learned 
through great effort and torture, while the former is present without 
any doubt. In brief, the choice of one over the other, specifically since 
both belong to the “mind” of the modern subject, has to be decided on 
other grounds. The latter suggests that the selection of a quantitative-
mathematical metaphysics as a method is done on the basis of a will 
to control, to master the environment. It is obvious that if we know 
how to define something mathematically, we also know how to make 
it. Metaphysics, in the mathematical form as a method is, in principle, 
technical. It contains rules of construction and resultantly such rules 
can be applied on anything and force the thing to adhere to mathemati-
cal requirements. But this metaphysical method, and this ontological 
base take for granted that there are no essential distinctions, no qualita-
tive differentiations among the objects composed of the “atomic” parts. 
The difference among composed objects is one of quantity. While deal-
ing with the world of objects, the human does not change anything es-
sentially, does not affect the ontological constituents of the world in any 
way. The human simply changes the quantitative aggregation of atoms, 
gives them a different arrangement in spacio-temporal proximity. Any 
qualitative and essential distinctions have been already relegated to sub-
jective region and dismissed as scientifically and objectively irrelevant. 
Moreover, the reflectively established access to the ontologically 
posited homogeneous reality is already technological in a very specific 
way: it can construct a priori metaphysical worlds – indeed utopian 
worlds – and then attempt to bring such worlds about by subjecting 
the environment and the human to possible transformations. Thus if 
nature is regarded mathematically, then, it is understood at the outset 
“technologically”. The next step introduces a question which is con-
cerned with the “realization” of the reflectively calculated possibilities. 
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How do these quantitative, ideal manifolds can become thing-like, real, 
and metaphysical thinking made into visible reality? Precisely when the 
ideal, mathematical factors can be used for the possibility of the pro-
duction of the calculated entity. Since mathematical procedures are at 
base “technical”, i.e. contain within themselves the rules of their own 
procedures and “production” then, when applied to a quantitatively 
conceived reality, the same procedures are productive of reality. This 
means that mathematical definitions are both productive and causal. 
The quantitatively conceived objects lend themselves to human calcu-
lations and manipulations; by calculating and arranging material pro-
cesses, the human is in a position to calculate and predict the results 
of such processes. Obviously, this procedure requires human physical 
intervention in the reified nature. The quantitative, a priori calculations 
of the material aggregates requires that such aggregates be arranged 
in a causal sequence through physical, experimental activity such that 
the calculated arrangement can yield predictable results. This process 
excludes the perceptual-qualitative components and regards only the 
“underlying” reified aggregates which are arranged, experimented with, 
in accordance with the reflectively instituted calculations. The quanti-
fied arrangements of “matter” allow, correlatively, the quantitative cal-
culation of “material” results. We should be reminded of the fact that 
by the eighteenth century, reality was no longer defined in terms of its 
being but in accordance with “the conditions for the possibility of be-
ing”. This is, in principle, the arche, the ground of modern instrumental 
rationality. It should be obvious, by now, that the modern fact is a prod-
uct, understandable and accessible through the methods that human 
subject constituted.
yet what leads the process is the possibility of increased formali-
zation of mathematical propositions, resulting in the concept of for-
mal systems which can be differentiated into formal sub-systems and 
of splitting up of systems into distinct “scientific disciplines”. Thus we 
have physics, macro and micro physics, physical chemistry, biology, 
evolutionary biology, chemical biology, genetic biology, psychology, 
psycho-genetics, mechanical genetics, social genetics, psycho-chemis-
try, behavioral chemistry, micro-chemistry, etc. each in a position to 
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define its formal domain and to make events happen by producing the 
required conditions. Disregarding the morphological composition of 
the lived world, this process pretends to subsume under itself all do-
mains of the world not on the basis of perceptual content but on the 
basis of formal designations and differentiations. The result is obvious: 
each discipline is ruled by “experts” and each new discipline requires 
new experts whose range of understanding must be reduced to such ex-
pertise. The formal systems can be called “formal discourses” resulting 
from the basic conception of formal “lingua universalis” from which 
everything can be deduced. 
The increased submission of events under human controls to yield 
increasing power for increasing controls is the source of what com-
prises the modern notion of progress. Progress is an inverted process; 
instead of calculating and arranging material forces to yield results, we 
project and calculate the desired results and thus design the material 
conditions to yield such results. But the more results we project and 
the more material conditions we establish to yield the results, the more 
power we gain to establish more conditions to achieve more desired 
results. In this sense it is a progress of technical power over nature. This 
is to say, progress does not mean an acquisition of greater knowledge 
or wisdom, but a constant growth of technological means to achieve 
novel projected material results; the latter can also become technologi-
cal means or a quantity of material force to yield further results, etc. The 
modern human is convinced that every technological application leads 
to new technological discoveries and applications without end. Every 
transformation, i.e., quantitatively arranged material process, every 
shaping of the material stuff through technology, offers more possibili-
ties and power to shape more matter into desirable results. Moreover, 
the shaping of matter into new technologies opens, in turn, a demand 
for other technologies and discoveries. If a technological means makes 
material discoveries possible, the new discoveries will call for their tech-
nological implementation to suit our needs, and indeed production of 
new needs, ad infinitum. No achieved technical stage is adequate; every 
stage calls for new and improved technologies to yield new intrusions 
into the material domain to yield new results. But this is the process 
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which increments the human power to control all events, to shape them 
in accordance with human wants and hence to liberate the human from 
“natural” calamities, from his residua of inner infirmities. Progress 
must be without regression, without death, and all formal systems and 
all transformations of the lived world into calculatively remade world 
are enhancements, maintenances of this permanent structure. What is 
peculiar about progress is that it has no “subject” that would progress. 
Its aim and its subject is itself and thus it is self-referential. Progress is 
its own destiny. All that is left is progress for the sake of progress – the 
purpose of progress is progress. We could say that it is a sui generis pro-
cess wherein the human “evolves”. 
In this context, an interpretation of “nature” as a material stuff to 
be used as conditions for the attainment of desired results, is only one 
side of the picture, since the human processes and activities are also re-
garded as both, the conditions required for the attainment of results and 
as results of conditions. The language of conditions-results and results-
conditions constitutes one of the most pervasive metaphors in various 
modern sciences and humanities. Sociology, economy, psychology, 
etc. claim that humans are “products” of social, economic, biological, 
genetic, chemical, and any other invented discipline, such as psychol-
ogy with its conditions. If we can calculate and establish certain condi-
tions, then we can predict the resultant human behavior quantitatively. 
But conversely, it is possible to project a “desirable” human behavior, 
or in fact human “structure” and to establish appropriate conditions 
for the attainment of the projected result. to note, there is no qualita-
tive human essence, therefore the human is part of the combination 
of material parts that, given different conditions, could be made into a 
“new” human being. While various theoretical theses have recognized 
this state of affairs, such as behaviorism, Marxism, various economic 
schools, they transformed that recognition into a deterministic ontol-
ogy such that human behavior, human thinking, the very human mor-
phology, became a result of “material conditions”. Let us be clear on 
this; such theses are not some past historical residuum: they are the rage 
of all the technical disciplines of today. In short, what was deemed to 
be a “liberation” of man from nature and from natural and indeed es-
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sential humanity, turned around and made man a slave, a subject to his 
own “genius”. It is important to note that the notions of good and value 
have changed. Values are human and appear embodied in the produced 
facts. Whatever we can make, is value, but not a value in itself – it is a 
use value; there is no end of such use values. We have sent ourselves 
on a mad and wild journey, and we now no longer know where we are 
headed. As the saying from the East goes, once you mount a tiger, you 
will not get off. 
GLOBAL cONTEXT ANd  
NATIONAL IdENTITIES
The two major social arrangements, capitalism and socialism-
communism, share the same modern metaphysical method and onto-
logical materialism that allow both to be technocratic. The difference 
between them, at the level of the so called “objective” research, is which 
is more efficient in producing greater advances in technology, i.e new 
facts. Their confrontation is a competitive race to win in the arena of 
technology. Each had distinct features concerning who will dictate such 
a race, a state enterprise or private enterprise, and the ways that these 
two forms of enterprises would have to absorb or dismiss the quest for 
national identities based on culture, language, religion, or ethnicity. The 
Soviet state enterprises depended upon scientific research funded and 
managed by one bureaucracy and technocracy, while the Western re-
search was distributed among different private organizations (or even 
universities that depended for research funds from such private organi-
zations). yet in all variants, the base is the same: technical “progress” 
and training of individuals to become efficient in specific technical 
fields, required by each type of society. 
We should recall that for modern Western civilization, the sole 
objective reality are things, no matter how complex, composed of, 
and analyzable into smallest units. All the rest of human experience 
is subjective. This means that such aspects as values, ethnic histories, 
qualitative languages, divinities, arts, literatures, even nationality, are 
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expressions of subjective desires, images, inventions, results of inad-
equate scientific upbringing, to be excluded from the objective domain. 
Even if such aspects were allowed some status in the objective world, 
they had to be explained in terms of material conditions at the level 
of technical social states of affairs, whether such affairs were economy, 
level of chemical causes, biological drives, or genetic codes. In brief, 
to be consistent, the “production” of culture is based on “conditions”. 
If conditions change, then all these subjective categories will have to 
change. Soviet Union was regarded as the “grand experiment” to pro-
duce a new man in terms of the changing and shaping of conditions by 
“scientific-technical experts”, of course under the guidance of the auto-
cratic and infallible communist leadership which knew the very aim of 
history, equally based on the claims that history moves in accordance 
with the dialectical laws of matter. This grand experiment demanded 
the homogenization and standardization of most diverse national and 
ethnic populations, such that technical experts could be moved to what-
ever location they were needed. They too became uprooted from their 
“subjective nationalistic” or even linguistic identities, and could func-
tion anywhere in terms of their “specialization”. Everyone belonged to 
the new “broad” society, full of promises that this type of society will be 
global. The reshaping of all sorts of ethnic and national groups into one 
new society, and the collapse of the latter, indicates that ethnic groups 
and national identities are temporary. New identities are invented and 
the old ones vanish. Indeed, there are strong arguments that national-
isms, and their identities are, from a broader civilizational perspective, 
abnormal. While capitalism might be different, yet it and communism, 
after all, believe that the only moving force of history is material and in 
principle any other view, such as the autonomy of the individual makes 
no sense in such a belief. Both would have to maintain that any worth-
while future is a continuous material fulfillment. This is comically des-
ignated as McDonalization, where every produced fact is global, since 
it can fit, as a part in the world-technology and technocracy, anywhere 
in the world.
The legitimacy of the production of increased material facts 
through science-technology conjunction is offered as a lure that such 
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a power is for human benefit. More things, more benefits, more en-
joyment, more health, more... more.... The populations, in turn, take 
the technologization as economic progress for granted and exert pres-
sure on the public institutions to “produce” visible results. Failing such 
results, one can justifiably argue that institutions have no legitimacy. 
The populations of the new nations are split concerning their current 
status: some claim that while their nations acquired Western standards 
and above all technical sophistication to have an indefinite variety of 
products, the distribution of the latter depends on the mechanism of 
the market that promises future improvements, or failing to fulfill such 
improvements, on political theatre in various forms, inclusive of rituals 
and above all, ideological incantations. 
The first principle that rules such incantatory fulfillment is the fi-
nal “ideal” of modernity: man is the maker of his world and of himself; 
the second is: man is on the way toward fulfilling this state of affairs – 
whose final purpose is human eternal life in the genetically improved 
material world. 
The market distributes directly perceptual, sensuous, bodily tech-
nologies, offering everyone the means to achieve those ideals in any cor-
ner drug-store, beauty parlor, grocery outlet, and exercise places. Moreo-
ver, there is a skin-deep global equalization in numerous domains lending 
the appearance of increasing material equality. Everyone can have similar 
foods, spices, drinks, even similar looking clothing – despite differences 
in quality – and hence the promises seem to be approximated. Everyone 
is “enjoying” an apparent equality in terms of the socially proliferated 
ideals and looks. “She looks like a million” and this despite the fact that 
she is working on an assembly line. The saturation of all domains with the 
images, tastes, sounds, conceptualities of the good life, lends technology 
a mystical power. Images of an ideal female, ideal male, ideal body, from 
toenails to hair, are proliferated for the “consumer”. This is to say, ideolo-
gy is no longer a matter of consciousness reflecting the material-econom-
ic or technical conditions, but is an inscription in the body, in the images, 
the passions and desires appearing through the images and on the body. 
The idealities of the ideologies are coextensive with the daily discourses, 
daily imagery, mass-media, sounds and tastes, architecture, popular arts 
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carried by vast systems of circulation thus making any art-form accessible 
and “popular”, to be imitated by the activities of the “people”. This is to 
say, there is a global culture that is equally homogeneous, standardized, 
“sexy” and nationless. If one were to check the television programs in the 
Baltic states, there would be ample evidence of global “culture” in music, 
dance, talk shows, competition. Even the music of local cultures is an imi-
tation of the global rhythms, sounds, body contortions, attire and make 
up. At the global popular level of culture, one’s identity is equivalent to 
identification with some super star (there are no longer any regular stars) 
by any means. 
to make the point of globalization more impressive, it is sufficient 
to add some examples from India; it produces and exports countless 
technical experts to various continents and countries. They are diligent, 
industrious and, as Central Europeans, nomadic. But they do not bring 
their home cultural symbols with them and they do not adopt the sym-
bolisms of the cultures in which they settle. They are detached experts 
and accept their assigned role by becoming consumers of the global 
standardized tastes, sounds, looks, advertised in all department stores, 
hair salons, exercise centers, and movies. They are no different in their 
wants as any other Westerner, and the men advertise for wives with 
specific properties: Western looks, model-like figure, at least a master’s 
degree, although a “real Indian woman”. At the “cultural” level they are 
as skin-deep as any Westerner. yet they are most desired as technically 
superior in the area of their expertise. There are some thirty journals 
advertising for brides, and brides, with bleached faces, with jeans and 
saris for shirts, advertising their availability. This does not include the 
countless web-sites that allow women to become e-mail brides.
yet one vast nation, the Soviet Union, collapsed, and there are 
many views as to the reasons for its collapse, but one fundamental the-
sis is unavoidable: its technological progress could not compete with 
that of the West – and this in all areas of society, from food production, 
medical technologies, to military hardware. It might be unbelievable 
that in the most “advanced” region of the Soviet Union, the Baltic Re-
publics, in 1993 stores were using abacus instead of cash registers or 
in many cases computerized systems at checkout counters. Meanwhile 
the images, seeping in from the West, suggested the “good life” where 
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one could get anything, be anyone, look “great”, use the latest gadgets, 
appliances, exotic foods, have private possessions and thus be “free”. 
Above all, the “memories” of the past ethnic identities and national 
pride offered a chance to be separate and unique, independent from the 
great experiment and forge one’s own destiny. Not having been allowed 
to deviate from the homogeneous and standardized technocratic world, 
one hoped to discover one’s true identity. But the latter could not be 
had on individualistic grounds, since such grounds were lacking; hence, 
a demand to have a national autonomy with its own customs, language, 
traditions which, as has been noted, are for modern understanding sub-
jective, and hence could have only symbolic value. yet it is equally rel-
evant to note that even the grand Soviet technocratic experiment could 
not dispense with symbolisms, so obvious in the grand parades, pride in 
the achievements of the “workers” and the victories in world Olympics. 
Having escaped the Soviet Union, the Central Europeans immedi-
ately declared that they do not belong to the Byzantine Russian Empire 
but are part of the West. But the latter has many meanings and thus 
each “independent” nationality had to establish its own identity – in 
very tenuous ways. Some proclaimed to be Catholic, others Protestant, 
still others joined the Scandinavian traditions, and even groups within 
such new identities wanted to become more unique. After all, if one is a 
Catholic, then there is no difference between the Polish, Lithuanian, Ital-
ian, Southern German, Latin American and French symbolisms: same 
rituals, same tradition, same saints to be worshiped and same text to be 
followed. Thus these broad symbolic structures had to be fragmented 
along other symbolic designs, such as language, “pure” history of “our 
people” leading to the squabbles within these nations as to which his-
tory is correct, which ethnic group had been an enemy and which was a 
friend in the past. Good example is yugoslavia which, as one nation, fell 
violently apart – and is still at odds which borders belong to which eth-
nic, religious, or linguistic group. Even little Czechoslovakia split into 
two different “nations”. Only two options remain: join the European 
Union under the banner of universal human rights – become Europe-
an, and have a right to adhere to any national identity, any subjectively 
acceptable symbolism and history. Not that these are unimportant, but 
they have no necessity, apart from their rhetorical appeal.
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What remains of Europe apart from the right to symbolic designs 
of identity is the entire modern Western civilization of scientific en-
lightenment: metaphysical systems applied on homogeneous material 
environment. While everyone has equal rights, the latter are, in a practi-
cal domain, the right to obtain a profession through education, the right 
to engage in private enterprise, and the right to move to any European 
region (and beyond) either to join global business ventures or to of-
fer one’s technical expertise where the living conditions are more fa-
vorable. This is to say, the right to become detached from one’s specific 
region and its symbolic designs of identity, and join the emergent no-
madic civilization of disattached experts whose only real commitments 
are to the technological or entrepreneurial global “progress”. This is not 
to say that such nomadic civilization is negative in any way; it is most 
attractive since it introduces continuous novelties in every area of social 
life: conveniences, medicines, travel, and communications, establishing 
new communities, and allowing the maintenance of ethnic ties around 
the globe. Indeed, the new communities can be among a great variety of 
interests and purposes, or more specifically among the technical experts 
whose services are required at a moment’s notice. In this global context, 
national and ethnic identities cannot depend on geographic locations, 
having national boundaries. With the global means of transportation, 
one can be home within a day.
Nonetheless, two concerns emerge: first, the global forming of 
communities along ethnic or national symbolisms is not the same as 
being in a concrete situation. In addition, such connections are frag-
mented in the sense of being assigned a specific segment of time, while 
the rest is detached professionalism in a cultural environment that has 
no symbolic value. Hence, one is reduced to living a nomadic life. Sec-
ond, and perhaps more importantly, the trend in education is toward 
an abolition of cultural, national, ethnic, and even civic requirements in 
favor of greater technical competence in order for individuals to com-
pete more successfully at the global level. National, ethnic, linguistic, 
historical cultures are irrelevant for the success of modern progress, 
based on technologies and experts, including experts in market econ-
omy. After all, cultural aspects add only subjective “enjoyment” while 
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serious objective life must follow a ceaseless competition for advance-
ments in expertise and creation of “improved” means for the sake of 
more means. In this sense, the Central Europeans, having joined the 
European Union, find themselves in a quandary. The new European 
requirements at the university level, so called Bologna process, calls for 
a shift toward technical disciplines in order to produce experts capable 
of competing for positions at the global level and thus assuring Europe’s 
competitiveness with the United States. In this context, the smaller na-
tions must shift their meager education budgets away from programs 
that would maintain their national identities toward production of glo-
balizable technical experts in all kinds of fields. This means that even “at 
home” the symbolic attachments are being eradicated, allowing anyone 
with competitive edge to emigrate and live an abstract, disattached, no-
madic global life. Even such notions as democracy, autonomy, freedom, 
and responsibility become equally subjective that is completely redun-
dant for nomadic civilization. 
POLITIcAL TEchNOcRAcY
We are now in a position to connect the public’s wish for material 
fulfillment with the appearance of modern technocracy. It was already 
noted that in principle everything should be makeable, producible, and 
the production of the human into an ideal image. This source of pro-
ductivity is, in brief, irrational. Given a complex social fabric composed 
of irrational wants and their fulfillment, there must emerge a social class 
in the service of the state, capable of adjudicating the material resources 
of a society in a “rational way.” No doubt, this rationality is not to be 
confused with any presumed “natural” reason, with logos; it is instru-
mental reason that can calculate the distribution of states resources in 
accordance with ideologically designated rules. What is unique about a 
technocracy is that it is capable of adjudicating such a distribution by 
interpreting the rules in accordance with specific situations and unique 
settings. In this sense technocracy is given a direct power over the dis-
tribution and hence over the material well being of the population. In 
turn, the same technocracy is instrumental in writing the rules, since it 
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is staffed by “experts” on whom the inexperienced political figures are 
completely dependent. Hence technocracy guarantees for itself a po-
sition and, with increasing material complexities, it also demands for 
increasing staffing and expansion of power.
The arbitrary demands of the modern man must be rationalized, 
and with the increased demands, greater and more extensive ration-
alization must be instituted. In this sense technocracy enters the same 
logic of modernity: increased material power, controls, reshaping of 
the environment for human “consumption” is coextensive with the in-
creased demands for technocratic controls of distribution, effects, side 
effects, and interrelationships among the materially achieved results. 
Scientific and political technocracies, stressing the increased fulfillment 
of human want, rush to produce numerous “miracles” and the latter 
bear with them numerous and unforeseen effects. The more demands 
the population places on technological production and on the politi-
cal establishments to guarantee for everyone an access to the products, 
the greater risks will arise with respect to increasing effects. Hence the 
technocratic management of the results calls for a greater concentration 
of power and functional incrementation of technocracies. After all, the 
populations not only want material welfare, but are incapable of dealing 
with the results and side effects, and hence places demands on the polit-
ical domain to guarantee the control of results. This pressure inevitably 
leads the political arena to be dominated by technocratic power. Hence 
technocracy performs two opposing functions: first, it is structured to 
enhance the expansion and distribution of material products, and sec-
ond, it is called upon to control the effects of such production.
It is irrelevant whether the societies are nominally “free enterprise” 
or “state enterprise,” basically their modern direction of increasing ma-
terial power and controls demands the appearance of vast technocracies 
as a faceless government that cannot be held responsible, although they 
have a direct power of adjudicating the political edicts. technocracy 
could be called “material hermeneutics” since its interpretation of the 
political edicts is coextensive with an application of material means and 
material power. It is a hand that can give or withhold, liberate or sup-
press, and thus determine directly the levels of survival of a given social 
group. technocracy is forced into a material interpretation of social 
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events, and by accepting this necessity; it inevitably acquires increasing 
material power. It is by now well noted that the efforts to “liberalize” 
society in Russia are running into a solid wall of technocratic power. 
In the West, the willful productions of the “free” enterprise system call 
for the increased controls of its results and effects and, coupled with the 
popular opinion that the political institutions should enter the arena of 
offering material fulfillment, technocracies are an unavoidable medium. 
POSTScRIPT
The modern metaphysics, in the form of mathematics, and the 
modern ontology, conceived as a sum of homogeneous material parts, 
allows the creation of novel metaphysical systems, their fragmentation 
into sub systems, and their application on the material environment 
in order to structure it in accordance with our “needs.” In turn, as the 
construction and reconstruction of the available materials becomes 
more sophisticated, complex and powerful, this very process becomes 
self warranting and produces its own “needs” that require constant 
modification of human technical skills in order to keep up with such 
increasing needs. Left to its own devices, this process becomes a pro-
gress without any purpose, requiring the functions only of technical ex-
perts. In principle, there are no criteria why this process should cease; it 
only needs more sophisticated experts to insure its continuity. There is, 
nonetheless, a danger which, according to the arche of modern West, 
rests precisely in the creation of technical experts who have no sym-
bolic commitments to any ethos, any community, and thus can serve 
any tyrant and themselves be, basically, barbaric. The question then is, 
can there be a way to reestablish this nomadic tribe in the world that 
counts human behavior and interaction as based on norms other than 
technical functionalism? yet, as will become obvious in subsequent ar-
guments, the self, as already indicated in the classical thought, is more 
than any definition could encompass, and the “self-reflecting” mind of 
modern thought, cannot be reduced to any fragmented explanation; it 
is equally more and, indeed, it is the undefinable background on which 





GLOBALIZATION ANd  
RESPONSIBILITY 
INTROdUcTION
The question of responsibility in confrontation with globalization 
is tHE philosophical question from Socratic to modern philosophies. 
This question cuts across ideologies, theologies, individual and collec-
tive responsibility, and cultural determinants. In brief, it is impossible 
to practice philosophy and not to raise this question. It is well known 
that Socrates stood his ground unto death with the demand that he and 
others have a duty to interrogate all claims to truth regardless of their 
origin. Intellectual honesty was for him a requirement to keep open 
the discursive domain – called the polis – wherein the search for truth 
could be pursued. This means that the task of philosophy as such is 
identical with the maintenance of an open polis wherein all theories 
and propositions can be tested and contested. Hence, when we raise the 
question of the responsibility of the intellectual, we must recall the task 
for philosophy set by Socrates. yet our situation is quite different from 
that of classical Athens. We are confronted by modern philosophy in its 
ontological and metaphysical guises that require a serious considera-
tion whether we can even think of the relationship between intellectual 
and responsibility. It is our task, then, to consider what sort of position 
will open up for an intellectual that would be worthy of philosophy.
Despite some variations, Socrates as well as classical Greek thought 
sought to understand all natural events from their limits (peras). Every 
being is determined to be a specific kind of being by the limit which 
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cannot be transgressed. Whether the limit is located in topos noitos (the 
place of ideas), or is the morphe (the inherent form of a thing) in each 
case they are the very essence of a given thing. In turn, the essence of a 
being is what comprises its very purpose, its Alpha and Omega, its intel-
ligibility such that from the very inception of a given being, the form, 
the essence, is what determines the way the given being will unfold its 
dynamis, kinesis, its dynamics, the shape of its movement. The dynamic 
is intelligible at the outset because it manifests its own form as the very 
purpose of its unfolding. In this sense, every being has its own purpose 
which is its own essence. This means that the necessity of all beings is 
inherent in them. Contingency or accidental encounters do not alter the 
essence of beings. two entities, such as an animal grazing in a field and 
a lightning may collide, but the collision is an accident. The latter may 
be mechanical, but not essential to the beings of either event. Moreover, 
any notion of evolution is excluded a priori. A being does not evolve 
from previous beings nor does it evolve from itself by addition of ele-
ments from other events. In the former case, a parent does not produce 
something essentially higher than itself. It is the rule of aitia, an efficient 
cause, since the result can be equal, but never more than its cause. In the 
second case, a being, as a result of its essential cause, cannot evolve, since 
at the very outset it contains its essence that will unfold to full actuality, 
but it will not change in itself. A monkey will produce monkeys and 
cannot be a cause of something more. In turn, beings have no histories, 
apart from differences in the unfolding of their essence. A human may 
become a carpenter, a baker, a scientist, but these factors do not change 
the essence of what a human being is; they are accidental encounters in 
specific settings. A human is born and will die a human. 
GROUNd OF MOdERN WESTERN ScIENcES
The birth of Western modern modernity may be discussed in vari-
ous ways and under different categories: sociology, theology, theoreti-
cal prejudgments, ontological grounds, and metaphysical conditions. 
These ways of accessing the entire domain of Western modernity are 
undeniable; the immediate task nonetheless, is defined by a reflective 
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requirement. Most diverse philosophical and theoretical trends in con-
temporary West have defined the nature of reason – indeed its very es-
sence – to be instrumental. Given this pervasive claim, we are compelled 
to reflect from it and to decipher the birth of modernity that would 
comprise the conditions for the final emergence of this type of ration-
ality. to speak in accordance with historical hermeneutics, the truth 
of a particular thesis might show up “much later” even if the founders 
of such a truth would not have recognized its presence. This is to say, 
various modern theoretical moves intimated instrumentality of reason, 
even if they have not presented the arguments that were the founda-
tion of their implicit claims. The focus of this essay is on specific modes 
of awareness – ontological and metaphysical – that will best open the 
problematic of the modern/postmodern thought and the subject as 
individual with pure and unrestricted will. The following are essential 
factors that comprise the arguments, leading from one, the classical, to 
another, the modern, modes of awareness. 
1.  The rejection of the classical, basically Aristotelian, notion of a 
substance as a WHOLE possessing its own attributes, beyond 
those of the attributes of the parts of which the whole is com-
posed.
2.  The arguments leading to the primacy of reflective thought and 
hence to the primacy of the subject as the foundation and vali-
dation of theoretical and methodological avenues to objectivity. 
In turn, these arguments lead to a “voluntaristic individualism” 
and the primacy of self-determination. The success of these ar-
guments is premised on the abolition of the whole and the pos-
iting of parts as the primary ontological components of nature.
3.  The arguments of (1) and (2) lead to the conception of material-
atomistic reality that is not accessible to perception, but only 
to a subject as calculating reason. The result is that whatever 
is deemed to be real, must be established, synthesized, worked 
over and shaped by the various activities of the subject. Some as-
pects of this trend are obvious in Kantian synthetic thinking, in 
Lockean and even Marxian notion of the labor theory of value, 
and even in Hegelian conception of the absolute idea as working 
itself through history to self-realization.
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WHOLES AND PARtS. The problem of the whole and parts is 
concerned with the question of the ontological priority of the whole 
over the parts, or of the parts over the whole. This question includes 
the issue of the attributes of the parts and the whole: does the whole 
possess attributes of its own, as a whole, or are its attributes equal to the 
sum of the attributes of the parts? The modern resolution of this issue 
comprises the ground of instrumental reason and indeed of technologi-
cal conception of the environment and – finally – of the human. What 
then is the issue?
Greek thought had brought to light a fundamental theoretical is-
sue. A substantial entity, composed of parts, must be either an aggre-
gate, like barely and wheat in a barrel, or the parts must be blended into 
a unity. If the first position is true, then the substance as a whole cannot 
possess attributes beyond those of the parts. If the second position is 
true, then the whole can possess attributes which are more than the sum 
of the attributes of the parts. Using a modern example, the problem can 
be formulated as follows: either water, and its attribute of wetness, is 
the basic unit of nature, or the parts, hydrogen and oxygen, with their 
specific attributes, are the basic elements of nature. Since these elements 
do not possess the attribute of wetness, then their aggregation, to form 
water, should not possess wetness. In this case the whole is equal to the 
sum of its parts and their attributes. But in this sense, the attribute of 
wetness of water is an ontological mistake. 
The other side of the argument is as follows: if the parts are uni-
fied into a whole, then they cannot retain their individual attributes. 
If they were to retain such attributes, the result would not be a whole 
with its own attributes, but an aggregate, a sum of discrete parts. to 
form a whole, the parts must vanish as individual components into the 
whole in order for the latter to possess its own attributes. Here we have 
a dilemma, and Aristotle offered a specific solution to this dilemma. He 
argues that not only the parts, but also their attributes, cannot disap-
pear entirely. If this were the case, then there would be no unification of 
parts into a whole, but a destruction of one set of substances and a crea-
tion of an entirely new substance. This makes no sense. to make sense, 
Aristotle posits the following: (I) there must be a unification of parts 
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into a whole; (ii) the unification cannot be a mere aggregation, since 
in such a case there would not be a whole with its own attributes, but 
a sum of attributes of the parts; and (iii) the parts and their attributes 
cannot be completely destroyed and a new substance generated, since 
in that case there would be a creation of something from nothing. It is 
absurd that something could come from nothing.
The basic problem that had to be solved is this: how is it possible 
for the parts to exist in a whole without losing their individual substan-
tiality, and how is it possible for them to retain their individual sub-
stantiality without the whole being a mere aggregate? If the latter case 
were true, then the attributes of the whole would be mere appearances. 
As one can readily see, this prefigures the modern distinction between 
secondary and primary characteristics, and, by implication, the subject-
object division. Aristotle, meanwhile, attempted to solve this dilemma 
by a distinction between potential and actual existence. Since some 
things are potential while others are actual, the parts, combined in a 
whole, can in a sense be and yet not be. The whole can actually be other 
than the parts from which it had resulted, yet the parts can remain po-
tentially what they were before they became combined into the whole. 
In turn, the attributes of the whole are potentially in the parts. Those 
attributes become actualized when the parts are unified into a whole. 
With the unification, the attributes of the parts become potential. These 
arguments led Aristotle to claim that a whole composed of parts can 
have its specific attributes and be regarded as a basic ontological unit. 
This also implied other levels of “reality”. For example the state, while 
composed of individual citizens, is more than the sum of the interests 
of the individuals.
While this solution lasted throughout the medieval period, it was 
already challenged by Arab philosophers. The challenge points to a dif-
ficulty of the potential existence of the parts in a whole. If such parts 
become potential, then the whole is composed of potential parts. yet 
it makes no sense that an actual whole is composed of potential parts. 
If the whole is actual, then the parts must be actual. yet, in turn, if the 
parts are actual and retain their individual characteristics, then the 
whole is a sum of the parts, an aggregate. In that case the attributes 
66
Algis Mickunas. SOCIAL VALUE AND INDIVIDUAL WORTH
of the whole must be appearances, and appearances require a subject. 
Given this irresolvable dilemma, the thesis of the ontological priority of 
the whole was rejected, and a theory of the parts – atomistic – was ac-
cepted. It was granted that the basic ontological unity is a material part 
that cannot be altered or destroyed in the whole. This suggests that if the 
whole is a sum of parts, then there is no unity of a whole; everything is 
an aggregate of material parts in space and time. The visible whole and 
its perceived attributes have no objective basis. What is perceived di-
rectly must have a “place”, and this place was designated to be a subject, 
containing experienced qualities, while the real objective world was 
composed of material atoms or parts.
The consequences of this ontological decision were well developed 
by Galileo in natural sciences, and by Hobbes in social and political sci-
ences, and accepted by Descartes as the ground of his dualism. The per-
ceptible – qualitative – attributes of the whole are not only appearances, 
but are dependent upon the internal states of the experiencer. Since the 
atomic parts possess their attributes that cannot be altered, the whole 
is a numerical sum of the parts. Hence, any qualitative features of the 
whole are actually features of perceiving subject. In turn, this means 
that what the subject perceives are not attributes of the real, while the 
real, the atomic parts, cannot be experienced. In short, reality in itself 
is inaccessible to experience. Thus, one needs to devise an access to this 
reality by other means. 
It must be pointed out that while the modern choice of nature as 
a sum of material parts has been a dominant trend, sciences and indeed 
human sciences are in a constant quandary to understand characteris-
tics of things that are different from the characteristics of the parts. All 
that scholars in various disciplines can come up with is a thesis of emer-
gent properties. As is well known, this thesis dominated the dialectical 
thought of the 19th century and appeared again in biology, genetics, 
and even social and political sciences. Hence, the modern Western sci-
entific thinking is constantly facing its own limitations. It cannot derive 
the more in nature than the thesis of a sum of parts would allow. 
The ontological shift in modern philosophy toward mechanistic 
atomism strips all essential structures from nature and replaces all be-
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ings with a sum of material parts functioning in accordance with me-
chanical laws. Therefore no beings of nature have any purpose. This 
ontological conception of all nature leaves one entity, the human as a 
thinking subject, who has purposes. But such purposes have nothing 
to do with the real, material world, including human bodies that func-
tion mechanically. Moreover, such thinking and its purposes have no 
fixed rules or laws; it is basically voluntaristic. Hence human actions, 
directed by will, make their way that is distinct from the world of on-
tologically posited reality. Humans make history as a purposive pro-
cess which might aim at some final end. The latter has been depicted 
by various utopian images, including some versions of Marxism and 
capitalism. If material events are counted in this purposive history, they 
are not ontologically material, but practically, i.e. what can we make 
of the indifferent, mechanical, and purposeless stuff for our aims and 
presumed needs. We know the rest of the modern story as a progress of 
technology and human mastery of the material environment (including 
the material human as part of the environment). 
REFLEcTION
This implies another factor of modernity: a postulation of a self 
as an egological point whose primary activity is reflection upon itself, 
upon its own thinking, and upon its own powers, as guarantees of the 
validity of all claims and the possibility of their realization. All events 
must justify themselves in the court of the standards and rules estab-
lished by a subject reflecting upon itself. Whatever appears to the sub-
ject, whether it is a physical thing, a foreign culture, a theory, or even 
a feeling, cannot be taken as it is in its own right, but must first justify 
itself before the self-reflecting subject. Hegel ended the modern tradi-
tion by demonstrating its ultimate principle: no longer thinking and 
being are the same, but reflecting thinking and being are the same. It 
will not do to argue that various philosophical trends of the last century 
posited various explanations, even of the egological subject, in terms of 
social conditions, material or economic conditions, biological condi-
tions and numerous other claims. yet all of them posit their methods 
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and theories derived from and adjudicated by reflection. Such adjudi-
cation is regarded to be critical and hence objective and universal. This 
universality is regarded as global and should be either imposed on or 
accepted by all rational beings.
The task then is to expound the arguments and basic claims of the 
universalistic – objective – logic of globalization, its modes of construct-
ing self generation and self validation, and its ontological, metaphysical 
and, in the final analysis, valuative and voluntaristic groundlessness. At 
the same time, we shall show how this universalistic trend fragments it-
self into multiple logics and discourses as arbitrary constructs and thus 
abolishes its own univocal position in favour of what current writers 
superficially call “power”. Our task in this sense is to show the other 
grounds for the claim of power, at least in the sense of being groundless 
and arbitrary. This is to say we can show that the very exercise of power 
in globalizing modernity has no other rules or criteria apart from its 
own self reflective generation. The basis of universalizing globalization 
is subtended and pervaded by conceptions that claim to explain power, 
whether social, economic, political, technocratic, while at the same time 
these very conceptions presuppose the self generation of power within 
which they are included. This means that these conceptions are in prin-
ciple the ways of demonstrating the inevitability of arbitrariness and its 
resultant expression as globalizing power. In this sense, power is not 
something that is intended, but to the contrary all intentional aware-
ness articulated in various disciplines and domains are constitutive of 
power that contains the logic of the transformation of the world. We 
hope that at this level we shall avoid any kind of psychological, valu-
ative, genealogical, moralizing explanations, since even the latter are 
equally at the service of power.
It must be understood that in modern claims to universality and 
hence globalization there is a rationality that is distinct from what it 
wants to explain. yet, as we shall show, this very rationality is not a 
ground for explanation but is itself an instrument to achieve ends and 
purposes that need not be rational. In this sense, rationality, as has been 
claimed by many, is instrumental and therefore power laden. All ex-
planations without exception can be demonstrated to be participants 
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in the very proliferation of power which such explanations may claim 
to challenge. What we propose for the understanding of universality 
of globalization and its subsequent critiques is that it is impossible in 
principle to escape this universalization in terms of its own rationality. 
Every rationality that will challenge this universalization will ac-
cept its power logic, and hence will become inevitably part of that logic. 
As we shall show, even the breakdown of this universal logic into mod-
ern multiple logics, called scientific disciplines and discourses, are the 
means by which this universalization proliferates itself and survives. In 
this sense, the claims by postmodernists to multiple discursivity and 
therefore multiple discursive powers is a continuation of the mainte-
nance of modern universalization. What is central for our argument 
is, first, that postmodernity is a continuation of modernity and has in 
fact globalized itself, under the claim that it can save the other cultures 
from Western modernization. It is no wonder that various regions of 
the world that want to acquire identity in the pretended context of 
modern globalization are constantly appealing to being postmodern. 
Second, the various claims to cultural self identity, in contrast to mod-
ern universal individualism, is a variant of individualism at the cultural 
level. We know from philology that in modern West the challenge to 
individual universalism came from Herder who claimed that there is a 
cultural individualism with equal global rights. The notion of individu-
ality at whatever level and its identity remains intact. Third, modern 
universalization and postmodern challenge to it follow the same logic 
and therefore impose individuality and the rights to it on the basis of a 
rationality which, as we noted, is already power laden. 
In this sense, the language that postmoderns propose for multicul-
tural logic, allowing each culture to have its own identity, at the same 
time talk about empowering the other. This is an assumption that pre-
tends that others are equally engaged in power and that all that they 
need is to be granted that power from us. This is obvious in American 
feminist movement that wants to empower the Arab women to have 
their rights to be individuals. What is at issue here is not whether these 
movements are right or wrong but whether they already assume and 
therefore impose the modern universal individualism whether singular 
or cultural in the name of power.
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Given this context our first task is to show how this logic of uni-
versal globalization is founded on various unquestioned prejudgments 
that comprise speculative ontologies and metaphysics without which 
they do not make sense. Moreover, the speculative metaphysics and 
ontologies are premised on the principle of modern Western theologi-
cal symbolisms that lend priority to volitional arbitrariness and there-
fore anarchy over experienced perceptual differences. What we want to 
show is how a particular modern Western theological-mystical posi-
tion has intersected the so-called scientific reason in favor of arbitrary 
construction of rationality as an instrument. The suggestion here is that 
what Max Weber has demonstrated to be the origin of capitalist ethics 
is much broader to the extent that even scientific reason is at base voli-
tional, and therefore, scientific discourses have no other criteria apart 
from the criteria that science itself constructs. Thus, it is no wonder 
that even philosophers of science talk about world making or paradigm 
construction, and even verification that itself has to be logically verified. 
This reflexive circle indicates that perceptual awareness of the world is 
suspicious and that constructed awareness that is willful awareness is 
to be trusted. 
In this sense, the world has to be constantly monitored by some-
thing that is not part of the world, and to the extreme extent the per-
ceptual world would be inadequate and hence to be transformed to the 
higher constructive logic. yet the higher constructive logics have no cri-
teria by which we can judge them in terms of experienced world. This 
way metaphysics of the will that has no criterion becomes predominant 
and even our experiences that would make sense to us will have to be 
abolished and destroyed in favor of so-called logical rules that them-
selves are founded on an arbitrary will. After all, those logical rules have 
no other criteria or grounds in the experienced world apart from being 
arbitrarily posited. There is a continuous and direct denial and disrup-
tion of peoples experiences in their own worlds. They are deemed to 
be superstitious, inadequate rotten, inhuman, illogical, non-scientific 
against God, and therefore to be either destroyed or transformed to our 
constructs. This is how power operates: arbitrariness that leads to anar-
chy with respect to human experience in its diversity.
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MOdERN UNIvERSALITY
It has been said that the modern West has engaged in colonial-
isms in the name of economic expansion, capitalist greed, and search 
for resources both human and material. yet, various indications suggest 
that even Western European peoples were equally colonized by a set 
of metaphysical, ontological, and theological positions. The task of this 
section is to articulate those positions that comprise the conditions for 
understanding the universal globalization that would subject not only 
the others but also the globalizing peoples. This is to say, we want to de-
cipher the underlying intentionalities, the ways of looking at the world 
that became regarded as universal objective, scientific, and therefore 
dependable on methods and theories that are accessible to every think-
ing human anywhere and anytime. 
to form this logic, the modern philosophical-scientific arguments 
require the rejection of the experienced perceptual world as untrust-
worthy, qualitatively ambiguous, and therefore requiring strict rules as 
methodologies by which to interpret the true reality. Without going to 
the protracted arguments in the Arab world concerning the primacy of 
wholes over parts we shall simply presuppose the modern assumption 
that any perceptual awareness has to be excluded from scientific and 
philosophical explanations in order to give a true account of reality be-
yond all senses. This is to say that sense awareness and its distinctions 
are to be excluded from scientific considerations. This means that hu-
man experience must be disregarded and its existence must be placed 
in an area which is scientifically irrelevant. This area is designated as 
subjective. What is left apart from this area is an objective method that 
demands certain features of the world to correspond to the objective 
method. As has been noted from Descartes to Kant, the objective meth-
od, as a priori is formal and includes logic and mathematics. Therefore, 
everything that has to be understood scientifically must correspond to 
formal and quantitative rules. In this sense, whatever we deal with, in 
science, must be quantifiable and therefore measurable. What we are 
pointing to is the presumption of the primacy of methodology and, by 
extension, theory over perceptual experience. Since formal quantitative 
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method must exclude anything that is qualitative, then whatever would 
count as objective would have to correspond to the quantitative meth-
ods: measurable matter that disregards any qualitative difference. This 
is the point at which the modern subject is invented. He is the possessor 
of qualitative experiences, but in order to be scientific he must also use 
the quantitative formal methods to deal with the measurable reality. 
The first problematic that arises for this modern subject consists of 
a contradiction. The measurable material reality is posited to be objec-
tive, homogenous, and yet the method as formal mathematical is not 
an aspect or part of this homogenous material reality. Since the latter 
is posited as the only existence and everything else is designated to be 
subjective, then the scientific formal and quantitative methods must be 
equally subjective. In this sense, we come to a clash between objective, 
material, homogenous reality, and a method of science that has no ob-
jective validity. The sole solution to this problem had to take on the 
following structure: the subject constructs theories and methods to be 
tested in material reality. But the subject has no criteria by which to 
judge which constructed method is the correct one. Being subjective, 
they have to be adjudicated on the basis of objectivity which is percep-
tually inaccessible. Since the imperceptible objectivity depends on the 
constructed methodology which is inevitably subjective, then the only 
way to deal with this objectivity is in terms of subjective constructs. 
Our point here is that there is no way to demonstrate at this level how 
the subjectively constructed methods connect to the posited objectivity, 
i.e. the material reality. While the latter is posited as objective, it is also 
regarded as incapable of implying formal quantitative methodologies. 
In turn, these methodologies do not imply any empirical perception of 
this material reality directly, since by definition our direct perceptions 
are qualitative and therefore subjective. 
In both cases, whether we start with the posited materiality as 
measurable, or whether we start with the subjective methodologies, 
we have not shown the connections between the two. The reason that 
the connection cannot be shown is that the qualitative experience that 
indicates the direct awareness of the difference among things, differ-
ences that are more than the sum of the material parts, is reduced to 
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qualitative subjective experience, while the sum of measurable parts is 
posited as the objective reality, thus constituting the principal differ-
ences between subject and object. Our concern is this: given that ob-
jectivity is the sum of material parts and, by implication, everything 
else is subjective, then the formal and quantitative methods are equally 
subjective and therefore there is no connection between the subjective 
methods and the sum of the material objective parts. In this sense, there 
has to be an account by virtue of some median aspect that would al-
low us understand how the posited objective material sum of parts can 
be connected to the subjective formal quantitative methodology. The 
modern issue here is one of mediation that goes from Descartes to He-
gel and Marx, into the contemporary issues of the in-between domain 
the mediation. The point of principle that we want to articulate is how 
Western modern scientific logic proclaimed to be universal globaliz-
ing logic this issue of mediation. At one level it offered the notion that 
the connection between the subjective formal quantitative and the pure 
material homogeneous some of parts is through application of method 
to “objective reality”. 
The application is regarded as experimental testing of hypothesis 
in correlation to reality. The very testing means intervention. There is 
no notion of direct method that looks at the way things are but rather 
applying and testing means that somehow we must intervene in order 
to avoid our perceptual awareness and therefore to construct the so-
called imperceptible material reality in terms of our methodological 
that is subjective structures. In that sense, we give priority to the meth-
odological structures that require our intervention in order to construct 
the so-called material reality in accordance with our own subjective 
methods. It is no doubt that Kant drew the right conclusion: objectiv-
ity is synthesized by subjective a priori conditions. This means that we 
have modern science that connects different domains by a mediation 
which is our activity of applying the subjectively constituted logics and 
methods on the indifferent homogenous materiality. Here at this level 
emerges a mediation that is neither the methodological, so-called for-
mal quantitative rational, nor the so-called material homogenous sum 
of parts, but a dimension that ranges between the two of them and has 
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no criteria how to apply the formal to the material. This is the first in-
timation of a constructive process that emerges as the modern will. It 
becomes a selective process that has not posited anything apart from its 
own self generation.
This point of mediation has been called by modern philosophers 
“autonomy” suggesting that every formal and quantitative rule is con-
structed without any conditions, that is has no cause. In this sense, the 
material world subjected to those rules can be transformed without any 
question concerning the traditionally known categorical differences 
among experienced limits of things. In fact, the formal and quantitative 
rules do not have within their own compositions any criteria for making 
such distinctions, thus they can be applied on everything indifferently. 
At the same time, the material world, the extended substance, must be 
regarded as homogenous and, therefore, constructable in accordance 
with the invented rules. What is at issue at this level is the choice of 
formal and quantitative rules over qualitative categorical distinctions. 
Since both are by modern definitions subjective, then there is no inher-
ent criterion why one would be more objective than the other. We must 
look for an account within the very composition of those invented rules. 
First, it can be argued that it is impossible to gain any advantage over 
the environment on the grounds of categorical, qualitative distinctions. 
Second, it is also the case that formal and quantitative rules comprise 
within their own structures techniques for transforming the material 
environment. This way the choice of formal quantitative rules already 
implies the choice of instrumentality and the possibility for application. 
The modern sciences whose theories and methods are framed within 
formal and quantitative structures are in principle technical. This is the 
reason why any scientific discipline that cannot be technically tested 
is not regarded to be scientific. This is another reason that all modern 
scientific and philosophical theories are premised on arbitrary power.
We have reached the point where the construction of methods 
that have no other criteria apart from being technical requires the pro-
cess of application of scientific methods. While we have such methods, 
they have to be connected to the material homogenous world. This con-
nection is provided by various theories, yet all theories assume body 
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activity as a mediation through which scientific methods are applied. At 
this level is born what is known as human as a tool maker, as homo labo-
rans, as practical man, including the primacy of pragmatism. This is to 
say body becomes a sight which must be constituted in accordance with 
the abilities required of scientific application. This is to say such bodies 
must slowly become technical, productive, efficient, rule-bounded, and 
perhaps fragmented into diverse functions. At the outset we may note 
that the medium as body activity takes precedence over body as simple 
physiological object. The latter will be judge on the basis of its abilities 
or disabilities to perform technical functions. What is of theoretical im-
portance is that this required mediation precludes in principle to access 
the world as it is in itself. We propose that this is the reason for Kant’s 
claim that “the thing in itself” is unknowable. Any effort to deal with the 
world of direct experience is deflected toward active intervention and 
manipulation of the environment in terms of our own invented formal 
and quantitative rules.
The globalizing process that promises to improve everyone’s life 
and to bring liberation to all peoples from want and oppression is prem-
ised on claim to universality of this technical active intervention in the 
world. This intervention at the same time requires that all peoples any-
where and anytime must also engage in reducing their environments to 
required material resources for technical transformation and exploita-
tion. The term we used “liberation” was at times replaced by humaniza-
tion in a sense that we as natural beings in a natural environment are 
subjected to forces that are not under our control. That is they are alien 
and inhuman. Therefore, once the environment and our own lives are 
subjected to the scientific methods and their way of transforming the 
environment and us, then we shall reach a human stage which liberates 
us from natural necessities. At this level, this universal claim provides a 
rationale for teleology and progress. The teleology proposes that there 
is a stage in which man will be a total master of the environment and 
himself and this then provides a standard on the basis on which others, 
those who have not yet joined human history will have to judge their 
positions and lives as inferior. This is the logic that is offered by numer-
ous organizations caught in theories of development.
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The universal claim to this construct that has equally become a 
logic of globalization is the ground of various theories of power. At 
the outset, the very instrumentalization of method and theory applied 
through the mediation of body activity on the material homogenized 
world has an implicit premise: the increasing application of our meth-
ods and the transformation of the environment in terms of our own 
controls lead to an increasing ability to master and control domains 
of the environment and, therefore, to acquire greater power over the 
environment and ourselves. It is to be recalled that the methods and 
theories are not given objectively but are constructed as instruments 
to reshape the environment, and as instruments they are at the service 
of autonomous will. The latter sets its own criteria for increased mas-
tery and therefore increased power to master; all discourses are power 
laden. We have reached a position of the metaphysics of the will that, 
while generating itself, it generates the very rules by which the world is 
to be constructed. This self generation of itself and rules is the ground 
of modern anarchy and “human divine complex”. After all, only divini-
ties create themselves and the laws by which the world is constructed. 
Abolishing all the experienced limits, this will is an arbitrary source and 
power that abolishes all limits by its reductive and homogenizing meta-
physics.
ModeRn WesteRn UNIvERSAL IdENTITY
Postmodern texts inclusive of deconstructive logics have pro-
claimed the death of identity and specifically the identity of the subject. 
The problem is that they were not seriously concerned with what is the 
subject that was challenged. Based on our previous notions of scientific 
method and reconstruction of the world in favor of humanity there is 
the background subject that has no pregiven definitions. The modern 
subject that has been universalized in various pronouncements that 
include the United Nations’ universal human rights, both individual 
and cultural, and postmodern claims that demand respect for different 
cultural styles to self determination are premised on a modern under-
standing of subject as self generating. At the dawn of Western moderni-
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ty, Pico de la Mirandolla has announced that the human has no nature, 
has no essence, has no rules by which to live, and therefore whatever 
nature the human will posses whatever rules will be followed whether 
scientific or political will have to be invented as if “out of nothing”. 
This is an initial suggestion that the modern subject intends to be 
self created without any other conditions, including theological, scien-
tific, and ontological to the extent that the very distinctions between 
those terms are equally invented without precedence. This is the inten-
tionality that comprises the background for the articulation of what a 
human is as self created, a being with divine complex. Therefore, there 
is no pregiven subject that can be used as a criterion to determine what 
human subject is. Even Descartes could not avoid this intentionality 
when he argued that despite the power of an evil genius, it cannot do an-
ything against the fact that I constitute my own thoughts prior to truth 
and falsity. In short, the subject here escapes even and infinite power. 
The subject is posited as totally self constituting without any conditions 
or to speak with Kant, an unconditional subject. It seems that at this 
level, the constitution of modern subject has no essential criteria that 
would be used to judge what the subject is as identity. This type of self 
creative subject is totally autonomous, and its autonomy creates uncon-
ditional methods and theories that then through an autonomous will 
can create its own environment. One aspect of this creation is scientific 
methodology and technology. What we are pointing to is that while this 
unconditional subject is also the telos of modern Western science and 
philosophy. As Marx inadvertently noted, the future man, having gone 
through the labor of transforming the environment and the human in 
accordance with rules of total mastery of total nature such as a human, 
will be in a position to be totally self created. Hence, the beginning of 
modernity is equally its telos where the logic of self creation of the sub-
ject subtends the scientific, the social, the political theories that play a 
role of establishing the conditions for this “subject”. 
At this level, we reach once again the principle on the basis of 
which the Others of other parts of the world are to judge themselves 
whether they have established the conditions that would allow them to 
be free form all the blind material natural forces and be in a position 
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not only to master such forces, but to create those forces in order to 
allow the human to use them for self creation. This is the subject as sui 
generis and the final reason for human history. In this sense, the efforts 
to deconstruct this kind of self generating subject may fail because the 
subject at the outset does not have any identity. It promises the un-
conditional condition for everyone to acquire self identity, to become 
any identity you choose. This way, the postmodern logic is premised 
on the modern autonomous subject. The postmodern logic in principle 
claims that all cultural identities, including our own, have no causal, 
natural, supernatural necessitation, but are pure rhetorical constructs. 
This means that they still accept the self creation of the modern subject 
that invents its own logic for mastery of its own world and for self defi-
nition. The egological self definition is only one among the options. The 
postmodern globalization assumes this universal self generating sub-
ject that invents different cultures without any natural, material, psy-
chological conditions. After all, postmodernity claims that everything 
is a construct. The very notion of a construct is premised on modern 
autonomous unconditional subject. This subject is universalized as the 
possibility of identity for anyone. That is anyone can create of himself 
or herself whatever they want. 
Of course there is no one specific identity that is offered, but only 
the process by which everyone can either invent their identities or ac-
cept the identities offered by their cultures. This is to say it is impossible 
for any culture to claim that it has an identity without having accepted 
the logic of choice between the right of every individual to make his/
her own identity, or the right of a particular group to respect their own 
identity. The globalizing universality of the modern subject is being 
proliferated by postmodernity in such a way that the others in their 
own self reflection upon who they are, are already placed in a context 
wherein they must play out their lives, between what they can be as 
universal individuals or what they can maintain as members of their 
culture. The autonomous self creating subject that is being globalized 
as universal has become a background on which the Others as cultur-
ally different would be inscribed with their own rights to maintain their 
culture as singular, individual, unique, with a right to self preservation. 
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This self preservation is a phenomenon that has no basis in any onto-
logical, metaphysical, or theological claims since all these are equally 
unconditional cultural inventions. Therefore, they will have to be ad-
judicated in power confrontations each calling for the maintenance of 
its own position as means to preserve a cultural identity. Nonetheless, 
in principle it is impossible to say what the limits are to this self crea-
tion syndrome and hence no definition can be offered concerning the 
criteria by which we can treat one another. Resultantly, modern West, 
on the basis of its own ontology and metaphysics of the will, cannot 
constitute intellectual responsibility for itself and for the others. Some 
of the intellectuals, engaged in helping the others in development, fol-
low the same globalizing logic of willful destruction – and do so on a 
hidden premise of evolution: the others are on a lesser level of evolution 
and hence have to be brought up to modern instrumental rationality by 
discarding their outdated myths and modes of life. 
MULtIPLICIty OF CULtURES AND DISCOURSES
Cultural anthropology has to contend with the following issues, 
specifically ones that require methodological access to the cultural phe-
nomena and their multiplicity, and the presumed objectivity which is 
required as a guarantee to truth claims by theorists of culture. First, 
there is a claim that any member of a given group belongs to and under-
stands itself within and in terms of its own culture. But this would mean 
that there cannot be any privileged persons who could “escape” their 
own cultural understanding in order to see it from “outside”. How does 
one “alienate” oneself from one’s culture, if the very culture regards it-
self as alienating? One is already stuck in a cultural position and hence 
cannot claim to have any culturally impartial attitude. Indeed, the very 
comprehension of impartiality is an aspect of a given culture. Second, 
the major solution to this issue may be offered by some of the major 
comparative theories. The latter want to argue that it is possible to un-
derstand one’s own culture from the vantage point of comparison with 
another culture. This suggests that one knows another culture by being 
immersed in it and hence having obtained a similar comprehension as 
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the “natives”. This is to say, from this position one may claim that it is 
possible to see one’s own culture in terms of the limits that the other 
culture offers. The other culture is, after all, radically different, and we 
understand ourselves and the other in terms of the difference. 
Given this complex claim, it is impossible to offer a methodology 
that would allow us understand our own culture, since, seen from the 
culture of the other, our culture is already incorporated and interpreted 
in terms of the other culture. This means that either one picks up an-
other culture as a limit of one’s own and interprets it in terms of one’s 
own cultural grammar and hence has not escaped the problem of seeing 
one’s culture at its limit, or one adopts the other culture and translates 
one’s own culture in terms of the grammar of the other culture. In nei-
ther case has one gained any methodological access to one’s own, and 
indeed to the other’s culture. to speak pedagogically, if I am going to 
lecture on another culture, and claim that it is radically different from 
my own, I shall do so in terms of my language that is comprehensible 
to the audience to which I am communicating. Both, the audience and 
I understand the other culture by giving it our own cultural context and 
grammar of interpretation. The same can be said in reverse, when talk-
ing in terms of the other culture about our culture; in this case what we 
would get is the other’s incorporation of our culture into their context 
and grammar, and hence without offering anything more than their cul-
tural frame – but comprehensible only to those who are part of, or have 
been immersed in the culture of the other. Third, we face, what could 
be called the hysteria of objectivity. By “hysteria” I mean the shock that 
objectively speaking other cultures have to be treated as equivalent to 
our own, leading to the efforts that deny other cultures their due and 
right to speak. This is to say, the scientific modern Western pronounce-
ment that everything has to be treated with objective impartiality, re-
quires the positing of our own culture as one among others, having no 
value claim to be privileged in its various pronouncements. But this 
is the hysterical point: the claim to scientific objectivity is one aspect 
of Western modern culture and belongs to the interpretive context of 
this culture. Hence, the very claim to Western scientific superiority as 
having methods to access all phenomena objectively, is a culture bound 
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position that cannot be universal. After all, “objectively speaking” other 
cultures, as equal, have very different understandings that do not in-
clude such tandems as “objectivity” or for that matter “subjectivity”. 
Culturally objectively speaking, we cannot deny them their differ-
ent reading of cultural, and indeed all other, phenomena. to say that the 
others are wrong would be tantamount to saying that we have a criterion 
of the “right culture” which belongs only to one culture. But in this sense, 
one abolishes the treatment of other cultures as given objectively and 
equivalently. We then would posit our culture as universal and require 
that all others interpret themselves in terms of our own requirements. 
yet, by the claim of treating all other cultures objectively and without 
prejudice, we have just offered a position that requires (1) the treatment 
of other cultures not as they are but as they are interpreted in terms of 
one culture’s requirements, or (2) of surrendering our cultural prejudice 
of objectivity, and allowing other cultures their modes of awareness that 
do not regard themselves as either objective or subjective. Given this set-
ting, we revert back to the problematic mentioned above: how can one 
claim to know the other “objectively” when one has imposed one’s own 
cultural component of “objectivity” on others and hence not only did not 
understand the other culture, but failed to escape one’s own culture. In 
this sense, the very claim to be able to treat one’s own culture objectively, 
is to accept this very culture without any “objectivity”, since one already 
lives and accepts the terms of their own culture.
Given this problematic, we can note the minor variations that 
face the same nonsensical dilemmas. Various Western critical cultur-
al movements posit implicit valuative postures that seem to show the 
limits of our own and those of other peoples’ cultures. The limits rest 
with the claim of cultural relativism. By the very logic of being culture 
bound, any claim to cultural relativism becomes an aspect of one cul-
ture and thus ceases to be a universal necessity. Moreover, the limit is 
also reached with the tacit assumption that despite their radical differ-
ences, all cultures are human. If this assumption were not present, then 
we would end up in a position wherein each culture defines its own 
members in a unique way such that what is human in one need not be 
human in another – indeed in some cultures there may not be “humans” 
82
Algis Mickunas. SOCIAL VALUE AND INDIVIDUAL WORTH
at all, since they may not have such terms as “human”. But if the claim 
is made that despite variations all cultures are human, then we have to 
admit an awareness of ourselves and others as human. This awareness 
has not been articulated in modern/postmodern philosophies.
We have reached a point at which every culture is regarded to be 
self generating without any ontological, metaphysical, or theological 
grounds. This is to say the modern globalizing position led to the con-
clusion that all discourses are autonomously constituted and, therefore, 
are equivalent to one another. After all, there are no criteria external 
to such discourses which will allow the adjudication among them con-
cerning any truth claims. If there is anything common among them, it 
is their difference. Given this level, the theories that at times are paraded 
inadvertently such that a discourse somehow represents something are 
no longer maintainable. But this also implies that there is no misrep-
resentation. A particular discourse that frames a cultural world view is 
in no position to either represent the Others or to misrepresent them. 
The only thing that can be suggested is that each discourse inclusive 
of cultural discourses, will interpret Others within the parameters of a 
giving discourse. This is of course premised on the basis of the abolition 
of an essential presence of a subject or a structure of the world. But this 
essentialism has been already destroyed by the assumption that even 
the modern subject has no essence, but must make of himself in terms 
of the very discourses that he will invent. In this sense, the multicultural 
proposition is not premised on a pregiven essentialism, but in fact is 
constituted on the globalizing modern self destruction of an essential 
subject. The only criterion of this globalizing self invention, both of the 
individual subjectivity and multicultural identities is its practical effi-
ciency. It is not a question of the nature of the world, or the essence of 
the subject, but a view toward what works given that a particular people 
will be offered practical solutions to whatever they think the are lacking 
in their lives, or what they are told what they lack in their lives.
For multiculturalism the question that must be addressed is 
whether a given culture with its own constituted discourses has the 
same practical global needs that the globalizing autonomy is offering. 
This is to say, does a particular cultural discourse allow the definition of 
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the environment to be reduced to homogenous resources for arbitrary 
reconstruction? The first limit of modern non-essential conception of 
total and unconditional possibility of inventing any discourse for the 
sake of applying it for “human needs” may be given in the discours-
es of Other cultures. In order to set a limit for globalizing modernity, 
we must demonstrate that within the logic of this globalization there 
is also a reflective recognition that it as invented culture must respect 
the equivalences of other invented cultures without any other criteria 
apart from those that each cultural discourse possesses within itself. 
This means that if another culture has a different ontology and even 
metaphysics then there are no reasons why that ontology of metaphys-
ics should be disregarded or rejected, because it does not operate with 
the supposed efficiency, productivity, and exploitation of the homog-
enized environment. The limit would be set with the lack of primacy 
of instrumental rationality. If the meaning of life of particular people 
within their own cultural parameters does not require the fulfillment of 
indefinite multitude of pleasures, variety of middle class consumptions, 
then that culture must be in principle, and on the basis of globalizing 
modern logic permitted to pursue its own mode of having a lifeworld. 
to sharpen our argument and the parameters within which the dis-
cussion of globalization and multiculturalism could play out its destiny, 
we suggest that the very abolition of a pregiven subject in favor of self 
invention in modern sense leads to the notion not only that the Others 
are equally self inventive, but also the limitation of the concept of the self 
invention to the modern logic of Western autonomy and instrumental-
ity. This is to say that if every discourse is deemed to be invented and 
only valid within its own framework, then the very concept of discursive 
self generation belongs within the framework of modernist and Western 
postmodernist discourse. But this means that even if the Other cultures 
are regarded as self generated, their self generation may have very dif-
ferent self conceptions, ontologies, methods, and practices that did not 
respect the logic of modernizing and globalizing ontologies and meth-
ods. Practically speaking this means that whatever purposes there are and 
however the environment is interpreted need no follow the logic of causal 
efficiency of reconstructing the world into our own needs and power. If a 
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culture regards that playing music, listening to the stories of the ancients 
is meaningful and the metaphysical entities are relevant for life as protec-
tors of the environment then there cannot be an introduction of a crite-
rion that would claim that such conceptions are not realistic, mystical, 
non productive, since the latter concepts belong to another framework. 
In brief, the confrontation between the two is not between some truth 
and some falsity, but between two discursive frameworks, wherein each 
will interpret the Other in its own unique way.
yet it is also the case that a globalizing logic with its technical ef-
ficiency and promise of better life is an aspect of the Others. They see 
themselves in relationship to this efficient liberation from natural ne-
cessities, which becomes part of their own self understanding as differ-
ent from and yet related to this globalizing logic. This creates an inter-
nal tension within various cultures that constitute dual self recognition 
wherein one still maintains his own cultural discourses yet also judges 
those discourses in light of the global Other. This is the source of aliena-
tion and destruction of cultural self identity. We still want to maintain 
cultural identity, but we also like to be like the Other, to judge ourselves 
from the vantage point of the Other. This is an invention of a dual con-
sciousness that frames the power struggles within various cultures. The 
modernizers who at the same time claim to be part of the same culture 
want to transform that culture into civilized, practically efficient, objec-
tive, and beneficial. While it liberates the individuals from their own 
culture yet there is a wish to claim against the globalizing process the 
uniqueness of their own culture. In one sense, there is a demand to use 
the environment in a “desacralized” manner, purely for the purpose of 
the benefit of social members, whether the benefit is health, employ-
ment, increased wages as signs of the good life. 
In another sense, there is a wish to claim that we in our culture have 
our spiritual values that do not allow reducing the environment, includ-
ing the human, to mere resources. Within this tension, the adjudication 
cannot be had on the basis of some criteria that would be able to ad-
judicate which is more true. The only solution to this tension is power. 
Hence, we witness the many confrontations between the groups within 
given cultures that promote modernizations and at the same time intel-
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lectuals who resist modernizations. This means that a given culture is split 
into those who propagate the need to become globalized and modern and 
at the same time those who, recognizing the necessity of modernization, 
propose a battle against it as imposition of alien culture. In principle, they 
claim that we may use the efficiency of modern technology to resist the 
very logic that this technology imposes on us. In this sense, the very glo-
balizing logic constitutes a power confrontation, all the way from holy 
wars to so-called passive resistances. yet, in every case it seems that the 
reason for this power confrontation rests in the failure to understand the 
already posited limit within which the globalizing process must function. 
This limit is the very requirement that the Other and its self gener-
ated cultural framework is equivalent to the globalizing logic. Therefore, 
the latter sees to be universal and yet it must accept whether it wants to 
or not its own limitations. When we say whether wants it or not, we do 
not mean a choice between two options, but a power confrontation that 
is inevitable since there are no external criteria in this confrontation 
that would allow free decision. What we have is a temporal horizon of 
possibilities in such a way that one possibility is regarded to be recu-
peration of the past, while the other is offered as the future. Politically 
speaking, the rhetoric states that the one from the past is conservative 
and traditional, while the other is liberal, individualistic open, and even 
humanistic. Whether this designation is true or false is not our concern. 
yet it is generally claimed that those, in their dual consciousness, will 
play out their roles as both maintaining their tradition and at the same 
time proposing future transformations. 
At this point, a specific conception of the world of time is divided 
into closed past and open future. This conception subtends or underlies 
Western modern globalization: anything in the past can no longer be 
changed and therefore to return to it would mean to return to some-
thing changeless and thus conservative, while the escape from it would 
require an open and undetermined future projected by the will. This is 
the confrontation between any given tradition as a determined history 
and its rejection in favor of constructed and undetermined future. It 
is of note that the modern Western globalization is characterized by 
the shift of temporal awareness from the rejection of the “irrelevant” 
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past to possibilizing future. The Western globalization is premised on 
an implicit construction of time awareness that leads to the rejection of 
anything that is permanent or with set limits. 
Our challenge at the cultural level is whether this time awareness 
is universal. The cultural logics must be investigated within the param-
eters of peoples’ understanding of their world not only in terms of the 
lifeworlds and discursive practices, but also the lifeworlds that are sub-
tended by the cultural preconceptions of what constitutes the universe 
as time. Within this context, we hope to articulate the limits wherein 
even the power confrontations of the dual consciousness find their own 
limitations. Each culture has its own world conceptions as conditions 
for their own self understanding. If there is going to be any adjudication 
among cultures underneath the power confrontations such adjudica-
tions will have to articulate the world conceptions of various peoples. 
In this sense, the challenge to the globalizing logic will not come from 
the acceptance by the Other of the efficient technical means that make 
their own culture inadequate, but by the recognition that their own cul-
ture has a very different world understanding. We know from other 
cultures, whether Mayan, Hindu, or taoist that the world understand-
ing, even at the ontological or metaphysical levels, is different from the 
Western scientific and linear conceptions. So the task of cultural studies 
is to find the cosmic awareness that underlies their cultural parameters.
ThE LIMIT
What is crucial is the recognition of “value” as an invariant in this 
type of life world. What is at issue here is also the separation of value 
from fact. Facts, for modern ontology, have no value. Hence, values are 
constructed and imposed by us on facts. Such imposition takes on vari-
ous forms, one of which is the globalization of “Western values” and 
above all of technocratic rulership by qualified experts. This globaliza-
tion assumes that values can be exported; hence “democratic values” 
can be packaged and sent abroad on aircraft carriers, rockets, tanks 
and troops. It is deemed that anyone in the world would be more than 
pleased to welcome and “adopt” such values. 
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But values and valuations have to be evaluated not by their own 
self proliferating construction, but by a discovery of a constitutive 
awareness that is correlated to a tacitly lived eidos offering the possibil-
ity of performing a suspension of commitment to a given life world. The 
transcendental requirement is to disclose this eidos that would be an all 
pervasive presence demanding a transformation of a given, and specifi-
cally of the life world of political enlightenment. Instead of constructed 
values, this eidos can be called WORtH. As we shall see, the latter can-
not be constructed and it appears in the background of all values and 
valuations. It also provides a background on which every life world can 
be regarded in its essential morphology and questioned concerning its 
legitimacy. In this sense, the first task is to explicate the life world of en-
lightenment, inclusive of its two essential aspects, democracy and dom-
ination by experts, and to note their internal and inevitable connection 
and, in the final analyses inadequacy. The latter lies in its constructive 
character and hence comprises a fundamental crisis of democracy. This 
is not to say that it is therefore invalidated. Rather, its limits are exhib-
ited from a transcendental lived awareness that demands “more” and 
does so on the basis of discovery what this more is. The constitution 
of this more – what will be called WORtH – is not a construction but 
a disclosure of an intentionality whose meant objectivity, its eidos as 
WORtH, is present as absolute. We should not despair while using the 
term absolute; after all, in all awareness there are such terms compris-
ing a pregiven ARCHE whose denial is its unavoidable inclusion. This 
is to say, to attempt to negate an arche is to include it in the very nega-
tion and hence to comprise its absolute affirmation. We shall call this 
the PRINCIPLE OF SELF INCLUSION and venture a claim that only 
transcendental phenomenology is in a position to function within this 
principle. Now we are in a position to expound on the crisis of democ-
racy by showing what sort of life world it has established and the limits 
it has imposed upon itself.
It is necessary to turn to the essence of the life world of enlight-
enment in which we find ourselves. It IS A PROCESS OF VALUA-
tION. Everything in the universe assumes a value to the extent that 
it serves our interests. Contrary to claims that the world has no value, 
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the current world, constructed by enlightenment, is full of values: val-
ues for sale, values produced and to be produced, values of stocks and 
bonds, values of education, family values, religious values, ideologically 
constructed values, the changing and the new values, value of life and 
even calculated death. Indeed, the basic mode of awareness is valua-
tive selectivity. It should be clear also that awareness and perception are 
no longer given in some pure empirical sense, but are selected on the 
grounds of valuation. In this sense, what is given as a plethora of em-
pirical environment is, for the most part, ignored. What is perceived de-
pends on its specific value. Indeed, there are social mechanisms that not 
only consist of values, but evaluation of values that select specific ones 
deemed currently relevant in terms of future value projects. It has been 
argued that all these values are human and hence the primacy is placed 
on modern subject as the source of values. This claim would hold if the 
human were a distinct and decisive category, wherein all other catego-
ries and processes were subservient to humans. But this is no longer 
the case, since other values, such as technologies of various sorts, from 
electronic media to genetic biochemistry compel the understanding of 
the human to be equivalent to the rest of the values. This means that 
genetic biochemistry will not treat the human as a special category, but 
will have to reduce all human functions to biochemistry. Thus the envi-
ronment, that is constructed on the basis of the process of valuation and 
is deemed to be objective, requires that the human be treated equally 
objectively in terms of what such an environment demands, i.e. inter-
pretation of the human as material, chemical, biological, physical entity 
in order that such constructed technical values could be applied and 
thus useful and valuable. The public domain, once deemed the space 
of autonomous beings, has become a battle ground of values: what is 
more valuable, jobs or forests, production or clean air, god or freedom 
of choice? 
In the life world of modern globalization there is a constant de-
flection away from the human and its replacement by systems of values 
that make the human into a secondary and dependent phenomenon. 
What Heidegger was afraid of in his Letter on Humanism – the center-
ing of all modern thought on the human, turns out to be a mistaken 
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understanding. The human is not the center if we note the battle for val-
ues in current public “debate.” In the U.S. the much publicized issue of 
“family values”, leading to the emotional question as to who can marry 
whom, reveals a deflection from the human toward family, divine law, 
natural essentialism, social traditions, and genetic or cultural determi-
nants. While these are values in the public debate, they release the hu-
man from any rights and above all from responsibilities. It is nature that 
makes us who we are, it is culture or social tradition that has shaped 
our way of being, and it is divine law that demands our compliance. 
In all cases of such public debates, which may be deemed to be demo-
cratically guaranteed free speech, there is a constant rejection of such 
freedom by enlightenments tendency to “explain” and thus abolish the 
very public domain as that of autonomy. Even the latter is interpreted 
as one aspect of a contingent fact based on a contingent history of one 
tradition. Given other tradition such a fact could not arise. Hence, its 
universality is particular and cannot be used to understand life worlds 
of other traditions. 
One result of the introduction of contingency is the abolition of 
truth and its replacement by rhetoric. If all depends on historical tradi-
tions and their modes of interpretation, then different traditions have 
different interpretations, each claiming the right to its truths as equiva-
lent with those of others. In addition, even a historical tradition is com-
posed of a variety of histories with equal claim to their truths and hence 
to an increasing contingency of what truth is, ending in the notion that 
“truth is whatever a given history, a given culture, a given discipline, lit-
erary work, religious text may say”. They all have value and need not ad-
dress any content; they all are equivalent rhetorical figures. And no one 
lies, since what an individual states depends on the framework of a par-
ticular culture and its requirements. In a business or corporate setting, 
where profit is of essence, one can tell anything as long as the statements 
made are valuable to enhance the incrementation of profit. One would 
be a fool to do otherwise. The same can be said of any discipline, specifi-
cally of any technical discipline. The latter are constructs and function 
on the basis of production of what is valuable for human consumption: 
whether it is designed food products or medications, the claim has to be 
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made that each product is “contingent” and cannot be a cure for all ills. 
In this sense, the claims are statistical: the value of this product is pre-
sented with various disclaimers: in seventy percent of cases it will cure 
the liver, but it might cause high blood pressure, impotency, dizziness, 
and nightmares. And all these disclaimers are equally contingent. Thus 
one cannot say that the producers lie; they simply say that given the 
complexity of a specific organism, we cannot account for all possible 
implications. If something goes wrong with a given biotechnology, the 
answer is “we did not have sufficient evidence to warn against all re-
sults”. In principle, nonetheless, the human is a complex organism and 
nothing more, and the entire constructed environment is to maintain 
that organism. This is one major aspect of the crisis of democracy in the 
life world established by enlightenment.
The awareness of crises constitutes a unique reflective moment 
that, at the same time, allows a suspension of one’s participation in a 
given life world. We are cognizant, by now, that while living in a par-
ticular life world we are not aware of its basic composition. We live in it 
as if it were self evident and all inclusive. There is nothing lacking in it 
to the extent that it would not offer relief and answers to all of our ques-
tions. If we claim to live in a democratic life world, we take for granted 
that our elected officials tend to lie, that we can vote them out of office, 
that the injustices can be corrected by legal means, and that those who 
work harder deserve more. We also know that we would not tolerate 
dictators or anyone who would deny our right to make our own choices 
and mistakes. There must be a unique situation which allows us to extri-
cate from our life world and to raise the question of its legitimacy. That 
such a question can arise means that we rise to lived awareness which 
no longer belongs to a life world in which we live. This must be made 
clear: our awareness is always world oriented and our orientations, or 
intentional directions find, in their life world if not total, at least par-
tial perceptual affirmation. This is an epistemic aspect which takes for 
granted the division of our life world into categories and the way they 
are concretized or given perceptual fulfillment. But the fulfillment of 
our taken for granted intentions and the categories to which they cor-
relate, including the numerous value gradations – the epistemic under-
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standing – leave out the legitimating question given in live awareness 
that something is not fulfilled, something that no value can account for: 
INtRINSIC SELF WORtH. to reach the latter, the lived awareness 
must suspend the life world and explicate the access to the transcenden-
tal lived awareness that correlates to intrinsic self worth and demands 
legitimation of the life world in which one has so far lived in full belief 
and affirmation. The lived awareness and its intention toward self worth 
asks whether the life world offers any fulfillment and confirmation of 
this intention. At this level of awareness the categorical and epistem-
ic understanding fails, and an existential question of action becomes 
preeminent. Can I act, as I have always acted, and fulfill the intention 
of my intrinsic self worth? The latter embodies such requirements as 
honor, honesty, dignity, self and other respect, and justice. If honor, 
honesty, dignity and respect cannot be fulfilled in my activities, then 
the legitimacy of this life world is placed in absolute question, reveal-
ing at the same time the awareness of ABSOLUtE SELF WORtH. It is 
at this juncture that the transcendental lived awareness recognizes that 
the world of values, constructed by Enlightenment, requires evaluation 
as to its adequacy for human worth. Such a question is one of principle 
that required an essential delimitation of the construct of democracy 
and whether the latter could be adjusted, discarded or become open 
to the absolute requirement of transcendental awareness of self worth. 
We are in a position, now to attempt our venture into lived awareness 
that is lead by the intention correlated to self worth and thus a crisis in 
enlightenment. 
There is no need to go into a variety of utilitarianisms since in 
principle they follow the logic of valuation on the basis of psycho-
physiological needs. Utilitarianisms have no philosophical importance, 
since they presume that we all seek pleasure and value things and oth-
ers insofar as they will comprise some means to fulfill our pleasures. 
Indeed, such a psychologized ethos is precisely what leads to crisis of 
democracy insofar as the technical promises by elected officials to fulfill 
our pleasures lead the public away from public participation and hence 
maintenance of the public domain. Besides, striving to fulfill pleasures 
suggests our complete subjection to irrational drives and a loss of any 
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sense of autonomy. Hence, our task is to seek a more profound concep-
tion of enlightenment’s failure to provide the ground of its ethos. We 
already know that the highest point of Enlightenment, Kant’s critical 
works, have left us with a quandary regarding the final arbiter in human 
action. It was not the universal moral imperative demanding that we 
act out of respect for this imperative originating as it were out of total 
autonomy, but the empty condition called GOOD WILL. It is empty 
because it is purely formal and has no existential implications. There is 
no content by which to decide what sort of action would be recogniz-
able as one that follows good will. It is to be noted that the universal 
moral imperative, having total autonomy as its source, does not require 
a commitment to others, apart from not treating them as means but 
always as ends. Being universal, this imperative does not singularize 
and does not require respect for the other as having intrinsic worth; it 
simply requires obedience to the imperative or, as Kant would have it, 
obedience out of respect for the law. 
But respect for the law implies something more basic, some lived 
awareness that connects to the worth of a singular person beyond his/
her value and demands a treatment of oneself and the others in an hon-
orable, noble, truthful, elevating manner for its own sake. This also sug-
gests a crisis of democracy insofar as it has been reduced for the sake of 
other purposes such, as Regan once boasted, making money and getting 
rich. It seems that the loss of democracy for its own sake is premised 
on the reduction of the human to a purposive value and thus the exclu-
sion of worth for its own sake. The transcendental rule that emerges 
at this level of awareness is tHE DEGRADAtION OF tHE HUMAN 
AND tHE ENVIRONMENt tO A PURPOSIVE VALUE AND, By 
IMPLICAtION, VALULESNESS. yet both democratic ethos and the 
final arbiter of all values cannot be value; they are for their own sake 
and comprise a lived awareness that already recognizes intrinsic self 
worth as that which is coextensive with democratic ethos. Self worth 
and democratic ethos for their own sake comprise the lived awareness 
of the missing aspect of the way that enlightenments intentionality has 
unfolded. Here a person is exposed to treat the lived world, and her im-
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mersion in it, as inadequate and thus place such a world and herself out 
of play, in brackets.
It is, then, the task to unfold the lived awareness that is compelled 
to bracket, to place out of action, the life world of enlightenment and 
to note the presence of this lived awareness across diverse phenomena. 
All the intentional orientations toward a life world in which she has 
been immersed appear to be groundless constructs; the life world of 
public domain, which is no longer maintained, requires and recognizes 
a presence of intrinsic self worth even in its denial. In the most de-
graded figures that our age has produced there appears an intimation 
of self worth. Let us look at the logic of intrinsic worth. In the life world 
where everything is a trash bin of values, there emerge personal actions 
and expressions that demand honor, dignity, respect, truthfulness, not 
only of themselves but of others. Indeed, their actions are equally an 
indication of intrinsic self worth of others. It would be impossible to be 
a racist and degrade others without recognizing the other as a posses-
sor of intrinsic self worth. We cannot degrade a creature who, in its life 
world, does not recognize a need to justify its deeds, to make a choice 
between two life worlds; in short, to call a dog – dog, is neither a deg-
radation nor a negation of intrinsic worth. Only another person can be 
degraded on the basis of recognition of her intrinsic worth. This is to 
say, degradation, reduction, insult, are possible only when we recognize 
hers and our own intrinsic worth, honor, and dignity. This recogni-
tion is the ground of numerous events of our sophisticated age, among 
which is racism, nationalism, ethnocentrism and even homophobia and 
religions. 
Degrading of others in an effort to elevate oneself, is an indication 
of the worth of others, an indication of our anxiety in face of the other’s 
intrinsic self worth, her unavoidable height. Unable to withstand the 
other’s self worth, we condemn her to death and thus prove that we are 
unwilling to admit our own self degradation, our own crisis, and can-
not withstand the dignity of the intrinsic self worth of another. Such an 
awareness is demonstrated by Viktor Frankel’s depictions of life in con-
centration camps. This is an extreme case where the officers who ran the 
camps would immediately condemn to death anyone who showed self 
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and other respect, dignity and honor, thus revealing the lack of honor 
and dignity in the very officers – and all degraded to a mere value for the 
state. This logic calls to the others to recognize the crisis in their lives, 
to legitimate the life world in which they live and to ask whether such a 
life world fulfills their lived awareness of their intrinsic worth. This is to 
say, the very presence of the other who is aware of her intrinsic worth 
performs a tacit phenomenological bracketing and hence challenges a 
blind inherence in this life world. One can then raise a question whether 
such a life world is worthy of one’s intrinsic worth.
Intrinsic self worth, as a discovered given, appears not only 
through degradations and oppressions, but also through actions de-
manding mutual recognition of self and other. And it appears irrespec-
tive of culture, historical period, or social standing. Gandhi angered 
colonial rulers by his bearing, his dignity, his dignifying those who were 
at the lowest social rung, his demand that the colonial rulers have truth-
fulness and honor and thus made them recognize their own intrinsic 
worth and not merely their value for the empire. Gandhi reminded all 
that the life world of an empire is illegitimate because it does not allow 
the fulfillment of the lived awareness of intrinsic worth. Hence he asked 
for legitimation of his own value in such a life world and whether he 
must rise to a transcendental level and reveal a crisis in his own life and 
that of the empire based on recognition of what is the ground of final 
human self awareness and all the values. While being an object of deri-
sion and quixotic depictions, he took the blows with dignity, demand-
ing dignity from those who administered the blows. It is to be noted 
that he did not claim intrinsic self worth as a value of a specific culture, 
but as an unconditional and absolute ground that raises the question of 
legitimation of any life world and demands the fulfillment of transcen-
dental awareness that correlates to self worth. Einstein once pondered 
the phenomenon of Gandhi by wondering “that such a person could 
have walked among us”. In face of the intrinsic self worth of this slight 
person, the British Empire lost all of its moral, political, and military 
superiority. 
We reached a juncture at which the founder of Western philoso-
phy – Socrates – can make his entrance. Although scholars locate So-
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crates as the relentless seeker of truth, i.e. categorical epistemologist, 
we must also recall that the first condition of the search for truth is 
the good and a life world where a person can live in accordance with 
the demands of the good as one expression of intrinsic worth. Only 
under these conditions that Socrates can search for truth as another 
aspect of intrinsic worth. After all, the search for truth was, for Socrates, 
a practical-existential commitment and activity of a good and truthful 
life. Thus Socrates, like many others, was an object of derision and cari-
catures. He accepted the Athenian verdict of death in order to show that 
his and others intrinsic worth demands a life world in which the search 
for truth cannot be forbidden. He placed his internal worth as the good 
above his personal life and could demand that such a good should be 
a part of his life world. The decision by the jury to forbid Socrates his 
daimon, his eros, to “philosophize” was equivalent to a destruction of 
a life world in which his intrinsic worth once had a place. Socrates is 
compelled to face a crisis and reveal a crisis of his life world. He reaches 
and lives an awareness that places his entire life world into question and 
demands a decision: Is the life world, offered by Athenians, adequate 
to fulfill his intrinsic self worth. In turn, are the Athenians, by their 
own action, degraded themselves to a level of social value where truth, 
dignity, honor, will have no place. After all, such a degradation to social 
value is obvious from the trial when Socrates is offered a chance to sur-
render his troublesome quest and thus become a valuable citizen, and 
when Socrates offers, ironically, to accept a pension from the state for 
“whatever little services that he might render”. Here appears a depiction 
of the first crisis of democracy and Socrates reaches a lived awareness 
which demands a legitimation of the life world which is being offered to 
him. Can his lived awareness, correlated as it is to intrinsic self worth, 
have any perceptual affirmation in such a life world? The latter, after 
all, demands self degradation and thus the denial of self worth. Socrates 
resolves the crisis by accepting the verdict of the Athenians with a warn-
ing: If you condemn me, my fame will spread far and wide; do not do 
this, because it will be forever a black mark on Athens.
The responsibility of an intellectual is to raise the question of the 
legitimacy of any life world with respect to the lived fulfillment of in-
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trinsic self worth. Here, all cultural value constructs as to what human 
being is are rendered transparent as to their arbitrariness and inadequa-
cy, demanding the recognition that despite the variation of cultures and 
their values, there is a transcendental trace of self and other worth that 
is taken for granted even if not recognized. Such a recognition is the 
limit which cannot be transgressed without making cultures and their 
values meaningless. 
What was given in modern Western as a background awareness, 
is now in the foreground of the life world of enlightenment and the 
unfolding of the constructive-valuative intentionality that has become 
prevalent. Being in the foreground or “positional” and thematized this 
awareness points to the problem of legitimation and to the illegitimate 
ways that the basic awareness became obfuscated, degraded, perverted, 
and empty. It questions the claim of this life world to be the only le-
gitimate reality. This claim to sole reality appears only when the self 
worth becomes a foreground, enacted by a singular being in quest for 
an authentic fulfillment of self worth in a life world that at one stroke is 
made inactive, placed out of play. On the background of the life world 
that is placed out of play in its totality there appears a quest to act in 
favor of a world that would contain self worth. With the placing out of 
play, the life world without human worth is exposed to temporality: it 
becomes chronoscopic, i.e. an inadequate temporal perspective on the 
reality of the essence of the human. Such temporalization suggests that 
there is an atemporal, non-positional awareness which, inevitably can 
appear only chronoscopically. It is equally important to note that since 
the disclosure of self worth revealed it to be solely as activity and not 
accessible through categorical intuition, then honor, dignity, nobility, 
truthfulness and justice appear only as enacted phenomena and hence 
have validity to the extent of their enactment. In addition, the striv-
ing to enact intrinsic worth is also a chronoscopic awareness, since no 
single activity, whether honorable, noble or truthful, does not fulfill the 
entirety of the search for self worth. As an activity for its own sake, self 
worth also demands, as already suggested, public domain wherein such 
activity can be performed, resulting in the notion that such a domain is 
to be maintained for its own sake. Both, self worth and public domain 
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are phenomena that mutually require one another and hence are to be 
maintained as purposes in themselves. 
yet even the awareness of such purposes in themselves requires 
one more domain of awareness. The disclosure of intrinsic worth as 
atemporally present, but only chronoscopically experienced, requires 
a specific constitution of activity. As we know, awareness is oriented 
toward the world. yet such orientation is experienced reflectively, such 
that the world becomes represented and the self becomes represented as 
awareness that is turned toward the world. In view of her orientation as 
intentional aim, she also finds confronted by herself. Such orientation 
toward the world in face of oneself is the ESSENCE OF ACtIVIty. 
Given the awareness of such activity, the latter places another demand: 
not only reflection that represents an aim toward the world and the one 
who intends such an aim, but above all asks for legitimation as to the 
worth of such an action. At this level one does not ask whether such a 
world is known – this is already granted, but is this world worthy of 
one’s activity. The possibility of constituting a worthy life world is the 





TRANScENdENTAL GROUNd  
OF ALL vALUES
INTROdUcTION
Following the analyses of the two trends of Enlightenment, it has 
been suggested that democracy is in crisis, and crisis means a transi-
tion from one life world to another. This chapter is devoted to fill a gap 
left by the founding of Political Enlightenment, its constitution of an 
open public domain, and the reduction of the enlightenment to multiple 
interests and power confrontations. One question that will have to be 
answered is whether the public domain, constituted by political enlight-
enment, led to such confrontations, and what is the ground of the latter. 
In addition, there is a need to explicate the clash between two major life 
worlds that the enlightenment founded and hence to reveal the contra-
diction in such founding. The contradiction, here, has two senses: one 
formal, the other temporal. The latter too, in the final analysis, faces its 
own contradiction that cannot be resolved on the grounds of enlighten-
ment. yet our contention is that all the contradictions will have to be 
resolved at another – transcendental – level by opening up a dimension 
of lived awareness that cannot be accessed by the categories of enlighten-
ment, even when the latter has tacitly assumed and lived such awareness. 
This means that such awareness was and is available, but, as a transcen-
dental intentionality, could not be fulfilled in the life world of the en-
lightenment. to understand this intentionality it is necessary to make 
a phenomenological distinction between constitution and construction. 
Constitutive intentionality opens up or discloses an eidos that either can 
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or cannot be fulfilled in a given life world. The latter is a signitive inter-
connection of all events and objectivities, including a self interpretation 
of the subject as being in this life world. It is given as self evident and 
taken for granted that all events and objectivities in it are realities in their 
own right. For example, in the West and East it is granted that we live in 
an economic world, where things, processes and people have economic 
value. Whether we like it or not, we understand this world as our reality 
and cannot see any reason to doubt it – despite our complaints that this 
reality is unfair to some or even should be rearranged differently – and 
still economically. Even our scientific and technical achievements have 
the same value. What is crucial is the recognition of “value” as an invari-
ant in this type of life world. What is at issue here is also the separation 
of value from fact. Facts, for modern ontology, have no value. Hence, 
values are constructed and imposed by us on facts. Such imposition 
takes on various forms, one of which is the globalization of “Western 
values” and above all of technocratic rulership by qualified experts. This 
globalization assumes that values can be exported; hence “democratic 
values” can be packaged and sent abroad on aircraft carriers, rockets, 
tanks and troops. It is deemed that anyone in the world would be more 
than pleased to welcome and “adopt” such values. 
But values and valuations have to be evaluated not by their own 
self proliferating construction, but by a discovery of a constitutive 
awareness that is correlated to a tacitly lived eidos offering the possibil-
ity of performing a suspension of commitment to a given life world. The 
transcendental requirement is to disclose this eidos that would be an all 
pervasive presence demanding a transformation of a given, and specifi-
cally of the life world of political enlightenment. Instead of constructed 
values, this eidos can be called worth. As we shall see, the latter can-
not be constructed and it appears in the background of all values and 
valuations. It also provides a background on which every life world can 
be regarded in its essential morphology and questioned concerning its 
legitimacy. In this sense, the first task is to explicate the life world of en-
lightenment, inclusive of its two essential aspects, democracy and dom-
ination by experts, and to note their internal and inevitable connection 
and, in the final analyses inadequacy. The latter lies in its constructive 
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character and hence comprises a fundamental crisis of democracy. This 
is not to say that it is therefore invalidated. Rather, its limits are exhib-
ited from a transcendental lived awareness that demands “more” and 
does so on the basis of discovery what this more is. The constitution 
of this more is an intentionality whose meant objectivity, its eidos is 
worth, and is present as absolute. We should not despair while using the 
term absolute; after all, in all awareness there are such terms compris-
ing a pregiven arche whose denial is its unavoidable inclusion. This is 
to say, to attempt to negate an arche is to include it in the very negation 
and hence to comprise its absolute affirmation. We shall call this the 
principle of self inclusion. 
ThE LIFEWORLd OF ENLIGhTENMENT
The various major critiques of enlightenment, from Adorno 
through Heidegger, Habermas, Derrida, Levinas, to Deleuze fall within 
the parameters of one or another variant of enlightenment, whether it 
is rationalism, psychologism. sociologism, economism, and even biol-
ogism. Valuations that are available, such as utilitarianism, deontolo-
gism, and voluntarism are equally variants of enlightenment. Hence the 
task is to extricate the life world of enlightenment from such variants 
at its very limit in order to reveal its eidos. The first is the well known 
dualism of subject and object, the former is mind, the latter is matter. 
The subject is the unconditional source of all theories and values while 
the material world is an irrational and valueless sum of homogeneous 
matter to be constructed in terms of the subjects theories and values. 
Second, the subject is unconditionally an autonomous source of all laws 
in both the social and material realms. Since there is no other criterion 
concerning the material and social worlds, then all subjects are equal 
concerning the way that the material and social worlds are to be con-
structed. Third, construction is unconditional to the extent that no caus-
es can be assigned to the structures and procedures by which the subject 
interprets and shapes itself, social relationships, and the material envi-
ronment. Scientific enlightenment posits the subject as a rational bearer 
of theoretical and methodological constructs by which to manage the 
102
Algis Mickunas. SOCIAL VALUE AND INDIVIDUAL WORTH
material environment in terms of projected human “needs.” The latter 
are to be understood either biologically or psychologically and thus can 
be satisfied by scientific invention of “techniques” of fulfillment lead-
ing, to what is known, the reduction of scientific reason to instrumen-
tality. Fourth, invention of history and its progress toward a utopian 
society; the latter assumed various interpretations, yet common to all is 
the notion that humans can construct a material and psychological set-
ting wherein all previous ills would be abolished. It is obvious that this 
utopian notion, as “the aim and end of history” is a mixture of political 
and scientific enlightenments. Fifth, the reason that this mixture had to 
be posited as a future aim is that political and scientific enlightenments 
became incompatible; the scientific enlightenment, and its promise to 
fulfill material and psychological wants, had to abolish the interpreta-
tion of human life as autonomous, unconditional and self creative. The 
first requirement and interpretation of human life became material and 
psychological sum of wants and their immediate gratification. As we 
know, current reading of life and experience is regarded as a multiplic-
ity of intensive pleasure nodes, each clamoring to be tickled, gratified, 
in order that new pleasure nodes could pop up for more gratification. 
Utilitarianism is the general ethical position wherein all things and hu-
mans have a value to the extent that they produce pleasure. Second re-
quirement is the massive technology and its progress, designed for the 
constant fulfillment and constant invention of needs. The conjunction 
of these factors results in the abolition of historical aim and its replace-
ment by progress for the sake of progress. This is obvious from the es-
sence of instrumental rationality. Sixth, the notion of autonomy, the 
view of the subject as self creative had to be postponed and forever de-
ferred, and also regarded as scientifically irrelevant and contradictory. 
It is impossible to claim that once the material and psychological condi-
tions are fully established, then they will cause the human subject to be 
autonomous. As we know at the outset, autonomy cannot be caused. 
As just noted, this is equally problematic due to progress that can never 
reach any end and hence establish all the necessary conditions for emer-
gence of autonomy. Every new condition, as a result of instrumental 
reason, becomes means for new conditions and new needs, and the lat-
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ter split up into more novel needs. In this sense it is impossible to fulfill 
all human needs and then establish autonomy. Seventh, we are left with 
a democracy whose principle of human autonomy and the public do-
main wherein such autonomy is maintained and exercised is no longer 
available. It has been completely pervaded by instrumental rationality 
and the proliferation of needs and their fulfillment. Hence, the mem-
bers of a political and democratic community are reduced to material 
life, psychological titillations, and chemical prolongation of boredom. 
No doubt, progress for the sake of progress requires ever novel pro-
jects and future promises for the “benefit of humanity,” but it is also 
clear that such projects are to be regarded as expanding fulfillment of 
equally projected novel material and psychological needs clamoring for 
pleasant fulfillment. As we well know, in the current West, it would 
be impossible to elect a person to a public office if that person did not 
promise to improve our material life. 
It is necessary to turn to the essence of the life world of enlighten-
ment in which we find ourselves: it is a process of valuation. Everything 
in the universe assumes a value to the extent that it serves our interests. 
Contrary to claims that the world has no value, the current world, con-
structed by enlightenment, is full of values: values for sale, values pro-
duced and to be produced, values of stocks and bonds, values of edu-
cation, family values, religious values, ideologically constructed values, 
the changing and the new values, value of life and even calculated death. 
Indeed, the basic mode of awareness is valuative selectivity. It should be 
clear also that awareness and perception are no longer given in some 
pure empirical sense, but are selected on the grounds of valuation. In 
this sense, what is given as a plethora of empirical environment is, for 
the most part, ignored. What is perceived depends on its specific value. 
Indeed, there are social mechanisms that not only consist of values, but 
evaluation of values that select specific ones deemed currently relevant 
in terms of future value projects. It has been argued that all these values 
are human and hence the primacy is placed on modern subject as the 
source of values. This claim would hold if the human were a distinct 
and decisive category, wherein all other categories and processes were 
subservient to humans. But this is no longer the case, since other values, 
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such as technologies of various sorts, from electronic media to genetic 
biochemistry compel the understanding of the human to be equivalent 
to the rest of the values. This means that genetic biochemistry will not 
treat the human as a special category, but will have to reduce all human 
functions to biochemistry. Thus the environment, that is constructed 
on the basis of the process of valuation and is deemed to be objective, 
requires that the human be treated equally objectively in terms of what 
such an environment demands, i.e. interpretation of the human as 
material, chemical, biological, physical entity in order that such con-
structed technical values could be applied and thus useful and valuable. 
The public domain, once deemed the space of autonomous beings, has 
become a battle ground of values: what is more valuable, jobs or forests, 
production or clean air, god or freedom of choice? 
In the life world derived from enlightenment there is a constant 
deflection away from the human and its replacement by systems of val-
ues that make the human into a secondary and dependent phenom-
enon. What Heidegger was afraid of in his Letter on Humanism – the 
centering of all modern thought on the human, turns out to be a mis-
taken understanding. The human is not the center if we note the battle 
for values in current public “debate”. In the U.S. the much publicized 
issue of “family values,” leading to the emotional question as to who can 
marry whom, reveals a deflection from the human toward family, divine 
law, natural essentialism, social traditions, and genetic or cultural de-
terminants. While these are values in the public debate, they release the 
human from any rights and above all from responsibilities. It is nature 
that makes us who we are, it is culture or social tradition that has shaped 
our way of being, and it is divine law that demands our compliance. 
In all cases of such public debates, which may be deemed to be demo-
cratically guaranteed free speech, there is a constant rejection of such 
freedom by enlightenments tendency to “explain” and thus abolish the 
very public domain as that of autonomy. Even the latter is interpreted 
as one aspect of a contingent fact based on a contingent history of one 
tradition. Given other tradition such a fact could not arise. Hence, its 
universality is particular and cannot be used to understand life worlds 
of other traditions. One result of the introduction of contingency is 
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the abolition of truth and its replacement by rhetoric. If all depends on 
historical traditions and their modes of interpretation, then different 
traditions have different interpretations, each claiming the right to its 
truths as equivalent with those of others. In addition, even a historical 
tradition is composed of a variety of histories with equal claim to their 
truths and hence to an increasing contingency of what truth is, ending 
in the notion that “truth is whatever a given history, a given culture, a 
given discipline, literary work, religious text may say.” They all have val-
ue and need not address any content; they all are equivalent rhetorical 
figures. And no one lies, since what an individual states depends on the 
framework of a particular history and its requirements. In a business 
or corporate setting, where profit is of essence, one can tell anything as 
long as the statements made are valuable to enhance the incrementation 
of profit. One would be a fool to do otherwise. The same can be said 
of any discipline, specifically of any technical discipline. The latter are 
constructs and function on the basis of production of what is valuable 
for human consumpsion: whether it is designed food products or medi-
cations, the claim has to be made that each product is “contingent” and 
cannot be a cure for all ills. In this sense, the claims are statistical: the 
value of this product is presented with various disclaimers: in seventy 
percent of cases it will cure the liver, but it might cause high blood pres-
sure, impotency, dizziness, and nightmares. And all these disclaimers 
are equally contingent. Thus one cannot say that the producers lie; they 
simply say that given the complexity of a specific organism, we cannot 
account for all possible implications. If something goes wrong with a 
given biotechnology, the answer is “we did not have sufficient evidence 
to warn against all results.” In principle, nonetheless, the human is a 
complex organism and nothing more, and the entire constructed envi-
ronment is to maintain that organism. This is one major aspect of the 
crisis of democracy in the life world established by enlightenment.
We are now in a position to extricate the fundamental intentional-
ity that constitutes this life world, that means it in a very specific way. 
to have some sense of this intentionality it is necessary to explicate 
the directly lived awareness that could not be posited as an object by 
the thinkers of enlightenment. It ought to be understood that such a 
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lived awareness is transcendental and hence accessible only reflective-
ly from the meant objects that such a lived awareness intends. What 
then are these objects? While the process of valuation of events in favor 
of human “needs” was briefly indicated, i.e. various reductionisms of 
the human to biochemistry, genetics, and mechanics, the lived aware-
ness subtending this process intends an objectivity which is unique to 
enlightenment. I had suggested in some writings that one level of this 
objectivity is designed to be accessible to quantification and hence it 
has to be measurable homogeneous matter. This, design, of course, is 
meant by a specific exclusion of the entire perceived world and hence 
in no wise accessible to experience. yet covered by this homogeneous 
materiality as an intentional object is another intended objectivity: tem-
poral possibility. The live awareness that intends such an objectivity is 
an empty will, prior to the question of its being free or determined. 
Phenomenologically speaking, there can be eternal possibilities – as 
Plato and Husserl have noted, but such possibilities have been already 
enacted theologically and in part metaphysically. Enlightenment rejects 
eternal possibilities and is left with temporal, although in the first lived 
intentionality, empty temporal possibilities. It is to be noted that the 
term “temporal” does not suggest “being in time”, but an open horizon 
without any specific ontological locus. Hence any temporal location 
would have to be established within such a horizon. If we attend to the 
language of enlightenment up to date, we shall note that subtending 
the question of “reality” there is a prior discourse concerning the “con-
ditions for the possibility of reality”. Such discourses are premised on 
the first lived intentionality of empty temporal possibility. It opens a 
horizon of possible intentions and their fulfillment, requiring a second 
constitution of objectivities: possible valuations of what the will intends 
as valuable for us, but recalling that at this level all value possibilities 
are open as temporal. In principle, it is possible for us to be all that we 
will as valuable in time. This is enlightenments alpha and omega: empty 
temporal possibility and its temporal fulfillment by all that we value as 
our mode of final being. Both Marxism and capitalism offer the same 
intentionality. The intentionality of fulfillment of possible valuations as 
temporal does not lead to perceptual awareness, since the latter, in its 
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naturalistic mode, is quite limited and merely qualitative. Hence the 
fulfillment requires a constructive intentionality that can establish pos-
sible conditions for possible reality. One minor aspect for this establish-
ment is the shift of reason to instrumental rationality whose task is to 
calculate what reality is valuable for us and then calculate the conditions 
how such reality shall be achieved. Values, in this sense, are calculations 
of possible results realized solely as material. to achieve any value, the 
human has to be reduced to a system of interests, needs, desires, power 
and all must act aggressively against others to fulfill such wants. In-
deed, language itself is split into numerous technical discourses, and in 
public to the crudest form and lowest common denominator, designed 
to attack, insult and demean. The publicly appointed figures act in the 
same way: to use their positions in order to fulfill their own and the 
interests of their friends and not to maintain the democratic institu-
tions for their own sake. It must be understood that such reductionisms 
are not a given, but are intentional constructs that fulfill intentionally 
constructed needs, valuations, and desires. This is the background on 
which postmodern writers can talk with justification that our life world 
and all relationships and events within it are constructions and hence 
bear no ontological status or necessity. 
The issue of temporal value possibilities is the driving force of en-
lightenment at this level. transcendent or eternal possibility is abol-
ished; hence temporality is the pressure that demands a prolongation 
of our temporal existence. There is no other option; being temporal, 
we want to live as long as possible and hence the frantic rush for the 
latest technologies that promise to protract our lives. Such technolo-
gies have become equivalent to the value of life and death. The public 
domain is an arena for the struggle for life itself, and any means can 
be used, whether lying, killing, wars, all will do as well, as long as they 
promise to keep us safe, to insure our continuity at any price. All the 
changing technical inventions promote other inventions as values of 
life: we want to go on. The transcendental rule of enlightenment at this 
level is change as permanence enhancement. Thus the political shift to 
dramatic conservativism. The latter is a promise, by whatever means, 
to guarantee our security, safety, protection and continuity, as long as 
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we surrender our freedoms to participate in the public domain and to 
engage in public dialogue. In other words, the public domain, as the 
condition for other democratic institutions, is no longer maintained, 
despite all the rhetoric about democracy and its “values”. We are closer 
to Hobbesian world than to that of Locke and above all Kant. The in-
tentionality of enlightenment has worked itself out to reveal its truth 
two centuries later. Indeed, we are living this intentionality as an aware-
ness of our life world in such a way, that while speaking of democracy, 
rights, equality and freedoms, we intend such a world as a struggle for 
temporal and technical continuity. Thus all is valuable that enhances 
this continuity – and purely materially. This is not to be taken as criti-
cism, but as an opening up of the lived awareness of enlightenment and 
the life world to which this awareness correlates. In this life world we 
value freedom, equality, and establish public domain as the condition 
for both, but we no longer maintain them. Unmaintained freedom and 
the public domain vanish. After all, they are humanly constituted tem-
poral phenomena. Is it the case that one possibility within the horizon 
of enlightenment – democracy – is equally temporal and ceases to have 
value? We are at the level of temporal value fulfillment that comprises 
its own history. This is to say, democracy is one more passing event in 
history, specifically when the value of freedom and equality have be-
come redundant in the working out of the fundamental intentionality 
of enlightenment. This means that we are in a period of transition from 
democracy to not yet fully understood another life world. What the lat-
ter might be is a matter for discovering what lived awareness appears at 
the time of crises and what comprises the overlooked ground of politi-
cal ethos. 
ThE cRISIS OF ENLIGhTENMENT’S  
LIFEWORLd
The awareness of crises constitutes a unique reflective moment 
that, at the same time, allows a suspension of one’s participation in a 
given life world. We are cognizant, by now, that while living in a par-
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ticular life world we are not aware of its basic composition. We live in it 
as if it were self evident and all inclusive. There is nothing lacking in it 
to the extent that it would not offer relief and answers to all of our ques-
tions. If we claim to live in a democratic life world, we take for granted 
that our elected officials tend to lie, that we can vote them out of office, 
that the injustices can be corrected by legal means, and that those who 
work harder deserve more. We also know that we would not tolerate 
dictators or anyone who would deny our right to make our own choices 
and mistakes. There must be a unique situation which allows us extri-
cate from our life world and raise the question of its legitimacy. That 
such a question can arise means that we rise to lived awareness which 
no longer belongs to a life world in which we live. This must be made 
clear: our awareness is always world-oriented and our orientations, or 
intentional directions find, in their life world if not total, at least par-
tial perceptual affirmation. This is an epistemic aspect which takes for 
granted the division of our life world into categories and the way they 
are concretized or given perceptual fulfillment. But the fulfillment of 
our taken for granted intentions and the categories to which they cor-
relate, including the numerous value gradations – the epistemic under-
standing – leave out the legitimating question given in live awareness 
that something is not fulfilled, something that no value can account for: 
intrinsic self worth. to reach the latter, the lived awareness must sus-
pend the life world and explicate the access to the transcendental lived 
awareness that correlates to intrinsic self worth and demands legitima-
tion of the life world in which one has so far lived in full belief and af-
firmation. The lived awareness and its intention toward self worth asks 
whether the life world offers any fulfillment and confirmation of this 
intention. At this level of awareness the categorical and epistemic un-
derstanding fails, and an existential question of action becomes preemi-
nent. Can I act, as I have always acted, and fulfill the intention of my 
intrinsic self worth? The latter embodies such requirements as honor, 
honesty, dignity, self and other respect, and justice. If honor, honesty, 
dignity and respect cannot be fulfilled in my activities, then the legiti-
macy of this life world is placed in absolute question, revealing at the 
same time the awareness of absolute self worth. It is at this juncture that 
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the transcendental lived awareness recognizes that the world of values, 
constructed by Enlightenment, requires evaluation as to its adequacy 
for human worth. Such a question is one of principle that required an 
essential delimitation of the construct of democracy and whether the 
latter could be adjusted, discarded or become open to the absolute re-
quirement of transcendental awareness of self worth. We are in a posi-
tion, now to attempt our venture into lived awareness that is lead by the 
intention correlated to self worth and thus a crisis in enlightenment. 
There is no need to go into a variety of utilitarianisms since in 
principle they follow the logic of valuation on the basis of psycho-physi-
ological needs. Utilitarianisms have no philosophical importance, since 
they presume that we all seek pleasure and value things and others in-
sofar as they will comprise some means to fulfill our pleasures. Indeed, 
such a psychologized ethos is precisely what leads to crisis of democracy 
insofar the technical promises by elected officials to fulfill our pleas-
ures lead the public away from public participation and hence mainte-
nance of the public domain. Besides, striving to fulfill pleasures suggests 
our complete subjection to irrational drives and a loss of any sense of 
autonomy. Hence, our task is to seek a more profound conception of 
enlightenment’s failure to provide the ground of its ethos. We already 
know that the highest point of Enlightenment, Kant’s critical works, 
have left us with a quandary regarding the final arbiter in human action. 
It was not the universal moral imperative demanding that we act out of 
respect for this imperative originating as it were out of total autonomy, 
but the empty condition called good will. It is empty because it is purely 
formal and has no existential implications. There is no content by which 
to decide what sort of action would be recognizable as one that follows 
good will. It is to be noted that the universal moral imperative, having 
total autonomy as its source, does not require a commitment to others, 
apart from not treating them as means but always as ends. Being uni-
versal, this imperative does not singularize and does not require respect 
for the other as having intrinsic worth; it simply requires obedience to 
the imperative or, as Kant would have it, obedience out of respect for 
the law. 
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But respect for the law implies something more basic, some lived 
awareness that connects to the worth of a singular person beyond his/
her value and demands a treatment of oneself and the others in an hon-
orable, noble, truthful, elevating manner for its own sake. This also 
suggests a crisis of democracy insofar as it has been reduced for the 
sake of other purposes such, as Regan once boasted, making money 
and getting rich. It seems that the loss of democracy for its own sake is 
premised on the reduction of the human to a purposive value and thus 
the exclusion of worth for its own sake. The transcendental rule that 
emerges at this level of awareness is the degradation of the human and 
the environment to a purposive value and, by implication, valulesness. 
yet both democratic ethos and the final arbiter of all values cannot be 
value; they are for their own sake and comprise a lived awareness that 
already recognizes intrinsic self worth as that which is coextensive with 
democratic ethos. Self worth and democratic ethos for their own sake 
comprise the lived awareness of the missing aspect of the way that en-
lightenments intentionality has unfolded. Here a person is exposed to 
treat the lived world, and her immersion in it, as inadequate and thus 
place such a world and herself out of play, in brackets.
It is, then, the task to unfold the lived awareness that is compelled 
to bracket, to place out of action, the life world of enlightenment and to 
note the presence of this lived awareness across diverse phenomena. All 
the intentional orientations toward a life world in which she has been 
immersed appear to be groundless constructs; the life world of pub-
lic domain, which is no longer maintained, requires and recognizes a 
presence of intrinsic self worth even in its denial. In the most degraded 
figures that our age has produced there appears an intimation of self 
worth. Let us look at the logic of intrinsic worth. In the life world where 
everything is a trash bin of values, there emerge personal actions and 
expressions that demand honor, dignity, respect, truthfulness, not only 
of themselves but of others. Indeed, their actions are equally an indica-
tion of intrinsic self worth of others. It would be impossible to be a rac-
ist and degrade others without recognizing the other as a possessor of 
intrinsic self worth. We cannot degrade a creature who, in its life world, 
does not recognize a need to justify its deeds, to make a choice between 
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two life worlds; in short, to call a dog – dog, is neither a degradation 
nor a negation of intrinsic worth. Only another person can be degraded 
on the basis of recognition of her intrinsic worth. This is to say, deg-
radation, reduction, insult, are possible only when we recognize hers 
and our own intrinsic worth, honor, and dignity. This recognition is 
the ground of numerous events of our sophisticated age, among which 
is racism, nationalism, ethnocentrism and even homophobia and reli-
gions. Degrading of others in an effort to elevate oneself, is an indication 
of the worth of others, an indication of our anxiety in face of the other’s 
intrinsic self worth, her unavoidable height. Unable to withstand the 
other’s self worth, we condemn her to death and thus prove that we are 
unwilling to admit our own self degradation, our own crisis, and can-
not withstand the dignity of the intrinsic self worth of another. Such an 
awareness is demonstrated by Viktor Frankel’s depictions of life in con-
centration camps. This is an extreme case where the officers who ran the 
camps would immediately condemn to death anyone who showed self 
and other respect, dignity and honor, thus revealing the lack of honor 
and dignity in the very officers – and all degraded to a mere value for the 
state. This logic calls to the others to recognize the crisis in their lives, 
to legitimate the life world in which they live and to ask whether such a 
life world fulfills their lived awareness of their intrinsic worth. This is to 
say, the very presence of the other who is aware of her intrinsic worth 
performs a tacit phenomenological bracketing and hence challenges a 
blind inherence in this life world. One can then raise a question whether 
such a life world is worthy of one’s intrinsic worth.
Intrinsic self worth, as a discovered given, appears not only 
through degradations and oppressions, but also through actions de-
manding mutual recognition of self and other. And it appears irrespec-
tive of culture, historical period, or social standing. Gandhi angered 
colonial rulers by his bearing, his dignity, his dignifying those who were 
at the lowest social rung, his demand that the colonial rulers have truth-
fulness and honor and thus made them recognize their own intrinsic 
worth and not merely their value for the empire. Gandhi reminded all 
that the life world of an empire is illegitimate because it does not allow 
the fulfillment of the lived awareness of intrinsic worth. Hence he asked 
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for legitimation of his own value in such a life world and whether he 
must rise to a transcendental level and reveal a crisis in his own life and 
that of the empire based on recognition of what is the ground of final 
human self awareness and all the values. While being an object of deri-
sion and quixotic depictions, he took the blows with dignity, demand-
ing dignity from those who administered the blows. It is to be noted 
that he did not claim intrinsic self worth as a value of a specific culture, 
but as an unconditional and absolute ground that raises the question of 
legitimation of any life world and demands the fulfillment of transcen-
dental awareness that correlates to self worth. Einstein once pondered 
the phenomenon of Gandhi by wondering “that such a person could 
have walked among us.” In face of the intrinsic self worth of this slight 
person, the British Empire lost all of its moral, political, and military 
superiority. 
We reached a juncture at which the founder of Western philoso-
phy – Socrates – can make his entrance. Although scholars locate So-
crates as the relentless seeker of truth, i.e. categorical epistempologist, 
we must also recall that the first condition of the search for truth is 
the good and a life world where a person can live in accordance with 
the demands of the good as one expression of intrinsic worth. Only 
under these conditions that Socrates can search for truth as another 
aspect of intrinsic worth. After all, the search for truth was, for Socrates, 
a practical-existential commitment and activity of a good and truthful 
life. Thus Socrates, like many others, was an object of derision and cari-
catures. He accepted the Athenian verdict of death in order to show that 
his and others intrinsic worth demands a life world in which the search 
for truth cannot be forbidden. He placed his internal worth as the good 
above his personal life and could demand that such a good should be 
a part of his life world. The decision by the jury to forbid Socrates his 
daimon, his eros, to “philosophize” was equivalent to a destruction of 
a life world in which his intrinsic worth once had a place. Socrates is 
compelled to face a crisis and reveal a crisis of his life world. He reaches 
and lives an awareness that places his entire life world into question and 
demands a decision: Is the life world, offered by Athenians, adequate 
to fulfill his intrinsic self worth. In turn, are the Athenians, by their 
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own action, degraded themselves to a level of social value where truth, 
dignity, honor, will have no place. After all, such a degradation to social 
value is obvious from the trial when Socrates is offered a chance to sur-
render his troublesome quest and thus become a valuable citizen, and 
when Socrates offers, ironically, to accept a pension from the state for 
“whatever little services that he might render”. Here appears a depiction 
of the first crisis of democracy and Socrates reaches a lived awareness 
which demands a legitimation of the life world which is being offered to 
him. Can his lived awareness, correlated as it is to intrinsic self worth, 
have any perceptual affirmation in such a life world? The latter, after 
all, demands self degradation and thus the denial of self worth. Socrates 
resolves the crisis by accepting the verdict of the Athenians with a warn-
ing: If you condemn me, my fame will spread far and wide; do not do 
this, because it will be forever a black mark on Athens.
Even at the other end of Socratic tradition the lived awareness of 
intrinsic self worth is apparent in the most dire pronouncements of 
Nihilism. The latter not only challenges the continuous life world of 
values, but attempts to devalue all values, to discard all meaning, aim 
and purpose, and to set human life adrift on a turbulent ocean in a ship 
without a rudder. What is left over is blind, irrational, clashing pow-
ers expressed by Nietzsche as will to power. yet the same Nietzsche 
strives to find an answer to a question: given the meaningless, deval-
ued, directionless and purposeless universe, how shall we live? As we 
all know by now, for Nietzsche will to power is no longer adequate to 
understand events and human life. The shift from ontology to cosmic 
awareness made his power thesis untenable and redundant. Not being 
able to revert to values, even new values, since “new values have short 
legs,” he opens the lived awareness that intends self worth as self crea-
tion. It is significant that such self creation is precisely what is required 
of self worth: its own purpose, having no value for anyone, and above 
all for social functioning, it creates itself for its own sake. The meta-
phor of life is no longer will to power but self creation as its own worth. 
Thus his constant striving to find the great creators, those who dared 
become clay for self molding, those who did not want to lead or be fol-
lowed, those who answered a question with a question: this is my way, 
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what is yours? In this sense nihilism and the devaluation of all values 
does not abolish philosophical quest for self worth; to the contrary, it 
clears away all obfuscations and offers a higher opening to transcen-
dental self awareness. After all, it elevates awareness to encompass the 
cosmos as meaningless, and asks the ultimate question whether this 
cosmos is open for self worth. And the answer, for Nietzsche, is abso-
lutely yes, and precisely because the constructed and purposeful values 
have obfuscated the most fundamental human awareness: only open 
cosmic awareness is adequate to human self creation. The universe, for 
Nietzsche, is the life world.
Literatures, in this search for intrinsic worth, do not lag behind phi-
losophy. They too reveal figures that are in crises and are demanded to 
extricate themselves from their life worlds in order to ask the legitimat-
ing question: is such a world adequate for intrinsic worth. Let us look 
at one of the Spanish works, don Kichote. He is a figure at a juncture of 
two worlds. One vanishing and the other emerging, one of knighthood, 
and the other of a new iron age. The iron age – the modern – is charac-
terized by degradation, aggressiveness, crudeness, greed, cunning and 
calculation, where everyone acts with purpose and is out to get all he 
can in riches at any price. Language is debased and splits up into numer-
ous practical-technical jargons, full of curses and complaints. Quejana 
already lives in this life world, yet he is engaged in reading literatures 
about knighthood, thus giving him an awareness of another life world. 
This awareness disclosed his position as swinging between, as being in 
crisis, and demands of Quejana to legitimate the life world in which he 
already resides. In this world everything has value to the extent that it 
serves all sorts of base demands, such as greed, selfishness, power, but 
fails to address, indeed excludes, actions that would be honorable, noble, 
vision of others as having self worth, truthfulness, and justice. These ac-
tions are those that belong to intrinsic worth, and they have no place in 
the iron age. Thus Quejana reaches a living awareness, direct experience, 
although perceptually not fulfilled in the life world of iron age, of another 
world, a contrasting life world, containing self worth. The latter calls for 
legitimation of the iron age life world in which Quejana happens to live. 
Can my self worth be enacted and fulfilled in an iron age? Can others be 
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regarded, and be asked to regard themselves as having intrinsic worth? 
And this is when Quejana takes on the name Don Kichote and sets out to 
demonstrate what the iron age is missing. What is significant is the way 
that the crude, the degraded, the dirty become transparent with a nobil-
ity, grandeur, and honor of self worth. Through the farm maid, Aldonsa 
Lorenzo shines Dulcinea, his neighbor, Sanson Carrasco, is revealed as 
a noble knight, worthy of honorable battle. Having encountered a pos-
sibility of another life world, Quejana finds himself confronted with an 
option to release himself from his life world and at the same time com-
pelled to raise a question of legitimation of such a life world, i.e. does his 
life world allow an enactment of intrinsic self worth. Once more it is to 
be emphasized that this question does not have any relative boundaries. 
Quejana does not ask whether this life world is worth for me, since he, 
as an actor in this world belongs to, and is bound by it. Thus he must ask 
whether this life world of iron age is worth being in absolutely, leading 
then to his own existential question: if I have only one life, is such a life 
an authentic representation of intrinsic worth, if I were to live this life in 
the life world of iron age. 
ESSENTIAL AWARENESS
The point has been reached where a question of awareness of self 
worth can be answered. First aspect of this worldly awareness is the 
possibility to extricate oneself from a specific life world. Second, the re-
sultant disattachment, or bracketing of this immersion is the awareness 
of self worth demanding the possibility of world orientation that would 
answer the question of absolute legitimation of fulfilling in practice and 
action what the awareness always tacitly maintained as self worth. Third, 
it is to be noted that such awareness transgresses any specific life world, 
since any life world may offer partial-perceptual or signitive fulfillment 
of intrinsic self worth. Under any other circumstance, intrinsic worth 
would be an intentionality of a given life world, interpreted, for exam-
ple as value, equivalent to other values, and hence a self understood part 
of such a world whose refusal would go counter to what is categorically 
self evident in such a world. At this level a refusal to participate in such 
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a world would be impossible. In other words, intrinsic worth is not a 
perceptual given, but arises “perspectively” to the extent that we can 
regard our lived world as a total from the perspective of intrinsic worth. 
This perspectivity is the price for our freedom to survey any life world 
and ask the question of legitimation. In this context, the persons who 
were mentioned, whether Socrates, Gandhi, or Don Kichote become 
phenomena that disclose intrinsic worth and demand of us to recognize 
our degraded state. As already stated, the recognition of other’s intrin-
sic worth is equivalent to the recognition of our own and conversely. 
The awareness, correlated to intrinsic self worth, is a transcenden-
tal background on which any life world must be legitimated concerning 
its adequacy for fulfilling such awareness in activity. It was noted that 
the life world of enlightenment. at its epitomy, offered us a world of 
values which had no other source except unlimited construction and 
hence unbound from any restriction concerning the manner in which 
such values are used. This leads to arbitrariness and power to the extent 
that power must decide which values are victorious – for a while. But 
the transcendental background of intrinsic self worth was and is equal-
ly a given and provides a limit concerning the unrestricted valuations. 
The founders of enlightenment and its correlate – political democra-
cy – were persons who extolled honor, dignity, respect, truthfulness and 
justice in their actions and demanded no less of their adversaries. This 
comprises the background on which the crises of democracy appears. 
At the founding just as well as now, there appears a first transcendental 
rule of awareness: maintenance of permanent self worth, or currently 
its reclaiming. This rule then demands an establishment of a first demo-
cratic institution –public domain – in which every person must fulfill 
their self worth, for its own sake. This very fulfillment demands, in turn, 
the second rule of awareness: permanent maintenance of the public do-
main for its own sake. Such maintenance requires the bracketing, ex-
clusion, of arbitrary constructed valuations – such as economic, power, 
religious, ethnic, racist, that would promote the abolition of the public 
domain and self worth; indeed, such valuations do produce rhetorical 
means to obfuscate their degrading and disruptive tactics. Such oxymo-
rons as “free enterprise”, “public leadership” and even “free expression” 
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comprise some of the rhetorical means. This sort of engagement com-
prises a third rule: valuations as disruptions of permanent self worth. 
This rule is quite prevalent and has been at the background of such 
events as public apathy, non-participation in public affairs, and perva-
sive anti-intellectualism and anti-education. When the public arena is 
filled with all sorts of private interests, needs, desires, cultic dogmas that 
are at odds with each other, then either we too push for our interests or, 
lacking knowledge of such interests, we decline to participate. It must 
be emphasized that self worth and the public domain are not objects of 
knowledge but are constituted in our active engagement. If we cease to 
act honorably, justly, nobly, respectfully, we shall not have self worth 
or public domain wherein self worth is enacted. It must be also noted 
that freedom as autonomy is a result of self worth; after all, we extricate 
ourselves from our own and all other life worlds and demand legitima-
tion of any life world as to its adequacy for self worth. On this ground 
we then select the life world that permits autonomy for its own sake. 
But autonomy, at this level, is valid only if it is correlated and subject to 
self worth. Without the latter, autonomy may become reduced to “free 
choice” among things and lose its legislative dignity. 
It seems that the initial or founding intentionality of enlighten-
ment has permitted a partial fulfillment of self worth in the awareness 
of autonomy, yet the interpretation of the latter became restricted to 
the understanding of its period which mixed scientific explanations 
with freedom of research, rights to self invention and subject to no one. 
Scientific explanations were extolled as the sole avenue to truth, and 
offered categorical divisions of all things, while humanities, wanting 
to be scientific, engaged in equal categorization of its own disciplines, 
from theologies and their classification, to literatures. Categorization 
also subjected the human activity to become substantivated into cat-
egorizable characteristics: so and so is honorable, just, noble, while so 
and so is valuable, a business person, a teacher, etc., thus excluding the 
quest to return to activities that could be the sole understanding of what 
such categories mean. As we know, suddenly such categories, defining 
a person, could be acquired by numerous means, including money. Self 
worth, as an enactment, a participatory engagement vanished behind 
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epistemic terms. We are all citizens, with characteristics such as rights, 
freedoms, and even entitlements, but if citizen is only the one who ac-
tively maintains the public domain as a space of self worth, then how 
can one speak of inhabitants who refuse to participate in public’s life 
world? This is the point of crisis, requiring of all inhabitants of a society 
to become citizens. 
It is self worth that discloses the partial fulfillment by enlighten-
ment and hence demands more from the inhabitant, not as a Kantian 
duty in face of a law, but as a demand of self respect and respect of oth-
ers. Once the trust in a life world turns to mistrust and is placed into 
doubt, then the already stated issue of legitimation comes to the fore. It 
is possible to state that the legitimation crisis, suggested by Habermas, 
has located the crisis at the level of value of multiple interests, demand-
ing a public arena where such interests could be articulated, in compe-
tent speech, equivalently by any group. yet the crisis, as was contended 
above, must be sought at the primary level of awareness of self worth, 
and not at the level of participatory interests. What is more important 
is that the question of legitimation of a life world leads not only to activ-
ity, but to the transcendental awareness of singular commitment, to a 
question of existence and not knowledge. The appearance of partial life 
world, i.e. incapable of supporting self worth, gives rise to a fragile re-
sistance with the question of the individual’s existence in such a world, 
search to fulfill the more in awareness than the world offers. The “more” 
is a striving to disclose whether I myself am more than this life world 
and whether I have a choice and worth to live otherwise. to understand 
this shift toward requirements of active existence we need to specify 
more precisely the transformation from epistemic understanding that 
depends on second and third grammatical persons, to a first person’s 
self understanding and the recognition that the latter is not a narrowing 
down of the epistemic categorical field but has a very different logic. For 
example, if categorical language has truth in perceptual fulfillment of a 
proposition, existential proposition has truth as an honorable act of not 
lying. Categorical language is designed to open some general charac-
teristics, while existential is singular and unique, and even non repeat-
able. This kind of requirement is what led Sartre to existentialism as a 
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humanism, Nietzsche’s Third and Fourth books of Zarathustra, and to 
taoism’s discovery of total, singular authenticity. Even Heidegger at-
tempted to articulate such an authenticity, but failed by giving priority 
to historical hermeneutics that contextualized authenticity within the 
parameters of early Greek and contemporary German languages. 
What was given in enlightenment as a background awareness, 
is now in the foreground of the life world of enlightenment and the 
unfolding of the constructive-valuative intentionality that has become 
prevalent. Being in the foreground or “positional” and thematized this 
awareness points to the problem of legitimation and to the illegitimate 
ways that the basic awareness became obfuscated, degraded, perverted, 
and empty. It questions the claim of this life world to be the only le-
gitimate reality. This claim to sole reality appears only when the self 
worth becomes a foreground, enacted by a singular being in quest for 
an authentic fulfillment of self worth in a life world that at one stroke is 
made inactive, placed out of play. On the background of the life world 
that is placed out of play in its totality there appears a quest to act in 
favor of a world that would contain self worth. With the placing out of 
play, the life world without human worth is exposed to temporality: it 
becomes chronoscopic, i.e. an inadequate temporal perspective on the 
reality of the essence of the human. Such temporalization suggests that 
there is an atemporal, non-positional awareness which, inevitably can 
appear only chronoscopically. It is equally important to note that since 
the disclosure of self worth revealed it to be solely as activity and not 
accessible through categorical intuition, then honor, dignity, nobil-
ity, truthfulness and justice appear only as enacted phenomena and 
hence have validity to the extent of their enactment. In addition, the 
striving to enact intrinsic worth is also a chronoscopic awareness, 
since no single activity, whether honorable, noble or truthful, does 
not fulfill the entirety of the search for self worth. As an activity for its 
own sake, self worth also demands, as already suggested, public domain 
wherein such activity can be performed, resulting in the notion that 
such a domain is to be maintained for its own sake. Both, self worth and 
public domain are phenomena that mutually require one another and 
hence are to be maintained as purposes in themselves. 
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yet even the awareness of such purposes in themselves requires one 
more domain of awareness. The disclosure of intrinsic worth as atem-
porally present, but only chronoscopically experienced, requires a spe-
cific constitution of activity. As we know, awareness is oriented toward 
the world. yet such orientation is experienced reflectively, such that the 
world becomes represented and the self becomes represented as aware-
ness that is turned toward the world. In view of her orientation as inten-
tional aim, she also finds confronted by herself. Such orientation toward 
the world in face of oneself is the essence of activity. Given the awareness 
of such activity, the latter places another demand: not only reflection that 
represents an aim toward the world and the one who intends such an 
aim, but above all asks for legitimation as to the worth of such an action. 
At this level one does not ask whether such a world is known – this is 
already granted, but is this world worthy of one’s activity. The possibility 
of constituting a worthy life world is the reflective condition from which 
the failures of our degraded life world become visible.
POSTScRIPT
The figures mentioned in this essay, from Socrates through Don 
Kichote, to Gandhi are almost pure embodiments of intrinsic worth. 
But we also know that such figures are targets of attack at every turn in 
their lives. In the daily life of commerce with commodities, religions, 
family values, political cunning, and rhetorical obfuscations, such fig-
ures are quixotic. Imagine a business person in a position to make a 
solid profit in a shady – although legal way – would refuse to do so in 
order to act in an honorable manner? He would be an object of jokes, 
indeed a Quixotic figure. But this also means that he has not yet reached 
a reflective awareness at which his intrinsic self worth is disclosed. At 
the same time, such a person has no ground for political ethos, and 
resultantly cannot be an autonomous being in a free public domain. 
We must recall, nonetheless, that the ethos was constantly in the back-
ground of the continuous founding of democracy through self worth. 
Those who understood that democracy is not an entity but a constant 




SELF IdENTITY ANd ITS dISRUPTIONS 
INTROdUcTION
Among various questions of phenomenology, there is one that has 
ranged throughout methodological and theoretical discussions – self 
identity. Is there an egological self? If so, can it be regarded as the self 
or merely as an aspect of a self? Is there a symetry between a self and an 
ego, and between reflecting self and the self as an object of reflection? 
Are there any traceable rules of consciousness that would comprise con-
nections among such factors as self, ego, and reflection? Which among 
these factors is more basic? This essay will explore these factors and the 
rules of consciousness, if such there be, that might comprise some of 
the connections and disconnections of self and ego, reflection and its 
object. The deciphering of such rules, and the ways they relate the ap-
pearance of self, ego, and reflection, could provide symbolic evidence 
for a level of constitution of the self and the ego – this being constituted 
where the play of the dissolution of the self and/or the ego, and the dis-
connection of the ego from the self take place. The symbolic evidence 
will be regarded as traces of a more basic, genetic constitution of the 
self, ego, and reflection.
This means, then, that the basic issue of tracing direct or unmedi-
ated consciousness wherein all factors of subjectivity and objectivity are 
instituted will require a manifold understanding. First, the problems in-
herent in the experience of the self in direct evidence. Second, the origin, 
necessity, and the manner in which self constitutes as self. Third, the level 
of self at which self identity is achieved in contrast to another, an alien 
being or presence, and the manner in which the consciousness of other-
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ness arises. Fourth, the constitution of we-consciousness that is cognizant 
of a variety of selves and others and their relationships. Such relation-
ships will be explored by analyzing complex relationships between tem-
poral phenomena and their source in the functioning of the atemporal 
self. These analyses will include rules that subtend both memories and 
expectations. On the basis of the problematic of self identity, memories 
may become free floating and attached to others, to other egos and even 
to an anonymous environment. While these areas of discussion are not 
separated one from the others in concrete life of awareness, they will be 
treated as if they were separate in the process of exposition. Such separa-
tions cannot be avoided for methodological reasons.
ThE RAdIcAL SELF 
Phenomenological reflections have revealed that the human self 
has a basic composition called the living present (Held, 1966). In turn, 
the latter manifests two fundamental moments – the flowing and the 
static. While enacting the flow, the self is confronted with the missing 
aspect – the permanent. The permanent is excluded from, and yet re-
ferred to, by the flow. While flowing, the self is engaged in countering 
a stasis. On the other hand, while the self assumes a position of per-
manence, it is referred to a flow. The standing forever battles the flux. 
While being exclusive, neither can be given without the other. They 
are mutually referent. What is at issue in the quest for the Self and its 
identity is the access to these two moments of the living present and 
their most diverse relationships. It is to be noted that the relationship 
between permanence and flux is never given in its purity; it is always 
mediated by symbolic designs of a given culture. Thus in our questions 
concerning self and ego, those two terms will comprise symbolic tan-
dems of the two basic facets of the living present. We shall begin the in-
vestigation by tracing the moment of flux in the constitution of the self.
Through increasing radicalization of reflection we confront the 
problem of the primordial, passive stream, the “Heraclitean flow” as 
fundamental domain of awareness, for whose constitutive moments we 
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lack names; there is nothing found in the flow that would be an objec-
tive identity. Names, after all, apply only to the constituted identities, to 
objectified sense units (Landgrebe, 1963, p. 200). Such units, such iden-
tities, rudimentary components of reference, are discovered only in re-
flection that traces something constituted in the flux, such as an identity 
of a color, a sound, a trace of smell, a number, or an ego. All may find 
themselves and be seen as identical or constant in the flow. They are 
apparent as stasis moments. If our concern is with the ego then, at this 
level of awareness, it is glimpsed across the shifting phases of flow. How 
can this static ego, discovered in the flow, be identical with a self that 
enacts the flow and indeed maintains the ego in the flow as self-same 
or identical? A note of caution must be added: the self that symbolizes 
the enactment of the flow does not encounter the permanent ego due to 
reflection, but due to the very composition of the flow that immediately 
calls up its mutual and yet exclusive referent – the stasis. At this level, 
the moment of stasis can only be constituted as a recognizable act of the 
self that is flowing away and is given a symbolic designation – ego. The 
ego marks a distance between the acting self and its own enactments. In 
their static identifiability, the latter refer to the flux enacted by the self, 
and exhibit a characteristic that is different and exclusive of the self. 
This context suggests that the self cannot be exhausted in the identifi-
able act that is symbolized as an act of an ego. And yet the ego is present 
as a reflected self prior to an act of reflection. The self recognizes, in the 
ego, one of its already accomplished acts. The identity of the self that 
enacts the flow is not that of the ego as a stasis – a stasis that can be 
discovered in the flow. In this sense, the self is not reducible to a name-
able ego or even to a recognizable act of the self (Held, 1966, p. 81). The 
self that constitutes the flow is anonymous and its anonymity cannot be 
eradicated by reference to an ego found in the flux. The problem, thus, 
emerges concerning the access, if any, to the primordially acting self.
Following this statement of the problem, we can attempt to trace 
various levels of constitutive activities in an effort to exhibit the extent 
of phenomenological visibility of the active life of the self. to do so we 
must follow various modalities of self experience. yet each modality 
reveals only an impenetrable wall of anonymity, being too late, and an 
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identifiable stasis in the flow that has been defined as an ego. Thus the 
presence of the experienced ego in the flow to the experiencing self re-
veals a distance between them, a distance that is the very condition of 
such an experience. How is this distance to be understood? We must 
trace it within the limits of the living present and its two self referring 
constituents. This present cannot be understood in an ordinary, i.e. 
ontological or psychological sense; the present of the self is not given 
on the basis of a presupposed temporal position. A radical reflection 
also excludes the preconception of temporal succession. The present of 
the, self, its presence, could be called ur-modal, atemporal or originary 
(Landgrebe, 1963. p. 20) Any temporal regard requires an identifiable 
point of reference appearing in the flow of awareness. If the ego marks 
the first identifiable act in the flow, then the distance between the self 
and the ego is equally atemporal. At this level of awareness there are no 
traces of any memory that would hint at temporal locations.
temporal locations emerge not with the passive constitution of the 
flux, but with an active engagement of the self that, in the first instance, 
attempts to identify itself with the ego. Thus, the very effort positions 
the ego in relation to, either something that has been done as an act of 
the self, or something that is to be done. Here emerge the overlapping 
temporal phases which provide aground for subsequent locations of the 
ego and the distinction between acts of memory and expectation. If the 
flow is structured temporally, then the active engagement of the self 
already takes for granted the distance between itself and the ego. This 
is such that the enactment of temporal phases intimates tacitly a rule 
of self awareness. This rule we shall call permanence maintainance. By 
constituting the temporal phases, the self maintains the distance from, 
and the identity of the ego. In turn, this suggests that the enactment of 
the flow as having temporal phases and ego locations, may be seen as 
sense-making. The latter is the first mode of awareness that is premised 
on temporalization, since sense is a basic expression of directionality. 
Experience without directionality lacks sense. In other words, tempo-
ralization is coextensive with sense making. At this level various char-
acteristics of this sense making present themselves. We may speak of it 
as a permanent flow of all sense, or as an atemporal and ineradicable 
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presence. Regardless of the linguistic designation, the originary activity 
of the self is the source of sense. Thus the self is traceable as the endlessly 
reiterratable “this makes sense”, and is granted in correlation to tem-
poralization that establishes locations in the stream of lived awareness. 
yet, any reflection on the sense-making, on the primal function of the 
self, reveals it as a located ego in the context of temporal phases. In the 
very enactment of the flow, the self is traceable as the source of the sense 
of this enactment in an atemporal mode. Thus the ego is different and 
distant in “time” from the self. The tracing of the present of the self re-
veals it to be an atemporal stasis of sense making in transformation – a 
transformation that is a permanent enactment of sense-making flow – a 
transformation which nonetheless appears as an identifiable ego, in a 
context of already structured atemporal phases.
This analysis yields adequate, but not apodictic evidence of the life 
of the self as constant stasis in flux. The best that can be attained is its 
constant self reference from another – from a stream that contains the 
traces of the original enactment of sense. Thus, the insight into the sense 
of temporal phases (prior to temporal loci) and simultaneous reflectiv-
ity that reveals the self as an ego, leads phenomenology to experience its 
ultimate, critical, and apodictic foundation (Landgrebe, 1982, p. 111). 
According to this experience, the temporalizing self is grasped as al-
ready temporalized ego. This is adequate to the extent that we regard 
the ego in the flux of temporal phases as a trace of the self. Enacting the 
permanent sense making that is present in all the differentiations of, 
and locations in the flux. At this juncture we encounter the first layer of 
self that is involved with the distancing ego, not as a mere sinking away, 
but as a mark of identifiable permanence that must be maintained and 
enhanced. As already suggested above, this constitution of temporal 
sense and identifiable loci reveals the activity of the self in its main-
tenance of the permanence and identity of the ego. Thus, the first rule 
relating the self and the ego is permanence maintenance. yet, this rule 
also opens the possibility of marking a temporal locus for memory of 
any object and for the sense of otherness. Marking a temporal distance 
from the self, the ego, or whatever object maintained as permanent, be-
comes a condition for reflection.
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For the self to turn back upon itself, to revert to itself, it must al-
ready have constituted a gap between the experiencing self and the ex-
perienced ego. At the same time, and despite the gap and hence a divi-
sion, a mutual reference between them ought not to be lost. In order 
to reflect, the self must refer to the ego in the flow of temporal phases, 
not by becoming one with it, but by maintaining its permanence. While 
reflective reference is adequate to establish the identity of the ego, it 
is inadequate to provide self identity of the flux enacting self. In what 
sense can the functioning, the acting self, obtain its identity from the 
ego encountered as a distancing ego in the flux? Is the just enacted given 
as an ego or merely as an act? If it is given as an ego of a particular 
act, then the currently reflecting and acting self is more than the just 
enacted ego. The former contains all the possibilities of enactment of 
sense, while the latter is exhausted in the act that is attributed to it. But 
if the just enacted is an act, then it cannot be fully identifiable with the 
currently acting and reflecting self, since the self is reflecting from the 
just performed act. Here appears an asymmetry between them. Such 
asymmetry is a condition, both for distancing and even disassociating 
ourselves from the ego. Even our daily discourse testifies to this condi-
tion. We distance ourselves from an act which we attribute to our past 
by claiming: “What I did then could not have been the real me”. What-
ever else we may say, this suggests an already given distance between 
the self and the act attributed to an ego that is located and identified in 
the flow, and subsequently as past.
While this is a condition for dissociation of the self from an ego, 
and indeed from a variety of egos, it is equally a structural condition for 
the possibility of the self to collapse into an ego and to become dissoci-
ated from the self. The latter possibility can occur when the currently 
sense making self is no more than the sense making act which is flowing 
away, and in this flow it can be attached either to the self or the ego. In 
this sense there appears an equivalence between the self and the flow-
ing ego. Even if there is no guarantee of their identity, this equivalence 
comprises the basic condition for surrendering any priority of the self 
over any specific ego. This condition results in the self that is identical to 
a set of dissociated egos. Such an array of egos appears as a normal state 
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of affairs in our social understanding. We play different roles in differ-
ent settings and become the sum of our social roles: who we are, thus, 
depends on our role models. This intimates that the self has become 
ineffective in integrating the various activities and the various egos at-
tached to such activities. As we shall see later, the possibility of such an 
integration is the sine quo non for a mastery of ones variety of activities 
and the egos under which such activities are stabilized.
We must, nonetheless, explicate reflective awareness prior to re-
flection, i.e. inner-reflectivity between the self and the ego. This reflec-
tivity, the ego is a trace of an accomplished act, of the just having acted 
self as retended. In turn, the self that is reflecting from the ego grasps 
itself as acting. For the reflecting self, the distance between the act being 
performed and the just enacted is seen as bridged. Reflection experi-
ences unity in separation, identity in difference. The reflecting unifica-
tion with itself, constituting the experience of bridging the distance and 
keeping an identity of itself at the present, is given since the self enacts 
a constant streaming. The possibility of self reflection emerges on the 
basis of the constancy of streaming, as well as on the basis of the stream-
ing constancy of the self as it is traced by the ego. In inner reflection 
the self has unified itself with the ego, and bridged this distance in its 
streaming. This is the originary passive and active constitution where 
the transitory synthetic presencing of the self to its egological traces 
occurs. Thus all inner reflection is self presencing of the originary func-
tioning self before temporalization. In the transitional synthetic unifi-
cation of the living present, the self connects with itself before this unity 
is grasped in reflection. The pre-accomplished presencing of the self in 
its traces is the self actualizable reflectivity of the self with respect to its 
own egological traces. As Brand (1955, p.66) states, it is the functioning 
of “reflection in inception”. 
The dynamics of the living present is experienced as atemporal 
pre-accomplishment of passive and active transitional syntheses that 
are equivalent to self presencing. Thus, in each recouping refection, the 
self of the pre-temporal living present encounters itself as the stream-
ing, self temporalizing stasis traced in the ego. In any added reflection, 
the ego is encountered irrevocably as a temporalized object – as an-
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other. Thus, reflection upon the dynamic of the living present can never 
encounter the standing streaming self, the living present in its atempo-
rality. This is not an inadequacy of reflection; rather it reveals that there 
is no self presence which is not presencing and thus self presencing. In 
this sense, the self is never a pure self, never a pole without a temporal-
ized objectivity. The self has itself as an object and as a sense of first 
transcendence, otherness, such that a pure self requires self transcend-
ence and a self tracing in the ego. The notion of a self that constantly 
establishes a stream of conscious life is relativised to the extent that all 
direct awareness requires a sense of the other. This sense is the first ex-
periential moment that allows us to grasp the world as transcendence, 
as different from the experiencing self. This is to say, the otherness of 
the world is already encountered in the living stream. The latter is al-
ready constituted with a sense of temporality as first and thus an imma-
nent transcendence, a sense of otherness within the very composition 
of the self. The very distancing of the ego from the self and their partial 
unification opens the sense of the ego as temporal and worldly and yet 
as an index to the enactment of the flow of the self.
This immanent transcendence as primordial objectification, con-
stitutes a temporal objectivity, encounterable in an objective topogra-
phy of time and thus is reproducible. The passing, streaming present as 
objective past, is the first objectivity in immanence, the first meaning of 
transcendence and of radical otherness of the self. At the same time it 
is the foundation of history in the form of first temporality. Objectifica-
tion and temporalization of the enacted stream constitute the topog-
raphy for all objectivities and for historical events. This can be called 
the “always and already pregiven ground of history” (Landgrebe. 1968). 
History of the self is located at the level of first temporalization breaking 
out of immediate self and establishment of temporality. In other words, 
the pre-reflective synthesis as traced on the primordial flow of the ego 
and its constitution of the ground for differentiation, is at the same time 
a constitution of the history of the self. One must note that this history 
is not yet in time; rather, it is the basic condition that allows subsequent 
locations of activities and other egos. All this is prior to any objectified 
mediation: I am present to myself in a specific form of the now with-
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out becoming objective, without mediation (Brand, 1955, p. 65). But 
still one can point out that this already shows a presence of objectifying 
temporalization; the very naming of the “now” destroys immediacy and 
assumes a temporal field (Held, 1966. p. 105).
If reflection is temporalization and the primordial life is atempo-
ral, then any reflection will have to explicate the atemporal in a temporal 
way. It has been a persistent phenomenological finding that any temporal 
awareness is essentially incomplete and can never obtain apodicticity – of 
course, we may add, that we have eidetic and apodictic awareness of this 
incompleteness. Any grasp of atemporality must remain at the prereflec-
tive level. Once the atemporal life is given to consciousness, it becomes 
identifiable as a temporalized object, an object in flux.
The difficulties in the delimitation of the anonymous and atempo-
ral life of awareness come to the fore with respect to time. Since all tem-
poral designations originate with traditional metaphysics and ontology, 
they not only fail to enlighten, but are most misleading. Hence, it is 
necessary to exclude various temporal preconceptions. Both, the theo-
retical – linear and the psychological – polar cyclical constructs of time 
ought to be avoided, as well as their opposites, eternity and duration. 
Also, the various spatial and linear metaphors and mythical regions are 
to be bracketed. What is left consists of such possibilities as “everywhere 
and nowhere” (ibid, p. 4), fixed once and for all as “all time” or “all tem-
porality”, and “all temporality of the identical being as the universality 
of its past, present, and future” (ibid, p. 12). Since the term atemporal 
seems to be most neutral and yet encompassing, it has been used to 
designate the living present in this writing. It states a position between 
eternity and time. Atemporality avoids the metaphysical prejudgments 
concerning fixity and the ontological assumptions concerning time. 
Thus the relationship between the experience of permanence and flux, 
or the passive and the active, can best be designated as a transition be-
tween them. It could best be seen as permanence in transition.
Permanence in transition is indeed more appropriate for the con-
stitution of the ground of self and ego relationship. It offers an access 
to the sense of otherness. All the theoretical constructs of appercep-
tion, associative pairing, appresentation, and empathy, assume a priori 
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sense of altereity. Thus the origin of the experience of the sense of the 
other is alreacy given in the atemporal activity of the self. This can be 
maintained not only on phenomenological, but also on logical grounds. 
Since the self is anonymous to itself and its apodictic evidence of itself 
then it cannot claim to be more certain of itself than of the sense of 
another. Waldenfels agrees with this assessment. If the self is an anony-
mous life, then it cannot have the slightest power of disposal over it-
self. In this context, it is difficult to say which activities are of the self 
and which belong to an ego as distancing from the self, as the sense of 
otherness. Thus, even at the anonymous level there emerges a first con-
nection between a self and an alter-ego. This emergence is necessitated 
by the slippage, the stance in transition. The reflective recouping of the 
self in that transition is a direct recognition of itself as other and self. 
Originary self constitution of a streaming awareness of the anonymous 
self is coequal with a “we” constitution. Thus the “other functioning” 
is at this level of anonymity not yet distinguishable from self function-
ing. The only difference is the sense of self and other, and the first and 
second person designation (ibid, p. 76). These are, of course, dependent 
on linguistic traditions.
Having a sense of the other, as being with another, is not separa-
ble from being of the atemporal, anonymous self, in self presencing as 
the ego. This means that common ontification, temporalization, pre-
supposes an anonymous intersubjectivity that is already present. It is 
present in the constant slippage of the self constituting the transcen-
dental “activity” of atemporality, containing the copresence of other 
functional presents, of the sense of others as permanent markers in the 
stream of this activity of the self. This sense leads to the notion that 
each experience of the other, in its originary ontification, for example 
its immanent transcendence, constitutes a horizon. Upon this horizon, 
the experience of all others as copresent leads to the notion of the living 
present as an indefinite horizon, encompassing all selves and their self 
temporalization. What is to be noted is that such an encompassment 
is given to the originary reflection, and hence constitutes an originary 
temporalization, and an originary compulsion toward ontification. 
This is what appears to be the ground of all possible we-consciousness 
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and the history of the self that can instantiate permanent egos as senses 
of otherness, yet containing continuous relationship to the self as the 
anonymously constitutive stream.
The self can enact the flux in ways that empower, maintain, sup-
port, enhance the permanence of any ego in the flow. We called this the 
activity of permanence maintenance. At this level, the ego and the acts 
attributed to it acquire a sedimented and repeatable identity. It becomes 
a recognizable personality. Indeed, it claims that it is all that the self is, 
and thus can usurp the place of the anonymous self. The latter, nonethe-
less, is what constitutes the flow of awareness that maintains the stasis 
of the ego. One clusters various habits, repeated activities around the 
ego, which become the very history of the self. 
hISTORY, SELF ANd EGO
There has been a number of outstanding discussions on the ques-
tion and problem of individual and collective history. These include the 
experience, foundation, and aim of history. Central to these discussions 
are the late works of Husserl. They not only focus on the historical devel-
opment of philosophical issues, but above all depict history as the grand 
fact of being. At the same time, he saw the appearance of crisis in modern 
Western history. There are three major reasons that lead us to focus on 
this issue in relationship to the question of self, ego and alter-ego.
First, the emergence of various historical schools of philosophy, 
ranging from life philosophies, through methodical hermeneutics, to 
philosophical hermeneutics. These trends lent priority to a trans-hu-
man dimension called historical understanding that makes the human 
subject to its force. Second, the difficulties in resolving the above dis-
cussed issues of the self and the ego as the living present. yet, if history 
is experienced humanly as we-consciousness, then its ground is already 
prepared by this consciousness. The latter could neither be bounded by 
a specific synchronic milieu nor limited by any particular dogma. Third, 
at the level of history of the self and the we, the given plurality of egos 
or others are imbued with meaning and can be regarded as traces of 
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the constitutive activities of the anonymous self. Without the latter as 
a self constituting flux, history of the self and its traces in multiple egos 
has no foundation and may become posited as a self generating event 
that dominates over a people. Such domination has been assumed by 
too many modern thinkers, specifically in the nineteenth and twentieth 
century.
While avoiding such historicizing, we must also take care not to 
become entangled in psychologizations of the self. Such entanglements 
would either reduce sense to inner psychological states, or abolish sense 
as irrelevant to psychological facts. If the latter is chosen, then neither 
the self nor the other as an ego would function in experience. Psycho-
logical states do not bear indices of selfhood and egology. yet if the 
latter factors make sense, then to disconnect fact from sense would lead 
psychology to posit both the self and the distancing ego as two entities 
with immanent or inner characteristics and their own histories if, in-
deed, they would be identifiable at all. yet our brief considerations have 
suggested that the more originary phenomena of the anonymous self 
are not founded on natural or the identifiable egos as others of the self. 
The first task then, is to show that the history of the self, traced across 
various egos as its given accomplishments, as facticities, is not antitheti-
cal to these very facticities even in their psychosomatic interpretations, 
in at least two important ways. First, history of the self is completely 
tied to the sense of the others and their experience, and not to psyche. 
Second, the historical extension of awareness from ego to ego, and even 
from generation to generation, is not material but significative. This is 
to say, what it transmitted is the sense-making of the others, the other 
egos, and not brute facticity. Indeed, the latter is not even a given in any 
phenomenological sense. Basically speaking, every factual activity is an 
awareness of a system of sense implications. Historical communication, 
dialogal encounter, has the conditions for its possibility in the anony-
mously functioning absolute self and its first traces of temporalization 
and its primordial institution of the sense of “we consciousness”, in the 
flow of acts. This means that any identifiable ego and its activity, en-
countered in time, is an index, a trace of the absolute life, leading to the 
experience that the historical facticities are not excludable contingen-
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cies, but are essential traces of the constitutive acts of the self. Indeed, 
the already given egos in flow are sedimented modalities of the process 
of judging, predicating, perceiving, as constituted by pre-predicative 
life of consciousness (Landgrebe, 1963, p. 200). The sense of the real, 
encountered in experience, implies a specific consciousness process 
wherein the ego appears as this “kind” or having this “type” of being. 
Thus the question is: What kind of experience is, or was required, in 
order for a particular kind of being, having a particular meaning, to be 
present? This means that a question about the essence of specific egos, 
their sense, becomes a question of consciousness activities – intention-
alities. Every given ego in flux is already subtended by, and correlated 
to the temporalizing activities, and the essential structures of such ac-
tivities (Landgrebe, 1968. p 79). The egos are historical in the sense of 
being points of reference from which enactments toward the world are 
articulated. Such enactments are read as attributes of a given ego, the 
other from the self, that can be enhanced, denounced, disclaimed, or 
completely rejected: “It was not me, it could not have been me, I am not 
that kind”. They are not imbedded in nature but are significations that 
comprise a way of making sense of the world and are accessible to all. 
The accessibility hinges upon the primordial life and its incessant trans-
formative syntheses, its “slippage”, that exhibits self distanciation and 
unification of a self-ego, an originary we. Thus, every ego encountered 
in historical sedimentation is accessible to any self and to any other ego 
in terms of sense constitution and the type of ego it is.
If the atemporal awareness has no given temporal location, if it 
can regard itself from then to now, and can attach itself to any now as a 
locus of any possible ego, then any identifiable ego in time is traceable 
“vertically” to the self as a founding condition required for the consti-
tution of this egos sense. Every established ego is not only a system of 
activities, but also an index, a clue. The totality of clues need not stem 
from present awareness, from the manner of present activity. yet they 
can be relived, reanimated as achievements of my others and thus open 
to totality of subjects. Because of the atemporailty of the self, it can form 
attachments to any of the egos and reclaim their stasis by maintaining 
the flow that enhances the stasis. The enhancement may “forget” itself 
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completely and become regarded as the very activity of the maintained 
ego. This, then, excludes other egos and the background anonymous 
self. Indeed, the latter may become simply another, alien, and not a 
voice to heed.
Even if forgotten in their uniqueness and singularity, the egos 
are settled in one’s surroundings bearing the typological structures for 
continuous re-experiencing, as memorial traces that may focus ones 
appropriate enactments in correlation to an ego that “remembers” the 
very requisite activities. This is to say, the environment is equally a sedi-
mentation of typological givens and their sense interconnections and 
not a mere sum of facts. By reading the typological structures of the 
surroundings one also reads the correlative activities that are required 
for the very constitution of such typologies and their sense connections 
and overlays. The typologies are various, inclusive of the acts of others. 
to encounter such typological activities one may revert to one of the 
egos and its enactments and either maintain it as stasis by constituting 
the flux, or to disown it, to reject it as an alien being, totally different 
from the self subjected to alien forces that do not affect the self. The dis-
connection from, and thus the rejection of the ego as an alien being, al-
lows one to constitute a position of detachment, of a non-participating 
gaze. The condition of such a gaze is the function of the self as its own 
self disruption. The permanent constitution of flux that maintains the 
stasis of the ego must be disrupted and the sense connection between 
the self and the ego severed. 
The disruption may assume various forms. First, the ego may 
usurp the position of the self by enacting one sedimented orientation 
to the world and thus disrupt the flow that connects with other egos. 
Second, a particular typology in the environmental field may evoke 
one type of constitutive activity on the part of the ego and thus restrict 
the horizon of sense interconnections of the sedimented surroundings, 
This intimates a flux disruption of the self in favor of the egos direct 
attachment to some type of environmental subject matter or activity of 
another. Third, the permanent flux may be disrupted by chronic flux 
reclaiming activities that call for constant doing. But the doing becomes 
for its own sake and never constitutes any novelties. Such activities are 
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still able to maintain the varieties of instanciations of egos, but the latter 
remain dangling, dead relics one do not choose to vivify. They are all so 
boring, and one’s entire life has been nothing but a sequence of various 
egos, each maintained for a while and then discarded: none were worth-
while, and neither seem to connect with others to form a common his-
tory. Fourth, any specific ego can disrupt the flow by constituting its 
own fragmentation and dissolution. In this sense the flux is disrupted 
insofar as there are no identifiable tandems, such as an ego, to mark the 
flow of awareness. If, for example, a past activity attributed to a particu-
lar ego is not acceptable, then the ego ceases to be enhanced; it is not 
only disconnected from the flux of the self, but also ceases to mark an 
orderly temporal loci in the history of the self. The latter also loses its 
orientation and the possibility to obtain self identity in the other, the 
ego. The vanishment of the latter is the disruption of the former’s ori-
entation, continuity, and permanence as flux.
So far we have traced two basic compositions of the life of the self 
and ego; permanence enhancement, its maintenance, and permanence 
disruption, its fragmentation and disorientation. The compositions al-
low us to regard all events of the experienced world, its objectivities, 
to be treated as traces of the activities of the self, the history of its own 
correlations to the world. The self in its others, the diverse egos and 
the world are typological sedimentations of sense. The sedimentations 
need not be explicitly recollected as those of the self. Rather, they are a 
historical past that is attributed to others, the very egos distanced from 
the self from whom one may be completely detached. Mainly, they offer 
themselves tacitly as sedimented enactments of a specific ego, that re-
main identifiable either as past or as possible enactments of the future. 
These passively available accomplishments are not a substructure, pure-
ly associative mechanisms subtending perceptual life, but are always ac-
cessible as an open horizon of indices of activities that one must do in 
order to reenact the same experience. They are present in their sense 
implications and relationships horizontally, and in their constitutive, 
atemporal activities vertically as accomplished by others, by the other 
egos accessible to the atemporally present self. The passive connections 
of indices bearing all experience, comprise the meaning of intention-
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alities and motivations already found in the history of the self. Such 
connections can be either enhanced or disrupted, leading to a world of 
continuity, history, or to a world of disattached egos, with chronic and 
momentary activities without horizons, without other egos.
Each, then, must function in its solitary reiteration as if it were 
marking time, attempting to generate a flux and a horizon, yet remain-
ing caught like one nervously waiting for something to happen, some 
sense connection. This could be called a reduction to the past-present 
such that while it is being maintained, it is also disconnected from all 
horizons and thus from a possibility of constituting another ego, an-
other point of sense making of the world. This is all I am, this is the 
sole reality of myself and the world; it only makes sense to maintain it 
the way it is, and if terrible things are happening to me it must be my 
fault. Thus the ego does not open to possibilities, but searches for direct 
factical causes of the events afflicting it. “I must have done something to 
deserve this”. This does not allow the search for otherness, the opening 
up of a flux in which another ego, enacting the world differently, might 
occur, but the very search for reasons is a flux that maintains one’s per-
manent position of being subject to the burden one must bear. Indeed, 
the others, the alter egos, are equally bearing their load, are also subject 
to their deserts – even if they are not cognizant of them. This is to say, 
their options are no broader than the factual activities they performed 
that led them to the current predicament. By maintaining my own rea-
sons and restricting myself to the factical “all there is”, I also read the 
possibilities of the others in the same restricted way. This is to say, being 
stuck on the sedimented reiteration of indices, I cannot catapult into a 
horizon of flux marked with other egos, deploying diverse possibilities 
of identity and self reflection.
The passive indices, in addition, constitute the field of expecta-
tions in a passive mode. It is not necessary to orient oneself to what 
is expected explicitly. Being in a particular modality of awareness and 
activity, one assumes a passively open horizon that contains an inher-
ent orientation. The latter can be regarded provisionally as a collective 
concept of interconnection of indices, a tacit sketch of possibilities of 
sedimented experiences as possible enactments by any ego. The enact-
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ments, in turn, point to a continuous effort of teleological unification, 
integration, and synthesis of sense. The unification does not mean a 
system of thought designed to explain all events, but an unexplicated 
preconception that the most remote and the nearest historical others 
and events can be understood, can make sense without reduction to 
one modality of a self that is maintained as an ego in its disconnected 
way from the self. Even if such sense contests our own, even if we pro-
claim that this cannot be me, this other is totally alien to who I am, we 
can understand the contestation, and thus extend our awareness by its 
presence.
The indices lead to the self and its vertical constitutive achieve-
ments which are already enacted, and are accessible to any ego in its ac-
tivities of reiterating the sense implications of correlative environment 
and its typological traces, as either sense recouping, or sense disrupting. 
Each novel determination of already enacted others, the distanced egos, 
each new articulation of world and ourselves, is a new clue for the inter-
rogation of sense implications inherent in the encountered egos. This 
novelty is not free floating; it inheres in and is co-constituted by the 
horizons of the other egos. What can become a clue is prefigured by the 
situation of the self and its experiential treasury of sense. As was sug-
gested above, we cannot understand ourselves any deeper as a self than 
would be allowed by the clues encountered in the temporalized horizon 
of the other egos (ibid, p. 81). Thus the tracing of the situations of the 
other egos, their typological environments and their typological self un-
derstanding either as flux or stasis, comprising the context for their ac-
tivities, becomes equivalent to tracing the all temporal, everywhere and 
nowhere of the life of the ultimate self. If all beings, including ourselves 
as worldly in a specific self understand of who we are, are taken as clues, 
then they would no longer function as accidental or contingent factici-
ties, serving to exemplify necessities, but would be beyond the differ-
ence between them. Each, including our own current ego, becomes 
a constituted factical necessity of sense, answering to the question of 
what is necessarily presupposed in the constituting activities. What 
sense constitution, for example, is required as both universal and factu-
ally contingent to yield a being of a specific perceptual type and mean-
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ing? This is exactly where the difference between fact and sense must be 
surrendered. Whatever is given as an individual ego, a perceptual fac-
ticity, is already a perceptual index of the constitutive achievement. The 
relationship to the perceptual, the factual, is incorporated into the clues, 
incessantly pointing to the tacit ground of their constitution. Through 
free variations, as an attainment of sense, the factual is not abolished 
but unfolded in its complete sense. In this process, the transcendental 
subject, the self becomes transparent to itself in its horizons. The re-
gion of the constituted sense, the anonymous process, can be reached 
through a reduction to the passively enacted and accepted field of egos 
as indices and interconnections, capable of either maintaining or dis-
rupting them. Such interconnections are also traces of the way that the 
environmental typologies are prefigured. What is given for each ego, in 
its enactments of sense, is totally correlated to a history of sedimented 
typologies and their connections. If the egological enactments become 
disruptive of the permanent flux and its open horizons, then the hori-
zon of the typologically constituted and interconnected world of sense, 
becomes equally disrupted. yet both, the egos and their world are traces 
of the absolute, anonymous self. Obviously, the tracing of the latter is 
an enormous task. This process must be seen teleologically, as an aim of 
the self explication of the self in the living present. This is to say, what 
are the conditions of awareness that would allow the maintenance of an 
integral self across its own history, deployed in distinct egological pasts 
and future possibilities?
ThE ThEORETIcAL vENTURE
In an essay entitled “The Philosophical Problem of the End of 
History”, Landgrebe (1968) contends that historical process cannot be 
grasped from within history without a contradiction (p. 230). If the aim 
of history were in history, then it would be only one part of history; the 
whole of history could not aim at one of its parts. On the other hand, the 
aim of history could not be something completely alien, transcendent, 
and unknowable. Thus, the meaning of historical events, in the sense of 
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localizable experiences of identifiable egos, cannot be understood with-
out their common aim, i.e. a cognizance that they all have a purpose. 
Since traditional answers to the aim of history – immanence and tran-
scendence – are no longer viable, phenomenology must fill the gap and 
demonstrate the necessity of an ultimate aim from the side of multiple 
egos and their consciousness (ibid, p.231). We hope to trace the experi-
ential access to this ultimate aim.
No normal awareness is closed – it points to open horizons where 
each determination is transcended by indeterminations. This is already 
evident with every minimal impression that breaks up into proten-
tional expectations and retentional diffusions (Landgrebe, 1968, p. 23). 
These include the constant breaking up of the present and self into an 
incessant sense of self communalization, building a base for an inter-
monndie totality. The latter, as a focus containing all possible experi-
ences, perspectives, is the telos. Here we open the notion of atemporally 
constituted supra consciousness. For Husserl, the supra consciousness 
is bound by the historically constituted multiplicity of perceptions that 
comprises a “poli-centric” field. Thus my perception is not only mine; 
I borrow the perceptions of others and thus extend my own awareness 
through theirs, and they through mine. The field is extendable tempo-
rally in that the intentional awareness, such as memory, transmit the 
experiences of egos, as others of previous times. Such experiences were 
unified by the typological content toward which the others, the mem-
bers of the poli-centric community, have oriented themselves and thus 
became accessible to egos of subsequent times. This assumes an implicit 
telos of temporally constituted poli-centric supra consciousness. The 
understanding of others, living at other times, presupposes a possibility 
of unification.
Phenomenological reflection glimpses this telos by tracing the 
anonymous life of the self in the egos to its own maxim of procedure. 
Only such a procedure leads to the resolution of the problem of trac-
ing the self on the basis of temporally sedimented clues. It proposes the 
diminishment of the distance between the already temporalized, sedi-
mented, and the atemporal, anonymous life. This is the telos of history. 
The everywhere and nowhere of the atemporality is thus always present 
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vertically as an incessant recouping of the self communalization in a 
flow. It is thus a constitution of a premordial we-consciousness, of the 
copresence of others, and the infinitely remote totality of all selves. This 
attains a most encompassing focus of a sole inter-egoic universe experi-
enced by the totality of actual and possible selves. An absolute and apo-
dictic prefiguration of an absolute poll-idea of teleology is opened. One 
reaches, here, the all as a focus that is incomparable to any other focus, 
and hence it is unrealizable in any adequate intuition. It is an infinite, 
although apodictic focus (Held, 1966, p. 63). This is the poli-idea of a 
complete unification of the logos, the sense giving principle assumed 
by the anonymous life. Thus the telic logos lends the anonymous life its 
rationality. The sense of this life stems from teleology. The latter is the 
ground of all awareness, and the locus of grounding is the experiencing 
poli-centric consciousness. yet the latter is never a complete grounding 
for an all encompassing self as a functioning present.
But in what sense can the telos be a foundation? Given the phe-
nomenological grounds, it is a priori excluded that the telos could be 
identified with either an ego, or even a we-functioning, or that it could 
be something transcendent. Phenomenology has bracketed transcend-
ence. Even prior to phenomenology, modernity has closed all access to 
anything transcending human experience. Phenomenology must find 
an access to the telos in the very life of awareness. Initially the-poll-idea 
seems to fulfill the demands of telos as rational unity and logos. While it 
may seem to be beyond any worldly experience, it is given apodictically 
as an anonymous self, whose flow institutes the sense of self as other 
ego and as comprising a field of temporal unity of a we-consciousness, 
a telos toward which functioning and constituting egos move. The eidos 
of a final unity of all possible experience transforms all worldly experi-
encing and constitutive life into a teleologically ordered, although never 
closing, movement. yet the poll-idea is still problematic. The poll-idea 
of absolute unity, while present in an unattainable distance, is constitut-
ed as all temporal trans-reality, trans-truth, and trans-self. yet the telos 
cannot be seen as constituted in the activities of the anonymous self, 
since it too aims at unification that is presupposed as intuited in apod-
ictic evidence. Phenomenology must adhere to the limits of experience 
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and grasp the anonymous life as all temporal. Could the telos be under-
stood then as an all-encompassing poll-idea of unity? Since the anony-
mous life of the self as constant self communalization can constitute the 
poll-idea in complete apodicticity, it cannot constitute the certainty of 
unification of the self communalizing life of self. While the poll-idea is 
an apodictic aim, it does not guarantee the unity of the multiple egos. 
After all, each is experienced as distancing from, and other than, the 
self. And yet, throughout the various levels of analyses concerning in-
tersubjectivity phenomenology takes for granted the necessity of such 
a unity. In this sense, the telos is not to be understood as the poll-idea, 
but as the inner ground, the pre form, that is already assumed in the 
formal unification of self communalizing life. It is only on the basis of 
such a pre-form that the we-consciousness could have a telos. This sug-
gests that the ordering principle of the self must be found in an abso-
lute self which is not identical with the self communalizing primordial 
consciousness, but is its unifying pre-form. It is the latter that can offer 
an a priori correlation to the poll-idea of a telos of our awareness. Thus 
the originary form of teleology is no longer the unreachable unification, 
but its anonymous pre-form correlated to the eidos of policentric core, 
of an ultimate and all encompassing awareness of the world. The telos, 
then, is the tacitly present unifying ground of self communalization of 
the self, forever correlated vertically to the poll-idea of all egos as a tele-
ological principle. The latter is not a future but a vertical presence.
Another way of approaching the same question, leading to the 
same conclusion, is suggested in Hussen’s thought. According to him, 
we would not be able to offer an account of our break with the mun-
dane mode of egological immersion and continuity in the world, and 
our turn to phenomenological reflection without having the presence 
of the unifying pre-form. Only the phenomenological stance leads ul-
timately to a justification of all knowledge and activity, and demands 
that I must not only accept the world but become responsible for it. The 
anonymous and prereflective life, comprised of the self communaliza-
tion, is not a reaction to blind compulsions, causes, and necessities, but 
a constitution of free ties, subtended by a pre-form of unity of the pol-
licentric historical process. The pre-form calls for a poll-idea of an all 
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encompassing experience of the totality of a meaningful world. Hence 
I am not only responsible for others, but also for the world. The self 
communalization, subtended by the pre-form as a unifying telos of all 
awareness is uncompelled, prior to temporalization, and hence free. In 
other words, the telic pre-form of unification is the very immanence of 
the subjects freedom and responsibility.
It is important to note that at this level knowledge and value, epis-
temic judgment and ethical responsibility coincide. The very commu-
nalization as a process of knowing through the others stance and per-
ception, is the very value of the other and my complete responsibility 
toward the other. At the same time my unification with the other hinges 
on the assumed pre-form of this unification, and hence on the telos 
functioning in and through intersubjectivity.
The latter being self communalized plurality expressed in the sense 
of other egos, requires the pre-form for its unity, the telos. Hence his-
tory of the self in its diversity and theoretical purposiveness and value 
coincide.
POSTScRIPT
No doubt, other issues are opened. Perhaps the most noted con-
cern is the question of time constitution. It seems that the interpreta-
tion of this question assumes a direction which rests on
mundane prejudgments. Must acts of reflection constitute a tem-
poral distance to the active life? After all, such life is atemporal, and 
the introduction of temporalization in reflection constitutes an unwar-
ranted ontologization. Can the protentional and retentional phases be 
thought as sinking into depth and not into past? Our analyses seem to 
suggest that the sense making processes need not be successive. It is not 
necessary to employ temporalization in order to grasp the meaning of 
time phases and their initial flow. Indeed, the various designations of-
fered as “all-time”, and “atemporal”, suggest an escape of temporaliza-
tion.
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No doubt, there are difficulties presented with the distinction be-
tween the phenomena and the exposition of the phenomena. While the 
phenomena of sense of the other as the distancing self might be all pre-
sent, their linguistic exposition is temporal, leading to the view that the 
phenomena are equally successive. We simply point to these issues not 
because the readers are not aware of them, but due to their own inher-
ent problematic. 
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INdIvIdUAL SELF IN ThE  
cONTEXT OF TWO WORLdS
INTROdUcTION
In the contemporary turmoil of globalization, creating a nomad-
ic civilization of technical elites, having their identities and values as 
specialists or even workers in different positions, we are at a loss con-
cerning who we are, what is essential, and what to believe or think. The 
global pop culture, replete with the images of stars, the Michael Jack-
sons, gyrating huge crowds around the world into mass orgasms, we no 
longer discriminate between individual, social roles, values and worth: 
in brief, we have no conception of arche, of ontological base from which 
to judge. The declaration of universal human rights, cultural rights, na-
tional sovereignity, has lost its force and every mini-tyrant can proclaim 
his right to be the ruler of his people according to the customs of his 
“culture”. But at the end of last chapter we indicated that there is a dif-
ference between the immediacy of individual self awareness, and the 
mediated, social and even cultural selves, the egos, the gurus, the stars, 
the shamans. The task of the following chapter is to disclose two major 
signitive worlds and their cultural symbolisms at the most fundamental 
level – their arche – to note wherein the individual identity belongs.
Lithuania and the entire Central Europe has lived under the rule 
of a vast empire, we could call it Byzantine, despite its other various 
names, such as communism. The latter is simply a variant of a tradi-
tion with a specific arche which is not present just in one location, but 
can be explicated in various modalities. Thus, it might turn out that 
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groups of peoples living in the same geographic regions and claiming 
to be of the same nationality, at the cultural level they might belong 
to an entirely different symbolic signification as to the very essence of 
the cosmos. For example, persons of scientific enlightenment and ra-
tionalism, although living in China, belong to greco-roman symbolic 
design, while fundamentalist Christians, living in the west, might be-
long to midestearn symbolism. In this sense, the signitive phenomena, 
as basic ways of awareness, are neither derivable from nor reduceable to 
particular nationality or geographical site. yet, on the basis of symbolic 
awareness, there will be a radical disagreement concerning the ground 
and form of public institutions, purposes of life, and the very meaning 
of the self. Indeed, each will want to expand and bring such public insti-
tutions to all peoples. It is the case that globalization, and by extension 
universalization, are claims made by every culture. This is to say, at the 
level of awareness, which we call cultural, members of a given culture 
will make a claim that theirs encompasses everything. Greco-Roman 
naturalism and rationalism, up to day, claims that all peoples must fol-
low this mode of awareness in order to be realistic and open and hence 
have public institutions ruled by citizens. But the same universality 
and encompassment is claimed by a Hindu: the founding text of our 
civilization, the Mahabharata, it is claimed, includes all humanity. The 
Mid-Eastern Judaic-Christian-Islamic monism will claim to be subject 
to one law and ruler. In this sense, there appears to be no room for the 
Other. Each cultural awareness will confront the Other with an effort 
to subsume the other under its own logic. Each culture, as a symbolic 
design, will interpret the Others and attempt to locate them within its 
own parameters. If cultural modes of awareness are irreconcilable, there 
arise confrontations that may lead to mutual destruction. We have holy 
wars and racial genocide, we exert efforts to reeducate the Others, to 
make them sane, convert them to true beliefs, and do so for the good, 
the salvation, the enlightenment of the others. Thus, if we bring them 
better material life, medicine, etc., we are doing them a favor. In turn 
if we bring them faith and salvation even if they resist, we can bap-
tize them and send them to heaven. At one level, the modern Western 
scientific and above all technically signitive level, there seems to be a 
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transcultural and intercultural communication and even exchange of 
modes of thinking, creating various technical and pedagogical uses. yet 
these very uses will not be regarded in the same way. One will regard 
these uses as traces of material, pragmatic, or rational civilization, while 
the other will regard them as implements for a holy war. By holy war 
we do not mean necessarily a religious war, but any claim to a position 
that has to be defended at any cost, such as nationalism, market, ethno-
centrism, Hitler as well as Stalin and just as well as Reagan can claim to 
have a holy war against those who are culturally different. 
Given this context, there appears another signitive fact, as part of 
our methodology, that is currently unavoidable: intercultural aware-
ness that inevitably locates the individual ”between” cultures and makes 
one visible in correlation to and different from others. This is to say, we 
are no longer capable of being restricted to one culture, since we have 
already incorporated the cultural means of the others, either at the tech-
nical or at the lifestyle level – even if we reject that lifestyle. In this sense, 
we do not deny that we belong to aculture, but we also recognize the fact 
of cultural intersections. Hence, we shall not borrow a method from 
any culture, because in the current global interconnections the cultures 
are already transparent one through the others – they are in transition. 
Whether we do or do not accept theoretically our own inherence in a 
culture, we are finding ourselves in an in-between domain. This means 
that the self constitution of awareness of current cultures, even if not 
recognized positionally, is in-between, in transition. Whether one be-
longs to Mid-Eastern, Greco-Roman, Mayan, or Hindu culture, one 
has already recognized, at the cultural level, ones being in transition 
between them. This fact of transition and at times confrontation is cur-
rently the unavoidable methodological consciousness. Any other fact, 
or signitive awareness, would be inadequate with respect to the phe-
nomena of our current global encounters. Here our efforts will focus 
on modes of awareness in order to note how such modes either deny 
or attempt to subsume the other modes, and how both attempts fail, 
leading to different understandings and inevitable mixtures of cultures.
In the last chapter we noted that the individual, as more than any 
cultural or social definition, is the ground of cultural symbolic designs. 
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Regardless of a variety of symbolic cultural design, there appear two 
mutually exclusive and mutually indicative phenomena, composing 
distinct signitive modalities: frame and energy, form and power, law 
and love, organization and spirit, boundary and transgression, li and 
ch’i, all implicating the phenomena of structure and action, perma-
nence and change. What sorts of relationships are available between 
these basic phenomena of awareness, they will always appear in the 
analyses of cultural symbolic designs. Meanwhile, at whatever sym-
bolic level and in whatever culture, whether in depictions of nature, 
metaphysical “realities”, empirical givens, subjective constructs, it is 
deemed that structures are in principle definable. Thus any ego, as hav-
ing a recognizable position, belongs to socially established requirement 
– value. On the other hand, change and action do not yield themselves 
to full delimitation and can challenge any position – and this action 
is what defines an individual as worth. In turn, there seem to be two 
“languages”, the exoteric, appropriate for structure, and esoteric, ap-
propriate for action. If they become confused, for example if structural 
language were to be used to frame the awareness of flux, then one can 
expect an ironic consciousness. The same can occur in the opposite di-
rection, where dynamic language may be used to depict an awareness of 
structure. Regardless of cultural variations, all trace the living present 
of structure and change as the basic modes of individual awareness and 
its self identification with some of its “others”. yet what makes for the 
differences among cultures is the way that structure and change are re-
lated. In brief, the modes of awareness are these very relationships. Live 
awareness is the sense making composition which, as phenomena, are 
tacitly present through all cultural symbolic designs. This suggests, once 
more, that what phenomenology calls transcendental awareness at its 
most primordial level, is coextensive with social and cultural architec-
tonic. In this sense, our analyses are phenomenological. 
For our purposes in the investigations of contemporary cultural 
intersections and crises, we shall open four types of relationships be-
tween stasis and flow at the level of individual awareness. First, any 
change can maintain and even enhance a static self, i.e. a social self. 
Second, any change can disrupt or ruin stasis, regardless how either 
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are understood at the symbolic levels of culture. Third, stasis can al-
low and even promote change. Fourth, stasis can completely suppress 
flow, by inevitable laws. These four awareness compositions may ap-
pear synchronically as if they belonged to one culture. The reason for 
such appearance is that at the cultural level there seems to be mutual ac-
ceptance of varieties as long as the varieties are not pushed to the limit 
and, reveal incompatible architectonics. Our following task is to reveal 
these intersections and crises, even among members living presumably 
under the same national banner. Such members might have a greater 
affinity to groups of other nations and regions than to those living next 
door. Thus, a battle concerning the nature of public institutions, cul-
tural clashes, become inevitable.
TRAcING cULTURAL dESIGNS
As is the duty of philosophy, we must make things as clear and 
precise as possible, even at the expense of some psychological discom-
forts to persons who would want to claim that radically different and 
contradictory positions can be “accommodated”. Thus, first, let us look 
at the Western culture and what is its arche, its very condition, this is to 
say what is Europe and the Occident in principle. The term “Europe” is 
2700 years old, and stems from Fonecia as ereb, erebos, meaning west-
ward where the sun sets. First conception was of a direction toward 
the Western Aegean coast, toward a formless Occident. Europe is not 
a name for a precise geographic location, and was not even named by 
“Europeans” but peoples from Asia Minor and its first glance across the 
Aegean sea. In this sense, Europeans knew their identity in a diffused 
way as a reflection from others, lending Europeans a specific move-
ment as a distancing from what is familiar to something that is totally 
strange – it is a tearing away from what is fixed and established and 
opening to the unfamiliar, the open and strange. The last movement 
to tear away from the Middle East was the mortal battle against the 
invasion by Persian autocracy (the cradle of all sorts of monotheisms, 
and divine rulers). The Greeks drew a line not only between Asia Mi-
nor and the West, but also a cultural divide. Three hundred Spartans 
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stood against hundred thousands “obedient to the laws of Sparta”, and 
Athenians sent a fleet to close the access to Occident – equally in obedi-
ence to the laws of their own creation. We can say that for the first time 
in human “history” appeared a human as human, living in accordance 
with human rules, not kneeling before some self declared divinities, and 
rejecting any efforts by the then “great” civilizations of Middle East, to 
make humans subject to some “higher” laws or edicts. We prefer to die 
on our feet than to live on our knees. The line was drawn such that the 
Occident was born as “philosophy”, as searching for the individual and 
responsibility, and realized through paidea, education.
No doubt, the shamanism holy men, and persons who have ob-
tained their education in the West, have justly accused the Occident of 
being imperialistic, colonialist, exploiters, arrogance, and slavery; but 
we must immediately note that it was the same Occident which criti-
cally assessed and denounced these practices and demanded their aboli-
tion globally. This is in accord with the Occidental human arche: we are 
limited, fallible, and responsible for our mistakes; thus we must correct 
them and make certain that they are not repeated. No people, within the 
contexts of their own cultures, have admitted to having been wrong, or 
making mistakes. The Africans, who were the major suppliers of slaves, 
have not admitted their responsibility; the Muslim slave traders would 
not even consider that such an action is wrong. The intellectual fury 
of western intellectuals against western practices is well known: there 
are libraries of books and articles analyzing various ideologies and their 
condemnation as not belonging to the Occidental culture, as to be for-
bidden by law – whether it is communism or fascism, as against human 
rights. We find an interesting global contradiction: the denouncement 
of the Occident, coming from members of other cultures and demand-
ing admittance of “guilt”, at the same time constantly appeal to the West 
to help abolish inhuman practices in their own cultures, to intervene 
and to bring “democratic” reforms, to help build education, health, and 
to welcome the others as immigrants to the West. In brief, the West is 
guilty, but at the same time it is only the West where the others seek 
refuge and protection. It offers and demands rationality, universal, yet 
modifiable laws, responsibility, and accountability. Let us then look at 
the very creation of the Occident in Greek life.
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We could take some well known cultural and social phenomena 
and demonstrate our case of contemporary cultural intersections and 
clashes quite easily. But we do not wish to be accused of following the 
easy path. Hence, we shall select cultural symbolic designs that operate 
at the level of what currently would be regarded as interesting stories. 
We shall begin with the rebels found in the stories of evil. Such stories 
should also reveal the psychological states and social relationships of 
the rebels. Literate persons are familiar with the assertion that Western 
world is rooted in classical Greek thought. The latter was also rich with 
stories one of which was a depiction of a rebellion against the law of 
highest authority and thus a violation of the rules of action. This ap-
pears in the myth of Prometheus, who rebels against Zeus’ edict that 
forbids fire to humans. Prometheus, moved by the unnecessary suffer-
ing of humans, steals fire from the gods and gives it to humans. Here we 
have practical assistance for which Prometheus does not ask anything. 
He does not wish to rule or to have others follow his way of life. What 
is interesting is that the Greeks accepted the action of such a rebel as a 
noble violation of bad laws. Although speaking formally, the act of Pro-
metheus was “bad”, his personal nobility and his positive attitude and 
qualities outweigh his formally bad act. Prometheus may be regarded as 
practically rational and secular naturalist. His aim was to help others, 
but with this help he changes the notion of instituted symbolic designs. 
Even Zeus accepts this change by admitting that his edict prohibiting 
fire to humans was a bad law. The secularism of Prometheus appears 
in his personality which is independent from any authority. He has his 
own views and is capable of planning his own future based on his own 
knowledge and choices. If he makes mistakes, he admits them and cor-
rects them. After all, Prometheus had decided to support Zeus in the 
battle against the titans, but after the battle he recognized that Zeus had 
become a tyrant. Thus he decides to correct his mistake by rebelling 
against Zeus’ laws simply because he decides that such laws are practi-
cally unjust. Here the highest authority is negated as unacceptable in 
principle without any question as to one’s own benefits. In this classical 
Greek story one develops the notion of personal responsibility for one’s 
own action. Although one makes mistakes, he takes full responsibility 
for such mistakes and deems it his duty to correct them.
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This story suggests a cultural symbolism that points to a lived 
awareness, composed of a specific relationship between stasis and flow, 
structure and action. In Promethean story, Zeus is the highest cultural 
symbol of stasis – having a social definition as authority. Prometheus, 
in turn, is a cultural symbol of action. As an initial supporter of Zeus, 
he reveals an awareness of permanence maintenance and enhancement, 
and hence become socially identifiable. yet by becoming a rebel, he dis-
closes an awareness which is disruption of stasis, and hence of his po-
sition in society. Such a disruption in the story of Prometheus reveals 
that an individual is more than any social position would allow and, in 
the final outcome, a very specific relationship between stasis and flow: 
the highest symbol of stasis – Zeus – agrees with Prometheus and thus 
abolishes his permanent social position. In this sense, stasis can be open 
to flow, allowing the reappearance of an individual in action prior to 
social positions and cultural designs. This means that at the cultural 
level, there arises a possibility to challenge any authority, law, to inter-
rogate them sensibly by an active individual, and thus to change them. 
In other words, there emerges a dialogical relationship between active 
individual and stasis of society. In our setting, cultural symbolic de-
signs can compel social changes. Given this composition of awareness, 
classical Greek understanding could not escape radical individualism. 
Every position, every tradition, even the thinking of the highest figures, 
can be interrogated openly and reasonably, investigated, analyzed, and 
requested to justify themselves in a full light of public and polilogical 
debate. If a given position, and even an accepted tradition cannot be 
justified by reason and by the well being of humans, then they can be 
openly rejected. This is the reason that classical Greece comprised an 
arena of intellectual tension among multiple positions, views, all calling 
for an open public in whose context such a tension could be maintained 
if not resolved. The agonal culture, a play between active individuals 
who challenged their own positions and the social positions of divini-
ties and themselves. This active individualism had to create an open 
public space that comprised a cultural symbol of stasis that tolerated 
and enhanced all creative flow of individuals. The individual’s “law” is 
this: it requires a maintenance of stasis that allows individual’s flow be-
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yond any social norm. This lived awareness comprises the ground of 
every person’s rationality and responsibility, and also founds classical 
and the modern Western democratic understanding that demands au-
tonomy and equality of all persons in open public institutions.
yet there is another important aspect for the creation of Western 
culture that distinguishes it from other cultures. This aspect is known 
as “Orestea” tradition, disclosing the arche of what it is, in essence, a 
human life. Let us look briefly at this aspect. Without having done any 
deed to deserve either favors or disfavors, Orestes is placed in a situ-
ation between the polar powers: the furies, the earthy-maternal and 
Apollo. As we know, Orestes, the son of Agamemnon, is called upon 
to murder his mother and thus avenge the murder of his father. But he 
has not placed himself in the situation to murder his mother in order 
to be true to his father. His only “guilt” is being a son. None of his own 
passions should move him to the tragic deed. Only the command of 
Apollo, the master of his world, binds him irrevocably to murder his 
mother, even in contrast to all his efforts to resist such a deed. And yet 
he must also accept the consequences of his deed and be guilty in face of 
the powers of blood of earth goddesses. Orestes is gripped by the clash-
ing cosmic divine forces and the human is only a play of such forces that 
are impossible to overcome, resist or escape. He reflects on the stage all 
that constitutes the essence of Greek tragedy. Whichever side he selects, 
he will be culpable. If you don’t, you are damned, and if you do you are 
damned. Hence, if there is a way out it will be his burden to find it.
With his origin from the worlds of spirit and blood, his descent 
from mother’s right and father’s rule – two images of distinct and sepa-
rate powers each having a part and equal claim in one person, the son – 
he is placed on the stage for the first time in human history as a mere 
human. The gruesome battle between the forces comes into focus in 
Orestes. In order to be adequate in deed to his father he must murder 
his mother. Without a slightest deed by the individual, the human finds 
himself in a setting of tragedy. While not having chosen this life, he 
is called upon to be responsible for its direction; while not capable of 
denying his heritage for which he is not guilty, he is made to be guilty. 
While he resolves to act, i.e. to accept his heritage and in turn to rec-
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ognize the responsibility and guilt for his act, he discloses seriously for 
the first time the magnificence and the decay as characteristic of what 
is human – a human who is his own greatness and poverty. Here free-
dom and responsibility cannot live without guilt. Orestes recognizes his 
own tragedy. tragic life of man consists of being the sole entity who in 
his freedom is called upon to struggle for life and in an absurdly para-
doxical way he is a play thing of this very struggle. His consciousness 
and conscience is a playing field needed by great cosmic forces to test 
their own powers. Our human story runs the gauntlet of clashing cos-
mic forces depicted in divine imagery and human gender antagonisms. 
The struggles and sufferings of humans are designed to bring into relief 
and foreground the forces that have heretofore dominated human life 
in invisible, cunning and secret ways. 
It was a divinity that demanded the murder of the mother and the 
spilling of blood to atone for the spilled blood of the father. It is Apollo 
who provoked the furies. There should not be any reason to demand 
Orestes blood unless he is guilty against himself. In this sense for the 
furies Apollo is not only one of the guilty parties, he is the only one who 
is totally guilty. Apollo is confused by such logic, since more sacred and 
most dear to man than ties of blood is honor. The strife between Apollo 
and the furies is not just between two divine regions, but between two 
world orders each sanctified by its own divine images. The region of 
Apollo, the sky, does not spring from the earth and is not held together 
by blood, but is an invention of man proclaiming his freedom from the 
earth. If man’s imagery is to survive his own short life span, he must 
be concerned with his continuation through blood. The children, born 
of mother, must become his own. Hence man had to accept family life 
and to transform it in a way that he becomes a master of the woman 
and submits both to the rules not derived from life, but imposed from 
above. Following this path he becomes a chief, a leader of a tribe, a king, 
and his order, sanctioned by sky figures such as Apollo who guarantees 
man’s social identity and position, he is not yet a master of himself. 
There is no question that man can gain his identity by identifying him-
self with higher authority, be it social or transcendent, but not yet hav-
ing identity of his own.
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Apollo sees the claims of the furies as wasted nonsense originat-
ing with barbaric times. With his rule, a superior order has been es-
tablished. He is so certain of the higher position that for him even the 
natural mother right – which cannot be avoided without surrender-
ing man’s continuity – must stem from man. For the divinity of light 
this state of affairs seems unquestionable and he demands and receives 
praises for his achievements. This does not provide the resolution be-
tween the two forces, and Zeus appoints Athene as a mediator. Athene 
is well aware that gods and goddesses must have an equal claim as valid 
powers of cosmos. As became obvious, the situation ends in a dead end 
such that the case of Orestes is well beyond the solution by divinities 
such as Apollo or the furies; it seems hopeless. Athene does something 
completely unexpected. While she was appealed to by humans, who 
have reached a hopeless situation, to resolve the issue by her wisdom, 
she simply pointed to a terrestrial human possibility that would be fit-
ting to make humans into what they are in essence. But the possibility 
was unheard of and radically new, invented and founded by the god-
dess of the city of Athens. This is a moment in human history where the 
healing and welfare of humans is handed back to them. It is not handed 
to some singular hero who is usually a supporter of his own group, but 
to the totality of individuals who, in their mutual work with each other, 
will establish harmony. This mutuality is valid only if it stands under 
the rule that all matters of life and death shall be the affair of the hu-
mans. Athene suggests that to escape the strife, humans must establish 
their own court. The time and place for the establishment of such a 
court must be immediate, since the law of blood vengeance, whether 
demanded by mother earth or the will and honor of the sky god, be-
came helpless to solve this human problem and thus must surrender 
its unworkable and destructive solution. If humanity as humanity is to 
continue, it must find a new way. The stage is set: there is a place into 
which enters the murderer of his mother, Orestes, and right behind him 
the entire blood demanding swarm. Not willing to abandon his favored 
Orestes, Apollo also shows up to show his contempt for his opponents 
in this peaceful setting. How will Athene protect the people of her city 
from being drawn into this self destructive strife?
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A surprise follows: not only she does not protect the citizens from 
the angry encounter, but in fact pushes them into it. From among the 
honorable citizens she devises a court that will be empowered to de-
cide the case of Orestes. She throws the gauntlet at the citizens’ feet 
that demands the abolition of blood vengeance without abolishing the 
sanctity of life. Of course, Athene does not leave the citizens “hanging” 
with this problem; she leads them to the only way that it could be mas-
tered: court should take over the responsibility of making judgments 
concerning guilt or innocence of any citizen and thus break the chain of 
blood vengeance. But what lends the court such wondrous power and 
wisdom that no divinities possess? It is significant that by proposing 
a court Athene excludes the passions of affected persons; an impartial 
court need not consider personal hates, loves, commitments to blood 
line or allegiances to groups. Thus the question of revenge is equally 
abolished. Moreover, a judgment does not come from one person, 
whose views might be narrow, but from persons who are selected for 
their known honor, honesty and truthfulness. The court, in its judg-
ment, will be charged not only to consider the well being of the indi-
vidual, but above all of the entire society. The judgment should follow 
the majority vote cast for or against a person after careful considera-
tion of motives, witnesses, and validity of arguments. yet another pos-
sible suspicion should be avoided: the conspiracy of the judges to rule 
in a specific way in a given case. Thus, while the court proceedings are 
common, each judge will make his decision without consultation with 
others. In brief, no “party” formation is allowed. Only individuals with 
their sense of responsibility for the community comprise final decision. 
truth here is integrated from partially available decisions where each 
brings to bear on the whole to the extent that each judge has also a view 
as to the good of the whole. 
The arche, the principle of this story so far is that humans are fal-
lible, and yet they must turn back to themselves as individuals and, as 
best they can, decide all matters by themselves. This reminds us of our 
first chapter and the quest for the essence of “fact”. There, each individ-
ual, participating in public affairs, must exclude his private, psychologi-
cal etc. aspects and deal with the case as it is, and do so as an individual 
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judge. This is what Athene demands: each individual must test the facts, 
weigh the evidence and make a decision – as an individual. At this level, 
the founding by Athene her city is a celebration of a birth of individual-
ism, responsibility and factual “objectivity”. Here, humans are free to 
decide and agree, but must also observe the limit which would be fatal 
if transgressed. The limit is transgressed when the court fails to per-
form in accordance with the conditions set out above or when citizens 
fail to adhere to the rules requiring each to respect the humanly estab-
lished laws. If these implications are accepted, then the human settle-
ment, established by Athene, will become Polis. But the citizens must 
be reminded what occurs when the limit is transgressed. That is why 
given the tragic human condition, the understanding of Polis (politi-
cal society), does not come after the age of the lion – the hunter and 
hunted, but from its very essence. This is a complex proposition; after 
all, Aeschylus parades the entire blood bath sequence on the stage in 
full force to demonstrate that the very clashing forces must be visible 
in the Polis. In order for the forces not to explode the newly built Polis 
of light, each citizen must be watchful for the explosive powers which 
are built directly into the Polis. This light would allow the exclusion 
of blood guilt from entering into judgment of person’s responsibilities 
and duties. The goddess of Athens speaks for the new light and the new 
age that begins the epoch of “Orestism” such that the dangers of blood 
vengeance are replaced by the world of human common sense. Person’s 
pride is invested in being a citizen of his Polis and the responsibility for 
its freedom. The Polis is built by homo humanus must be constantly 
realized and maintained by each citizen if the human order is to pre-
vail. The Polis is, the primal image of human order in principle, and 
hence an idea in the full sense of the word in Greek. Orestie is used to 
make visible this idea as human individual arche. The established Polis 
is permanent, but all the forces that were directly active in tragedy, are 
to be revered and present to remind the citizen of the consequences of 
forgetting his responsibility. This is a first and unique way of separat-
ing political society and religion. Religious figures cannot be banned, 
divinities must be present, but no longer as images of worship, but as a 
presence to remind the citizen of what would happen if he failed in his 
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responsibility: return of the strife of divine forces in the midst of human 
affairs such that the strife would demand of humans to take sides and 
battle for their various divinities – back to tragedy. Perhaps this should 
be a lesson to our current age where political society is attempting to in-
troduce divine strife into human life, leading to vengeance of one group 
against another, where mass murder, holy war, murder in the name of 
“historical inevitabilities”, murder in the name of a nation, murder with 
impunity, seems to be acceptable.
We reached a juncture at which the founder of Western philoso-
phy – Socrates – can make his entrance. Although scholars locate So-
crates as the relentless seeker of truth, i.e. categorical epistemologist, 
we must also recall that the first condition of the search for truth is 
the good and a life world where a person can live in accordance with 
the demands of the good as one expression of individuals’ intrinsic 
worth. Only under these conditions that Socrates can search for truth 
as another aspect of intrinsic worth. After all, the search for truth was, 
for Socrates, a practical-existential commitment and activity of a good 
and truthful life. Thus Socrates, like many others, was an object of deri-
sion and caricatures. Essential to Socratic individualism is his admis-
sion that we are fallible, and yet responsible to correct our mistakes 
by finding truth. In this sense, Socrates is part of the enlightenment of 
Athens and a daring to question any authority, whether divine or hu-
man. He accepted the Athenian verdict of death in order to show that 
his and others intrinsic worth demands a life world in which the search 
for truth cannot be forbidden. He placed his internal worth as the good 
above his personal life and could demand that such a good should be 
a part of his life world. The decision by the jury to forbid Socrates his 
daimon, his eros, to “philosophize” was equivalent to a destruction of 
a life world in which his intrinsic worth once had a place. Socrates is 
compelled to face a crisis and reveal a crisis of his life world. He reaches 
and lives an awareness that places his entire life world into question and 
demands a decision: Is the life world, offered by Athenians, adequate 
to fulfill his intrinsic self worth. In turn, are the Athenians, by their 
own action, degraded themselves to a level of social value where truth, 
dignity, honor, will have no place. After all, such a degradation to social 
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value is obvious from the trial when Socrates is offered a chance to sur-
render his troublesome quest and thus become a valuable citizen, and 
when Socrates offers, ironically, to accept a pension from the state for 
“whatever little services that he might render”. Here appears a depiction 
of the first crisis of democracy and Socrates reaches a lived awareness 
which demands a legitimation of the life world which is being offered to 
him. Can his lived awareness, correlated as it is to intrinsic self worth, 
have any perceptual affirmation in such a life world? The latter, after 
all, demands self degradation and thus the denial of self worth. Socrates 
resolves the crisis by accepting the verdict of the Athenians with a warn-
ing: If you condemn me, my fame will spread far and wide; do not do 
this, because it will be forever a black mark on Athens. At base, Socrates 
challenges values, as socially accepted individual positions, and hence 
fitting for categorically definable persons, and opens himself as an un-
defined and anonymous individual who is more than any social func-
tion could exhaust. He demands the primacy of culture over a social 
system of values.
PERMANENT OPEN PUBLIc dOMAIN
The praxis, initiated by Promethean revolution, and by founding 
of the city of light, has a mode of action which is the positing of the hu-
man as an object of human signification, such that none is superior to 
others. It signifies the reality of the universal equality of the human as 
human. The individual, thus, is equal to any other individual, recogniz-
ing no dominance of one person over others, and no authority which 
is not affirmed by the individual’s reflection upon herself. Every indi-
vidual is independent from others, and in a free association with others 
she only recognizes authority of others only if confirmed, agreed upon, 
and appointed by her. The representatives must be accountable to the 
individual and the public. This equality also leads to independence and 
freedom of each. If all are equal, then all should be submitted to the 
same laws, chosen by all. Obviously, this general tendency of equality 
to establish common laws may be specified” by regional and more spe-
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cific laws, but the first impetus is “equality under the law” of all. Thus, 
a central rule. After all, in face of equality, it would be most distressing 
if a law were to apply to one and not another citizen. This includes the 
legislative power, irrespective of what origin this power might be; it too 
must submit to the laws as any individual. 
yet we should point to a difference between democracies: some 
have emerged among the people who had an understanding of inde-
pendence and freedom prior to calling for equality. Once they have 
gained equality, they retained a strong sense of individual freedom and 
a sense of opposition to any governmental decrees that would limit free-
dom. Others have begun with equality, e.g. the European monarchic 
absolutism which had established equality without offering freedom. In 
this case the European development tended toward equality and the call 
for state guarantees of equality even if freedom is to be either limited or 
suppressed. This is the difference between the Anglo-American and the 
Continental trends. The English, who settled in the new world to found 
a democracy, were accustomed to deal with public matters. They were 
accustomed to freedom of thought, of expression, personal freedom, 
and participation in local self-government. They took these freedoms 
as self evident and built their new world of democracy. Equality was 
founded on freedom. For the Americans, thus, freedom is the older 
over equality. For the Europeans the case is reversed. Thus in France, 
when the democratic revolution was established and equality achieved, 
all power went to the state. The lacuna could not be filled by any other 
means. Equality requires that there should not be any rank distinctions, 
and indeed not even singular differences in freedom. 
The eidos of the democratic revolution is equality through free-
dom. yet the equalities established by freedom pose dangers for free-
dom. One wants to be free in order to be equal, yet once equality takes 
root, freedoms begin to shrink. As the French revolution has shown, 
with one act the people acquired freedom, and having established 
equality, again abolished freedom. But what is more troublesome and 
unintended is the tendency of equality toward the median, the aver-
age, and a distrust of any outstanding, or at least publicly unglorified 
personalities. This does not lead to a blatant tyranny, does not abolish 
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public institutions, but has a peaceful pressure against freedom. Free-
dom of course can never vanish in a POLIS that maintains the hard 
won equality. Equality could not long survive without the former. Thus 
democracy is criss-crossed by two trends: on the one hand, the trend 
calling for the centralization of political power and the rejection of such 
a power, and a tendency to demand freedom. 
The democratic revolution takes for granted that there is no rigid or 
fixed form that democracy should assume; it remains open and variable. 
Usually, there is a concern with the well being of the public, but not an 
overly great concern with grand purposes. The individual is “independ-
ent”, although the social enterprises tend to subsume him and exercise 
power over him. While customs are established and maintained, they 
do not have the force of law or inevitability. Even the laws have become 
“humane” guaranteeing not only rights, but many other amenities such 
as protections against social powers and their incursion into the private 
lives, possibilities of public education without ideological impositions 
and manipulations. Of course life lacks the magnificence that was once 
the province of the rulers, at the expense of the ruled. Novelty itself 
seems to be the main outline of the democratic life. Provisionally we 
must point out that while education is a requisite democratic institu-
tion, in the age of political-administrative technocracy, it tends toward 
technical, fragmented knowledge for social and private interests and 
thus neglects the civic knowledge. Here education becomes an equal 
opportunity for technical mastery of a disconnected field. This is shown 
in our articulation of various modes of technological power, scientific 
enlightenment, discursive power, and legitimation crisis. 
If there are drawbacks in democracy, there is one basic means of 
checking them: political freedom. If freedom, which owes its realiza-
tion to equality, is not to disappear behind equality, then these two de-
terminations shaping democratic consciousness must be reversed. The 
democratic consciousness has assumed equality to be preeminent. In 
this sense, freedom is used for the establishment of equality. But if this 
is not to lead to the despotism of equality, freedom must be backed by 
equality of freedom. This is not a surrender of equality, but rather a rec-
ognition of the main factor which made equality possible. This reversal 
164
Algis Mickunas. SOCIAL VALUE AND INDIVIDUAL WORTH
allows the establishment of the initial equation of freedom and equal-
ity: the will to equality becomes the basis for the will to freedom, while 
freedom becomes the determining viewpoint for the will to equality. 
But the transformed consciousness is not adequate for the realization of 
the eidos of democratic polis. We suggest the fulfillment of three condi-
tions:
1.  The thought of freedom cannot be forced upon a person exter-
nally. No placards and proclamations can make one free; one 
must recognize one’s own task and responsibility. Indeed, one 
in a way “knows” this freedom and responsibility, yet one must 
insist upon exercising it. This “knowledge” is equality and the 
latter is a prop for the reversal of equality and freedom in order 
for freedom to be regarded as a basis of equality.
2.  The establishment of this transformation in reality is called for 
when one recognizes its necessity, i.e. when it is endangered. 
If freedom is not seen as threatened, then one will continue to 
maintain equality, but not allow, or at least will not call for, the 
founding of equality on freedom. It could be well argued that 
freedom currently is endangered and precisely by equality. The 
more equality becomes preeminent, insisted upon, the more is 
freedom restricted. Thus what has to be limited is the all perva-
sive power stemming from equality, appearing in the phenom-
ena of mass opinion, political non- participation, privatization, 
etc. This power is what necessitates the transformation of demo-
cratic consciousness toward the priority of freedom.
3.  This necessity is a task to be taken up; if the citizen does not 
take up the task, then freedom ceases to be a factor. Freedom 
is not a state of being but a deed, an insistence and persistence: 
it is the very moment when an individual appears in her action 
and reveals herself as undefinable, as more than a social value. 
No doubt, this kind of transformation of democratic conscious-
ness elicits in the social arena numerous tensions and conflicts. 
The will to freedom reentering the domain of the polis, turns 
against all the tendencies in democracy to limit or even abolish 
freedom in favor of equality. yet such a will is in a position to 
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dissolve the contradiction into which democracy sinks. While 
this discussion has suggested a distinction between freedom and 
equality, it did not imply that a democratic polis could exist on 
the basis of either one or the other. Ultimately, both are a condi-
tion and must be treated as mutual. The culture of Prometheus 
and Athene of permanence as maintaining and enhancing a 
flow, are present as phenomena by the actions of individuals 
who maintain their own individuality only in this action. It is 
important to note that the initial founding of political society in 
the case of Orestes trial, the selected judges did not yet have any 
notion of prescribed social roles and their value; they were sim-
ply asked to act individually, truthfully, with honor and dignity; 
the same can be said of Socrates.
The modern subject that has been universalized in various pro-
nouncements, including United Nations’ universal human rights, both 
individual and cultural, and postmodern claims that demand respect 
for different cultural styles to self determination, are premised on a 
modern understanding of subject as self generating. At the dawn of 
Western modernity, it was recognized that the human has no nature, 
has no essence, has no rules by which to live, and therefore whatever 
nature the human will posses, whatever rules will be followed, whether 
scientific or political, will have to be invented as if “out of nothing”. 
This is an initial suggestion that the modern subject intends to be self 
created without any other conditions, including theological, scientific, 
ontological to the extent that the very distinctions between those terms 
are equally invented without precedence. This is the intentionality that 
comprises the background for the articulation of what a human is as 
self created. Therefore, there is no pregiven subject that can be used as 
a criterion to determine what human subject is. The point we are argu-
ing is that even Descartes could not avoid this intentionality when he 
argued that despite the power of an evil genius, it cannot do anything 
against the fact that I constitute my own thoughts prior to truth and 
falsity. In short, the subject here escapes even an infinite power that can 
cause anything. 
166
Algis Mickunas. SOCIAL VALUE AND INDIVIDUAL WORTH
The subject is posited as totally self constituting without any con-
ditions or, to speak with Kant, an unconditional subject. It seems that 
at this level, the constitution of modern subject has no essential criteria 
that could be used to judge what the subject is as identity. This type of 
self creative subject is totally autonomous, and as autonomous it cre-
ates unconditional methods and theories, and through them its own 
environment. One aspect of this creation is scientific methodology and 
technology. What we are pointing to is that this unconditional subject is 
also the beginning and end of modern Western science and philosophy. 
In Promethean terms, practical self creation of the subject subtends 
the scientific, social, and political theories. technocracy and its vari-
ous disciplines are one aspect of this practical self creation to become 
anything one wants. In this sense, the efforts to deconstruct this kind 
of self generating subject may fail because the subject at the outset does 
not have any social identity. It promises to be the unconditional condi-
tion for everyone to acquire self identity, to become any identity. In this 
sense, the postmodern logic is premised on the modern autonomous 
subject. The reason we say this is that the postmodern logic in principle 
claims that all cultural identities, including our own, have no causal, 
natural, supernatural necessitation, but are pure rhetorical constructs. 
This means that postmodernity and deconstruction accept the self crea-
tion of the modern subject that invents its own logic for mastery of its 
own world and for self definition. The egological self definition is only 
one among many options. Our point is that the postmodern globaliza-
tion assumes this universal self generating subject that invents different 
cultures without any natural, material, psychological causes. After all, 
postmodernity claims that everything is a construct. Our point to this 
claim is that the very notion of a construct is premised on modern au-
tonomous unconditional subject. 
This subject is universalized as the ground of identity for anyone. 
Anyone can create of himself or herself whatever they want. We are not 
saying that there is one specific identity that is offered, but the process 
by which everyone can either invent their identities or accept the identi-
ties offered by their societies. In short, it is impossible for any culture to 
claim that it has an identity without having accepted the logic of choice 
167
Chapter VI. Individual Self in the Context of two Worlds
between the right of every individual to make his/her own identity, or 
the right of a particular group to respect their own identity. What is at 
issue here is that the globalizing universality of the modern subject is 
being proliferated by postmodernity in a way that the others in their 
own self reflection upon who they are, are already placed in a context 
wherein they must play out their lives – between what they can be as 
universal individuals or what they can maintain as their culture. The au-
tonomous self creating subject that is being globalized as universal has 
become a background on which the Others as culturally different would 
be inscribed with their own rights to maintain their culture as singular, 
individual, unique, with a right to self preservation. 
ThEOcRATIc INSTITUTIONS
Now we must turn to a culture, originating in Mid-Eastern abso-
lutist conceptions, appearing in Persian imperial arche and personality 
cults of Judaic, Jesuist, and Islamic types. These seem to constitute an 
entire history that is counter to the philosophical efforts born in the 
West with classical Greece. These Mid Eastern conceptions were not 
only unphilosophical, they were and continue to be aggressively anti-
philosophical. While members of these cults may claim that they were 
and continue to be engaged in philosophy, the forbidding and banning 
of philosophical texts, the burning of books and their writers, belies 
such claims. No doubt, the members of these cults wrote vast texts and 
even used logic borrowed from philosophers, such texts are a good tes-
timony to their anti-philosophical character. All they are designed to 
do is translate their stories about the figures they worship into “philo-
sophical” language and pretend to “prove” the figures in such fairy tales 
really exist. Not only exist, but are the most real among all that is real. 
to one’s surprise, what we experience as the world of things, given to 
direct awareness, is regarded as completely dependent upon the figures 
in their stories. 
There seems to be a glaring East-West tension in terms of the his-
tory of Orient and Occident. Speaking precisely, East and West is the 
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ultimate issue, since the winner will determine the kind of world we 
shall inhabit: despotism or democracy, autocracy-theocracy or philoso-
phy. From the outset, the difference between them was decisive. One 
was completely autocratic, Persian, Byzantine, despotic, lending itself 
solely to an interpretation of “imperative ordering” by the autocrat. 
While it is possible for an autocrat to be benevolent toward the popula-
tion, his benevolence depends purely on his momentary dispositions, 
and the latter can coincide with the power of the laws the autocrat pre-
scribes. We hear the chains from Siberia, the cries of holy wars from 
Middle East, and Middle Ages, the torture cries from the dungeons of 
the autocratic papacy, the threats of total destruction by the magically 
reborn “in faith” and their second coming, the occupiers of “promised 
land” and the holy warriors committed to the establishment of divine 
laws under one universal ruler – and all armed with the latest means 
of technical and military power. The division into East and West is not 
geographic but composed of cultural topography. Hence the West has 
imported, or accepted an exportation of a Judeo-Christian-Islamic tra-
dition of personality cults, stemming from, and completely correlated 
to the Persian autocratic mode of exercising power. This is well reflected 
in one, among numerous others, structural designs: imperial Persia and 
the divinities signifying such a structure. to understand this correlation 
we must turn briefly to a discussion of legitimation.
We must recall that for Occident, legitimation comes from indi-
viduals forming rational agreements and living by such agreements. 
For Mid-Eastern culture legitimation is “magical” wherein the world 
is peopled by figures that are structurally isomorphic with the power 
holders inhabiting the “solar palaces”. There is the celestial Lord-King, 
his Queen, their retinue, their subservient supplicants and worshipers, 
each with a sign of appointed and anointed rank, and hierarchical posi-
tion. This is precisely the imperial regality, and in the final analysis the 
celestial region of stories, inhabited by divinities, that coincides with 
this ruling composition. This is to say, there is no legitimation here, 
since the stories do not justify the imperial deeds but are identical with 
them. The emperor can claim without a fear of contradiction that “we 
are divine”. Thus we find that the Persian imperial morphology and the 
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Judeo-Christian-Islamic composition also coincide. The ruling emper-
or is the law giver and the law, and there should be neither deviations 
nor questions concerning the power of such law. The language here is 
one of edicts and imperatives. All that lives and exists must obey and be 
subordinate to the edicts, indeed must act in ways that would constitute 
a support and enhancement of the edicts. No one can question the im-
perial force of the law, specifically when the law coincides with the story 
imagery that is also the magic of “making of the world”. The imperial 
powers make the world by their commands, and their divinities make 
the world by uttering appropriate words. “Let there be dogs” and dogs 
appeared by verbal magic. Hence the divine edicts are not some ethical 
commands of how humans must live, but are identical with the way 
humans are. At this level, we are faced with an understanding of verbal 
power that becomes coextensive with making, and indeed with an in-
distinction between word and event. The power holder’s every uttered 
wish becomes coextensive with law, deed and reality. 
Up to date the cult personalities are called “lords, masters, lord of 
lords, king of kings” and the followers of such cults must live on their 
knees, slither on their stomachs, sing their “praises to the lord”, go to 
“places of worship”, be grateful and thankful to the lord, pronounce 
that everything depends on the “will of the lord”. The lord is an absolute 
and infinite power; he knows and does everything – a sort of panopti-
cal being and demands that the transgressors of his rules confess their 
misdeeds. He is magnificent, perfect, vengeful and, once a while may be 
merciful. Let us be clear on these points at the metaphysical level. The 
human being, made by the power of magical words, must continue to 
be shaped and ruled by additional words. Hence, he may be declared 
a “sinner” not as some characteristic of his human essence, but as the 
very essence he acquires due to the verbal pronouncement. When some 
high shaman of these personality cults pronounces that a person has 
been “excommunicated” it does not mean, as is usually taken, that he 
is separated from the group, but that he has become by the power of 
excommunication a transformed entity. This verbal power to make and 
remake is evident from the rituals of “forgiveness”. One can become 
transformed back into a humble follower not by one’s own efforts but, 
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in the final analysis, a declaration of forgiveness by some supreme au-
thority or by an appointed servant empowered to forgive the “sinner” 
and remake him into a valuable being. It is important to understand 
the extent to which the notion of being a “sinner” is pushed. While one 
is made in the image of the lord and master, one is born inadequate, 
a “fallen angel” and must be made complete by a magical ritual, usu-
ally called “baptism” where mysterious words are pronounced to ensure 
that this being is truly a human and therefore a valuable worshiper and, 
if need arises, an obedient warrior in the service of the lord’s army. An-
other significant aspect of these cults is the ranking of human beings 
in a hierarchy of social positions: while everyone is made by the same 
magic words, in this life each is destined to have a specific place in soci-
ety which he cannot alter. If he is born a peasant, he will not be able to 
become aristocrat, no matter what he does. It is the will of the lord that 
he is born and must be nothing else but a peasant. An aristocrat is born 
to be nothing else and regardless of his fortunes or misfortunes, he and 
his children will be aristocrats. While everyone is equal in the eyes of 
the lord, this equality is postponed for a life in the “other world” but not 
in the world of flesh and blood. And everyone is watched to insure that 
the established identity and rules are observed – one cannot escape the 
all seeing eyes of the lord.
Thus it is not only the emperor who has spies everywhere – eyes 
and ears that see and hear everything – but the ultimate authority for-
ever knows everything a priori wherein no one can escape his gaze. Any 
hope of hiding is completely abolished. The servants, the appointed 
shamans of this “panopticon” are empowered to “hear the confessions” 
of the sinners and to pass judgment as to the status of the very being 
of those who confess. While the shamans act as eyes and ears of the 
supreme master in the sky, the extent of their vision depends on the 
total vision of the master: the sinner may attempt to get away with some 
omissions in the confessional, but he cannot escape the vision of the 
ultimate master, the lord of lords. This is evident from the rituals of 
the personality cults where no mediating shaman is required for con-
fessions. The individual must admit his misdeeds and transgressions 
directly to the master and proclaim that he was forgiven and therefore 
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restored to the “ranks of the faithful”. One aspect of this ritual shows 
up with the so called “evangelicals” who are “reborn” as one with their 
master. The appropriate shouts and noises, words repeated from some 
fable, empower them to become totally different as persons and, in 
principle, they too become empowered and commanded to “spread the 
word” by any means. The current fever in the United States among such 
groups to “spread the word” around the globe that translates into mili-
tary crusades for the conquest of the “unbelievers” or “infidels” is just 
one outcome of such empowerment. Some may object that the mem-
bers of their group do not use weapons to spread the word, but are en-
gaged in good works among the poor and the unbelievers, or believers 
in “false gods”. That may be the case, but using weapons to kill may be 
more kind than destroying peoples entire worlds as a way of life that 
made sense, was meaningful and allowed them to live in their simple 
ways. to make these people live on their knees in front of imported 
personalities is worse than death: it is enslavement and destruction of 
any vestige of human dignity. Of course, among the fables of the origi-
nal texts of personality cults slavery is sanctioned. That is why the slave 
trade, practiced by the members of these cults, was not considered to be 
evil. In fact, it was regarded as doing a favor to the unbaptized, heathen 
savages who needed to be subjected to the true faith and thus saved 
from their own erroneous ways. As we know, the conquest of the new 
world included the destruction of total populations in order to make 
them subservient to the new masters and their divinities. These actions 
were not based on the arche of Occident, but on that of Mid-East.
The suggestions so far also delimit an entirely different concept of 
the human than that offered by Occident. Not the free person empow-
ered to question and interrogate all positions in an open forum with 
others, a fallible and yet responsible individual, and not even the initial 
autonomous subject of modern thinking, but the one that is “subject 
to...”, is subjected to edicts, to the various strategies and techniques of 
controlling human actions and his very essence. In Mid-Eastern culture 
there are no humans without their articulation as an “ought”, as per-
mitted and prohibited, normal and deviant modes of being, decreed by 
authority. At the very outset the humans (and all things of the world) 
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are defined by what they “ought to be” and thus given a social value. 
They are a priori mediated and defined by another. If there would even 
arise a question of more that their social value, such as their self worth, 
the latter would be conferred, and thus mediated, by some lord of lords, 
king, heavenly being. Such notable as Emanuel Levinas, while rejecting 
philosophy, could not escape the pull of his culture, where the “ought” 
is prior to everything, where everything is measured by mysterious in-
finity who “freely” creates the other. Here we have a reappearance of 
the arbitrary will at the highest level of the tradition of personality cults.
Thus in the West also there is also another culture, with an arche 
from Middle East, and is expressed at the symbolic levels by Hebraic, 
Christian, and Islamic culture. This arche could also be understood 
from stories that depict a rebelion against authority. In this culture the 
rebel is, initially, Lucifer. His rebellion is presented in various guises. 
First, being the first born, he cannot accept the thought that his father-
creator has turned his love toward a younger sibling. Second, he cannot 
accept that he was created by another, and hence does not possess his 
own personality. He wants to be the author of his own being. Third, 
Lucifer’s revolution is absolute: he wants to negate the order of his fa-
ther and replace it by his own empire. In the latter, he would be the sole 
ruler. This does not mean that he can take over the throne of his father. 
In this arche, such a replacement is in principle impossible. Lucifer can 
only have a temporary empire which can mock and at times disrupt 
the empire of his father. In this tradition, the personality of the rebel 
is formed by envy, hate, and destruction. Since the rule of the father is 
absolute and changeless, it is regarded as good, while the disruptive re-
bellion of Lucifer is deemed to be evil. Symbolically, he is a negative be-
ing, and is not interested in helping anyone, in alleviating the suffering 
of others. Even if he fulfills some wishes of others, he does so to corrupt 
and thus to disrupt the order of his father. 
At the beginning, Lucifer was created to serve the father, to main-
tain the father’s order by discovering the transgressors of paternal 
edicts and thus deserving of punishment. In this sense, Lucifer cannot 
have a personal identity of his own. His entire being coincides with his 
service to his father, with his maintenance of father’s laws. to speak 
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metaphorically, Lucifer is the chairman of the board of unheavenly ac-
tivities, charged with suppressing all who defy his father. Indeed, those 
who defy the father, will be regarded as evil. At the level of the arche 
of this culture, the awareness here is activity that maintains absolute 
permanence. In other words, Lucifer is a cultural symbol of this arche 
of awareness. Lucifer’s rebellion constitutes another moment of this 
culture: actions that are disruptive of permanence. yet this disruption 
and its purpose is radically different from the one depicted in the story 
of Prometheus. The latter did not wish to establish a counter empire 
to that of Zeus. His rebellion was born of personal responsibility and 
individual decision which, in the final analyses, was capable of chang-
ing the order at the highest symbolic level. Lucifer’s rebellion has no 
possibility of changing the paternal rules; the latter are absolute and 
omnipotent. There is nothing in the world that is not a subject to this 
symbol of permanence. In this sense the activity of rebellion against 
this permanence, its disruption, is a caricature of action. It cannot make 
any impact on such a permanence. All disruptive activity is destined to 
extinction, damnation and evil as a sign of non-being.
The father-creator and Lucifer symbolism reveals an awareness 
as a cultural arche that is irreconcilable with the one revealed by the 
Zeus and Promethean symbolism. The first awareness does not permit 
an establishment of institutions which would promote the changing of 
laws and even the changing of such institutions for the sake of human 
well being. Moreover, this awareness would preclude any interroga-
tion, analyses, and changes in the symbolically expressed permanence 
of this awareness, and thus to change the very notion of truth and eth-
ics. This arche cannot tolerate independent personalities, individuals, 
who would be capable of an autonomous and rational decision whether 
a given permanence is adequate or inadequate for human needs, and 
whether such a structure should be modified. Such an interrogation 
would be regarded as human pride, and any proposal to change such 
permanence would be judged as bad conscience that introduces chaos 
and evil, based on human inadequate thinking. After all, Lucifer cannot 
know more than his father-creator, and cannot decide what he wishes 
to be – apart from sitting on a tyrannical throne as his father – a pure 
imitation. This cultural arche does not imply democratic and open in-
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stitutions where rational and responsible persons can decide common 
issues – without appeals to “highest authority”. 
Democracy and its open dialogue concerning human ways of liv-
ing and working together, cannot equate with father-creator and Lu-
ciferine symbolism and its basic cultural awareness. In the latter, one 
acquires a personhood and value from the obedience to another. Such 
a person finds himself in the first phase of Luciferine symbolism: he 
must act to enhance the absolute permanence and destroy everything 
that poses any threat to such permanence. Obviously, this also provides 
the logic for “holy wars” where everything is mobilized, subjected, and 
sacrificed for the victory against evil. In this arche there is no permis-
sion for open dialogue or choice. One either fights for, or is an enemy of 
the one true truth. The Promethean cultural arche, where permanence 
enhances change, and allows itself to be changed, endures through the 
Western modern thought and comprises the ground from which origi-
nate democratic, open public institutions. As permanent, they allow 
most diverse activities and tolerate various positions – even the sym-
bolic design of father-creator and son Lucifer. Within the Promethean 
civilization, the Luciferine is regarded as one among others and ac-
corded equal status. Its followers can discuss and critique openly other 
symbolic designs, and in turn can be evaluated by others. Everything 
can be accepted, rejected, challenged, and questioned. yet the Lucifer-
ine awareness defines everything as a creation of a changeless structure 
which cannot be moved by any questioning and dissatisfaction. If there 
are wrongs in the world, they are wrong only due to the shortness and 
inadequacy of human vision. Seen from the symbolic design of father-
creator, all is absolutely right and changeless truth. Everyone must be 
obedient to this truth and right. Those who fail to serve or have other 
truths, are, by definition, wrong and evil. Moreover, since this cultural 
arche is militaristic, requiring mobilization for war against all false-
hoods and evils, the followers of this awareness cannot tolerate others 
who think otherwise. If one’s consciousness belongs to absolute truth 
and good, then such a consciousness will regard those who think other-
wise as absolutely deviant and evil.
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While the birth of human as human arche demanded a direct ac-
tion of fallible and yet responsible individuals, with a duty to question 
others and above all themselves, the Mid Eastern arche has no indi-
viduals who are not mediated by an authority and given values in a 
hierarchy of preestablished positions. This arche has its variants in the 
theologies of communism and fascism, where there are no responsi-
ble individuals because everyone is mediated by social class, functional 
values, race, and hierarchy of commands. Moreover, such theologies 
proclaim the rule by inevitable historical laws (moving humanity from 
the city of man to the city of god) to which everyone is subjected. Of 
course, those who demand to live by Promethean cultural arche, are 
immediately disqualified from these theological value systems and, as is 
well known, eradicated. In brief, the individual as such is never allowed 
to appear, since for these theologies, there are no unmediated individu-
als – except those who are the “leaders”.
This cultural arche appears in contemporary globalization in the 
guise of various fundamentalisms and their activities. These move-
ments also include various fascistic. They have an affinity with theologi-
cal symbols, although expressed in a secular guise. Just like the Hebraic, 
Christian and Islamic fundamentalisms, they too are called to a holy 
war – until a total destruction – against all the deviant and evil others. 
All these trends have a dictatorial hierarchy of rulerships. Regardless of 
the symbolisms that reveal this mode of awareness, one thing is clear: 
in its militaristic phase, it has a task of establishing its absolute truth 
and changeless good, and at the same time of destroying all that does 
not comply with such truth and good, all who doubt, interrogate, or 
reject this mode of awareness. Given the latter, it cannot tolerate, above 
all, the Promethean mode and its cultural – individualistic –arche. Af-
ter all, such a mode tolerates various truths and numerous goods, and 
thus in accord with the Luciferine mode, tolerates falsehoods and evils. 
In this sense, the first task of father-creator and Lucifer son is the de-
struction of Zeus-Prometheus, and Athene’s mode of awareness and 
all that flows from it, including democratic institutions, and ration-
ally, autonomously and responsibly thinking persons. The most urgent 
task is to destroy such persons, since they maintain the permanence of 
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open and changing institutions that allow flux and require tolerance. 
The basic divergence of these two modes of architectonic awareness, in 
the West, frames the cultural crises, social tensions and confrontations, 
specifically with respect to public institutions: either fallible humans 
with their flawed and correctable institutions and views, or an absolute 
theocracy – one lord over all nations, one truth, and the bearers of this 
truth shall have a voice.
Meanwhile, the Promethean awareness extended to political and 
scientific enlightenments whose basis was open institutions promoting 
a rational public interrogation of all truth claims and promotion of tol-
erance of differences of opinions. Although our opinions may diverge, 
we shall not only permit, but regard it as our duty to allow others, with 
whom we disagree, to speak. This duty is necessary to challenge and 
to test our own opinions in face of those presented by the others. This 
mode of awareness, at the level of scientific enlightenment, constitutes 
a serious component in the confrontation between the two cultural 
arches. One of the founding conceptions of scientific enlightenment is, 
basically, Promethean: sciences are to serve practical human concerns. 
At this level resides one of the main reasons why those, who are living 
and acting in accordance with the father-creator, Lucifer son mode of 
awareness, call the modern West “the great Satan”, and demand a holy 
war. Such calls come even from within the West in the form of clinic 
bombings, demands for a religious war against those who think and act 
differently etc. This simply indicates that the modes of cultural aware-
ness are not geographically bounded.
to understand this demonization of Promethean “secularism”, we 
shall suggest the way scientific enlightenment “transgresses” the rules 
established by the Luciferine mode of awareness. Scientific enlighten-
ment is premised on practical assistance conception. In other words, in 
case of need, one can go counter to the will of divinities and their edicts, 
but also to change natural processes in favor of human practical needs. 
This practical conception, leading to technological mode of rational-
ity, offers possibilities to transform nature in accordance with human 
requirements and even rules. In this sense, the human can become a 
creator of his/her own environment and even humanity, and to manage 
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all affairs in a secular manner. Although claims may be advanced that 
there are “natural laws”, even such laws can be used for human well 
being and, given increasing technical sophistication, can be changed. 
We have explicated this „instrumental rationality“ all the way to the 
formal-signitive level.
In this context there appears a basic opposition to the father-
creator symbolism. The latter must claim that nature is pervaded by 
and obeys the rules established by the creator. to speak metaphorically, 
nature is “imago dei”. Thus any change of nature in accordance with 
humanly constructed rules suggests the transgression and violation of 
the divine rules. In other words, humans not only do not accept the 
rules, but can change them and thus disrupt the creator’s permanent 
order. Moreover, humans take the place of the creator by establishing 
their own rules and by changing nature in accordance with such rules. 
Human action turns out to be an absolute disruption of absolute per-
manence. Such a disruption is not allowable in the consciousness ex-
pressed symbolically by the father-creator imagery. For this imagery, 
the Promethean human is identical with Lucifer’s revolution: total dis-
ruption of father’s order. This is possible only if we fail to note that 
the Promethean mode is premised on assistance to humans, while the 
Luciferine mode is designed to subject all in order to rule and to mock 
his father. We can extend this comparison even further. The secular hu-
man not only disrupts the order of the father-creator, but also creates 
the rules “as if out of nothing” and restructures the world and herself by 
such rules. In this sense the Promethean human becomes the creator of 
itself and its world. But this means that such a human becomes identical 
with the father creator and, at the same time with Lucifer’s revolution. 
After all, Lucifer had to establish his own rules “out of nothing” in order 
to establish his counter empire.
Obviously, Lucifer’s empire is radically distinct from the Pro-
methean world. The latter allows others to create their own lives and 
to be responsible for them. In Lucifer’s world, all has to be used for the 
intentional battle against the father. All that the modern Promethean 
and secular humans achieve will be regarded as evil (in principle) and 
is destined for destruction. For the modern human of scientific enlight-
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enment such symbolic designs as the natural plan of the father-creator 
are completely irrelevant. Modern humans are interested in mastering 
nature for their own purposes. Seen from the active followers of father-
creator, such human mastery and transformation of the world is an in-
tent to destroy the order of the creator. This is one major reason why the 
modern Promethean humans are regarded by various Hebraic, Islamic, 
and Christian fundamentalists as the Great Satan. In other words, such 
humans, in their invention of rules and in their technical changes of the 
world, are also interrogating the inadequacies, partial evils, imperfec-
tions of the world and, by implication, the inadequacies and perhaps 
evils of the creator. Those who maintain in their actions the father-
creator as an unconditional permanence, and nature as the image of 
permanence, cannot avoid in regarding the secular, Promethean mod-
ern human as full of pride, self assurance, and eager to challenge the 
highest structure of Being in order to make it one among many options 
in a democracy. This type of awareness is impossible for the followers 
of the father-creator. Since there is, for them, only one and changeless 
truth, then any interrogation of “ultimate grounds” is in itself an ulti-
mate falsehood and evil; the only way of dealing with such interrogators 
is a call to holy war.
Contemporary crisis (parting of the ways) in the West and, due 
to the Western presence, perhaps a global crisis, between two modes 
of awareness, two cultural arche, cannot be resolved at the level of cul-
tural or social changes. Although in the West both, the scientific and 
political enlightenments have softened the Mid-Eastern mode of aware-
ness, the latter is reborn in its most virulent form, specifically in face of 
the globalization of the secular, Promethean mode of awareness. The 
virulence is expressed in the efforts to reestablish fascist dictatorships, 
various theocracies, and even capitalist “market” orders. This maintain-
ance of permanence will be seen in its limits solely when it shows up in 
its final, anarchistic mode of awareness. yet this mode will have to be 
left for a further study, since it is not yet fully manifest at the cultural 
level of symbolic designs. This means that a political culture is split into 
those who propagate the need to become globalized and modern and at 
the same time those who, while recognizing the necessity of this mod-
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ernization, propose a battle against it as imposition of alien civiliza-
tion. In principle, they claim that we may use the efficiency of modern 
technology to resist the very logic that this technology imposes on us. 
In this sense, the very globalizing logic constitutes a power confronta-
tion, all the way from holy wars to so-called passive resistances. yet, in 
every case it seems to us that the reason for this power confrontation 
rest in the failure to understand the already posited limit within which 
the globalizing process must function. This limit is the very require-
ment that the Other and its self generated cultural arche, is equivalent 
to the globalizing logic. Therefore, the latter ceases to be universal and 
must accept whether it wants to or not its own limitations. When we say 
whether it wants to or not, we do not mean a choice between two op-
tions, but an inevitable power confrontation, since there are no external 
criteria in this confrontation that would allow free decision. What we 
have is a temporal horizon of possibilities in such a way that one pos-
sibility is regarded to be recuperation of the past, while the other is of-
fered as the future. 
Central Europe, and specifically the Baltics and Lithuania, have 
lived under one of the variants of Mid-Eastern arche – the Bizantine 
type, under the name of communism. Any philosophy, any Socratic in-
terrogation, was evil, to be destroyed with the destruction of Socratic 
individuals. In brief, it was anti-western autocracy whose every pro-
nouncement was an absolute and unquestionable edict. All the “ene-
mies” of the sole truth and good were, by definition, evil. tens of mil-
lions were massacred with impunity – the very essence of autocratic 
rule, perched on the necessity to save the fallen world. Lithuania lived in 
this autocratic setting, but still the western arche, as ancient paganism, 
was part of its awareness, creating an inbetween non-positional status, 
till finally there was an upsurge of saying “enough” to the autocrats and 
their servants, enough of living on the knees, and time to stand up as 
humans – even under the threat of death. It must be emphasized that 
this sudden explosion is the most uncanny experience, since it rejects all 
authority, all social positions and their value, and proclaims that all is in 
our hands, that we start without any theocratic, autocratic, authoritar-
ian edicts, that we do not know what avaits us; we do not apologize to 
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the masters in their palaces, we take on the responsibility to start our 
lifeworld, with all the mistakes, uncertainties, and options. What we 
shall enjoy and suffer, we shall do so freely. Each of us is an irreplaceable 
individual who can propose to others and to himself what laws must be 
established, and what institutions must be erected. No one yet has ap-
pointed anyone to have a social value, but every individual is aware of 
his/her dignity, honor, truthfulness, and nobility, no subservience. This 
was a choice to become Western-Occidental, a Promethean rebellion, 
an Athenian enlightenment that has carried the west across two millen-
nia. This was a cultural upsurgence to live as open beings, open to its 
traditions, history, to its Occidental – unknown future. This means that 
Lithuania chose to have the arche of basing everything on individual 
self identity wherein each is more than any society and each is a creator 
and co-creator of this culture.
Each individual had to be totally cognizant that the ultimate pow-
ers, whether lords of lords, autocrats, theocrats, had to be excluded 
from human affairs, since their inclusion, as was pointed out by Athene, 
opens the door to tragedy, destroys responsibility, and makes humans 
playthings of all sorts of “higher” beings and forces. As we pointed out 
above, the current upsurgence of Mid-Eastern personality cults, their 
introduction into human affairs is obvious in tragic wars, revenge of 
one tribe of the same people against another, demands for submission 
to my Lord, my prophet, denouncement of the others and call for their 
destruction. The Greeks, and the Lithuanians said enough, and set up a 
culture that allowed humans to live within their own arche. Culturally 
speaking, Lithuanians chose to be humans, to be Occidental. They too 
have allowed the presence of all sorts of cultic images, but they should 
be advised that those images must be a reminder to avoid their becom-
ing ruling powers over humans, medium that would cover over what 
humans are in their very essence.
181
Chapter VI. Individual Self in the Context of two Worlds
POSTScRIPT
Our focus on the two cultures does not exhaust all of the transcen-
dental modifications. We selected the two modifications due to their 
contemporary relevance. What is significant to note is the difference 
and correlation we maintained between cultural symbolic designs, and 
our unavoidable being in between. Once such an awareness is cogni-
zant of itself –even tacitly –then the differences between cultures also 
become visible. But in this case, the differences that cannot be recon-
ciled also become obvious. But the differences that we articulated are 
transcendental and cannot be avoided; they belong to the very con-
stitution of the sense of all other –symbolic –cultural levels. The issue 
that the Baltic and specifically the Lithuanian people face is living in 
the not yet gone Bizantine arche, and still emergent Occidental arche. 
It is plausible that the exodus of people from Lithuania may have an-
other reason, apart from professional advancement or better life: the 
educated are more Western than anything else, and yet the autocratic 
attitude and behavior of the elected servants, is still from an old, Byz-
antine world. While Russia is openly Byzantine and is not at all embar-
rassed to rehabilitate the empyreal autocrats, such as Stalin, there are 
Lithuanians who attempt to rehabilitate the servants and supplicants. 
Such as Peleckis, Venclova, of Stalin. These Lithuanians have no clue 
what it means to be Western and thus human. It will be a while for such 
Lithuanians to get off their knees and stand on their feet – to become 
Promethean, Athenian, to stand without any socially provided shields 






It is said, after all, that the global process is designed to eliminate 
anarchistic and even terroristic violence, and replace it by market based 
democracy as a NEW WORLD ORDER. There is no need to debate 
the contradictory phrase “market based democracy”, since the task of 
this discussion is to explicate the way that this phrase (and more ba-
sic ontological-metaphysical preunderstandings) belong to anarchistic 
violence. to make sense of anarchistic violence it is necessary to dis-
tinguish among its various forms and locate the ARCHE of anarchy 
as it appears in various modifications. Once this task is accomplished, 
the globalizing processes will appear in a very different light than the 
one that is paraded by the protagonists (including “objective” journal-
ists) who regard globalization as a bearer of universal french fries and 
potato chips made from genetically enhanced, although locally grown 
spuds by indigenous peasants, and reaped by colorfully dressed native 
maidens. In brief, the modifications of such violence will show to what 
extent there arise confrontations among anarchies and, in the final 
analysis, how they might belong to the same metaphysics, or, as Karl 
Heinz Volkmann-Schluck points out “metaphysics gone insane”. But 
before this confrontation can be understood, a brief logic of anarchistic 
violence should be sketched in order to show its unique characteristics 
that are different from other modes of violence, such as revolutionary - 
despite the fact that anarchists invariably are defined as revolutionaries. 
It must be noted that as other modes of violence, the anarchistic is also 
a phenomenon that first of all belongs to experience and not to some as-
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sumed “ground”. This is to say, it is part of human conscious life. There-
fore, the term “consciousness” will be used to designate a given mode 
of perception that is basically a theoretical or a philosophical system. 
Another term that is relevant for this investigation is “conscience”, and 
it stands for ethical awareness. Although there are theoretical efforts 
to separate consciousness from conscience, in daily discourses the two 
are closely interrelated. Each basic consciousness - theory - is closely 
intertwined with its attendant conscience - ethics. For this reason Latin 
unites the two terms as consciencia. This term will be used throughout 
this essay.
LOGIc OF ANARchISTIc vIOLENcE
A complex civilization is in permanent flux; every consciencia is 
intent to govern the whole. Hence there is a tension among them, since 
each has an intension of its own dictatorship. Skinnerians have their 
Walden II, the fundamentalists have their holy wars, the capitalists have 
their market, and the Marxists have their utopia. Complex civilization 
is a continuous balancing among different types of consciencia, and the 
price each pays is that its conscience is inauthentic and hence potentially 
a bad conscience. Inauthenticity is a matter of justifying consciousness: 
we would like to impose our consciencia absolutely, but, for example, 
the weakness of human nature does not allow us inact our aims, or the 
fulfillment of our aims must be postponed to some remote future while 
we wait for the right signs from heaven, from historical conditions, or 
from the wise leaders.
Inauthentic consciencia lack stability and thus can awaken to their 
authentic purity, such that the previous tolerance of other types of con-
sciencia, and one’s own previous position, will be regarded as unethical 
conscience and all the justifications of such tolerance as false conscious-
ness. They must be destroyed. Hence anarchism, in its authentic mode, 
demands the destruction of all given social structures and the bodily 
practices which exhibit such structures. Anarchistic violence is basically 
terrorism. It is nonetheless necessary to distinguish anarchistic terror-
185
Chapter VII. Value and responsibility
ism from another major form of terrorism - that of social revolutions. 
The latter are instigated by groups which attack the established powers 
and violate a given law. Hence, they are defined as crime. yet revolu-
tionary terrorism is accompanied by consciousness that such actions 
will be legal in post-revolutionary society. What a revolutionary group 
suppresses by terror today, will be suppressed by law tomorrow. Legal-
ized exploitation and slavery are solid examples. A revolutionary group 
terrorizes established centers of power, both political and economic and 
thus commits a crime by attempting to abolish exploitation and slav-
ery, with a justifying consciousness that in a post-revolutionary society 
exploitation and slavery will be forbidden by law. This can be called 
horizontal intentionality that allows temporal justification, such that 
the disruption of currently imposed laws is designed to enhance and es-
tablish different laws in the future. terrorism of this type of consciencia 
is not grounded in anarchistic consciencia, since the good conscience of 
a revolutionary is grounded in a consciousness both of the current so-
cial, economic, and political factors and the future remedies. The latter 
might point to an invariant that has some overlapping features with the 
rules even of the currently established laws and relationships - specifi-
cally in today’s general adherence to scientific consciousness. 
Anarchistic consciencia has no interest in theories, and specifical-
ly in scientific consciousness. All theories, therefore, are at the service of 
existing and future realities. They must be rejected in order to enhance 
anarchistic violence as unconditional disruption of any permanence. 
Only the science of destruction is of interest. But what is central is the 
dictatorship of PURE WILL of the anarchist (as Bakunin insisted). The 
transition to the terroristic praxis without qualification posits a crisis in 
anarchistic consciencia. In order to be “eidetically pure”, the anarchist 
has to reject any and all positive content in her consciousness. There is 
no content that can be used to justify violence, since any justification 
would require an establishment of a positive structure. In this sense, 
the anarchist’s distance from the public is absolute, and hence his indi-
vidualism is pure autonomous will unlimited by any legal, institutional, 
ethical, and scientific norms. 
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It is noteworthy that this anarchistic consciencia offers numerous 
variants that are relevant for the discussion of modern globalization. 
While there is no content for the consciousness that could be used to 
justify anarchistic violence - destruction without justification - the an-
archistic writings of the 19th and the 20th centuries seem to suggest 
otherwise. to help articulate this issue it must be noted that the lan-
guage of persons such as Bakunin was quite akin to theological edicts 
couched in Hegelian dialectic. There are good reasons for this: first, 
modern theology has posited a content of its consciousness that is inac-
cessible: it is a vertical awareness that grants an infinite presence whose 
access is denied for a finite being, and all the institutions and laws that 
would be established in its name are inadequate and indeed false. In 
this sense, everything that humans build, establish and make must be 
destroyed if one is to remain true to the infinite demand - and indeed 
destroyed without any hope of revolutionary horizontal justification 
(one manifestation of this is the now famous deconstruction - meaning 
as forever deferred).
Second, the later part of the 20th century, exhibited for example by 
the Baden Baden group, shows a slightly modified version of anarchistic 
consciencia. It is premised on two arguments: first, the Baden Baden 
group were Marxian revolutionaries, and yet they realized the back-
ground contradiction in utopian Marxism: if there is a historical pur-
pose - an eschatology - then it cannot be in history, since history cannot 
aim at one of its events; but also it cannot transcend history, since that 
would be theology - and the latter is not acceptable. Hence, any activity 
of violence has no other purpose apart from destruction without a posi-
tive content. Second, there arose an awareness that all Marxian revolu-
tions established post-revolutionary regimes and power structures and 
constantly claimed that the inevitable attainment of communism must 
be deferred, and deferred, and hence constantly varied. This is to say, 
there appears a continuous decay of the pure content of scientific Marx-
ism toward numerous fragments that abolishes the one purpose history. 
In this sense, any revolutionary praxis loses its horizontal justification 
by a future society and becomes violence for its own sake. 
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Third, Hegel, in this sense, can be shown to be anarchistic, since 
no content of human consciencia is final, and the vertical prersence of 
the absolute removes any hope of temporal success to offer a final reso-
lution. Whatever is given historically must be abolished without justifi-
cation. The absolute here is a pure will that wills self-relationship. Given 
this logic, it is now possible to explicate its functioning and its limits in 
modern Western globalization and its resistances.
NOMAdIc vIOLENcE
The contemporary theories, all the way from Nietzsche’s regard 
that life is a wanderer, to postmodern conceptions of nomadism, are 
basically ontological. yet the latter is granted a priori without argu-
ments, apart from the tacit assumption of the metaphysics and ontol-
ogy of modern Western modernity. The following comprises a brief 
articulation of two major variants of nomadism that frame the current 
debates and also comprise, in principle, a conception of globalization 
and anarchistic violences that are in collision. It might turn out that the 
collisions are premised on a very similar metaphysical principle.
There is a close correlation of universalization of a particular dis-
course or text as ultimate truth to colonialism, militarism, and nomad-
ism. The imperial colonial movements have a logic that claims to be an 
embodiment of some ultimate (in some traditions called divine) will 
which is the source of all. In turn, the will demands total adherence to 
its edicts and the edicts of those who are legitimate bearers of the truth 
of this will. Hence, the legitimation of rulership comprises an isomor-
phic structure between the willed truth and the power of those who are 
charged with establishing such a truth over all peoples. In the final anal-
ysis the edicts of those who bring the “universal” discourse are identical 
with the ultimate will of the maker of the world. In this sense, the ruling 
emperor and the ultimate (divine, scientific, etc.) discourse, inclusive of 
imperatives, are one. At this level, no one is to deviate from the edicts, 
couched at times in moralistic pronouncements of prophets. The latter 
are there to insure that the ultimate authority is enhanced without in-
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terrogation. Moreover, since the world is regarded as founded upon the 
will that made the world by speaking - a discursive practice - then those 
who speak with the voice of this will, are entitled to make the world by 
virtue of their edicts. Imperial powers tend to place themselves in this 
position – divine right of kings. At the outset we are confronted with 
the conception of discourse as power to make - magical. The power 
holder’s every uttered wish becomes coextensive with deed and reality.
The unbelievers become a priori evil and destined for destruction 
or to be subjected and hence transformed into obedient bodies - but 
bodies that are required to change their comportment: lower, praying, 
on their knees and respectful of the higher who are in authority. It is of 
note that this type of universalized discourse is usually accompanied 
by monistic consciousness. Apart from other examples, Europe was 
colonized by the nomadic spreading of ONE tRUtH, willed by ONE 
PAtRIARCH. Having submitted to this ONE WILLED truth, the Eu-
ropeans became neo-colonials and in turn went out to spread it through 
the rest of the globe and hence to engage in this type of nomadic colo-
nization. There is no need to offer a protracted argument concerning 
the temporal priorities of such a colonization: do the nomads come on 
horse (one nomadic technology) and subjugate the indigenous popula-
tions and then establish their monistic discourse in order to legitimate 
their rule, or do they come already armed with monistic truth and then 
impose it by sword on the indigenous peoples. The concern here is with 
the establishment of various means of domination (building castles, 
temples, fortresses) and above all of positioning the nomad as a superi-
or being - an aristocrat. One condition for the latter, as Nietzsche noted, 
is to be more violent, more efficient killer, who is preoccupied with the 
art of war - a warrior priest. Meanwhile the indigenous must gear the 
body to perform the “lower” tasks in order to relieve the aristocrat to 
perform his “higher duties”. 
It could be said that the economy of the settled peoples, the pro-
ductive bodies, is an attraction for conquest by nomads who are basi-
cally robbers, yet who claim to be superior in birth, power and truth. 
Although they may manage the places they subjugate with prudence, 
they may also exhaust the land and the population, and wander on to 
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find other places and peoples to subjugate; after all, their supreme au-
thority  - the will that made all things - has not only granted them a 
permission to occupy any place, but also demanded that the truth be 
brought and imposed on all. Their universalized discourse also implies 
that every land is their promised land. 
The brief suggestions concerning this modification of nomadic 
conception lead to some eidetic invariants: First, the world is a matter 
of WILL AND DISCOURSE, and therefore has no inherent nature of its 
own; second, the making of the world is arbitrary, and those who rule 
the world - the nomads - can do so by edicts couched in the language 
of truth; third, the very mobility of the nomadic ruler leads to the no-
tion that there is a tRANSCENDENt, detached, pure (unsoiled by the 
eternal peasant, proletarian, and the pleb), truth and will, independ-
ent from the contingencies of locality and time. This suggests a spe-
cific type of anarchistic consciencia: First, the nomad is free to impose 
his discourse and rules by force, and hence violate - indeed destroy - 
the modes of life of indigenous peoples. Second, the consciousness is 
a claim to a universality of a discourse which is premised on unques-
tionable pronouncements. Any questioning of them will be regarded 
as disruptive and replete with falsehoods. Third, the conscience is an 
unconditional adherence to duty to impose the discourse on everyone 
by any means. Fourth, this imposition is teleological praxis such that all 
conquered social orders will have to be reversed.
Another modification of anarchistic consciencia stems from some 
aspects of LOGOCENtRISM and its regard of naturalism. What is 
“natural” is what constitutes proper legitimation. Thus it is natural for 
humans to use fire and it is inappropriate for someone to use autocrat-
ic-imperial edicts to deprive humans of fire. There is a possibility to 
strike bargains, to change them, contest them in the public arena. Greek 
mythology, for example, reflects this way of natural bargaining. The 
understanding of legitimation must be adjudicated discursively in the 
public and not imposed by prophetically pronounced edicts. The LOG-
OCENtRIC conception is what legitimates the subsequent conception 
of natural equality of all persons. Of course, within such an equality 
there were marked differences between abilities and developments of 
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human potential, as was evident from Platonic and Aristotelian writ-
ings, leading to the Platonic call for a POLIS ruled by the BESt. This 
was of course the answer to the inadequacies of the rule by the many. 
In fact such a rule by the best would be partially justified by the LOGO-
CENtRIC conception of the world where EPIStEME was deemed to 
be in a position to decipher and hence correspond to, and indeed be 
capable of ruling in accordance with the ALL RULING LOGOS. Thus 
those in possession of EPIStEME should rule by virtue of their knowl-
edge. What is to be understood is that knowledge could not be regarded 
as a legitimation to make, to transform the world. Knowledge of what is 
the case by nature is knowledge how one should act. This sort of ruler-
ship does not use power against a person or nature, but it can show dis-
cursively the mistakes the person might make with respect to the nature 
of the cosmos and its LOGOS. If a person is made to understand what is 
natural, he/she will act in accordance with such an understanding. No 
imperative from emperors or wills of divinities could alter the enduring 
LOGOS. to the contrary, emperors and divinities come and pass with 
the sway of the cosmic logos. 
While the life in “accordance with nature” seems to offer a settled 
and peaceful context, requiring no building of empires, there is in it 
an incipient disequillibrium that may tend toward a rulership by the 
best. The latter, such as Plato, might regard the population as being in 
error, in need of correction, and hence to be ruled from above in order 
to move it to the utopian state. Of course, the latter for Plato may be 
the most real, although it is value laden. What is at issue here is that 
the cosmic logos is not to be understood as power, but as enduring and 
elastic strength that yields but cannot be defeated. Those who live in 
accordance with its sway are also the enduring, the ones who bend with 
the storms but remain unbroken. The difference between strength of 
logos and power is that logos is ever present and never vanishes, while 
power has its rise and fall. It can be conquered, dissipated, abolished, or 
decadent. In this sense it is distinct from the strength of logos that is not 
nomadic, it does not come and pass, even if it is never at rest. 
These two modes seem to appear in the Brahmanic contrast be-
tween the all enduring and ruling KALA and the shifting powers of 
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kings, whether legitimated or not. Just as the nomadic rulers cannot 
completely transcend the logos, so the kings with their powers cannot 
escape the verdict of time. Given this context, the nomadic legitima-
tion efforts should not be identified with a particular ruler’s wish to 
justify his rule, but more basically with the effort to extricate from the 
strength of the all pervasive LOGOS and KALA, i.e. to make the tran-
sient power last and indeed become superior and transcendent to the 
strength of Logos. We shall argue subsequently that the current cult of 
deconstruction is premised on this notion of abolishing the enduring 
strength of logos, of “logocentrism”. And this means that deconstruc-
tion wants to continue the transcending nomadic rulership with the aid 
of the old, recouped, divinities and their supplicant servants. This effort 
to shift toward the superiority of the detached, nomadic transcendence 
may constitute an effort to bend the rule of the logos, and if possible to 
exercise will over it. 
Indeed, as already suggested, there is logocentric thought that may 
constitute an intermediary between the willed discourse as the trans-
cendent rule over the world and the human, and all ruling logos. The 
intermediary is the rule by the best who know the logos not as inherent 
in the world, but as transcendent to it and hence to be brought to rec-
ognition pedagogically and not imposed by will. Nonetheless, this very 
promise of recognition assumes a position that is different from the 
world and hence a possibility to impose it as would be the case in Pla-
toss LAWS, or in the historicising of such laws to be achieved in an uto-
pian state. What appears, here, is a claim that the world is an inadequate 
and hence a contingent process with respect to transcendent ideality 
DISCOVERABLE by thought. The ideality, then, must provide a guid-
ing principle how the worldly events must correspond to what thought 
provides. What is worldly cannot be destroyed by will, nonetheless it 
must be modified and hence violated. to speak with modern Western 
technical modernity, there is a standard of beauty and you must get a 
facelift to come closer to the standard. 
With the appearance of thought as transcendent over nature, and 
indeed being the determining factor of nature, there opens up a reflex-
ive region that lends nature not only a secondary status, but above all 
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a being that is dependent on thought. Thus in order to discover this 
dependence, one must turn to the composition of thought and how na-
ture must correspond to, and become subsumed under thought and, in 
the final analysis, under projects of will. This calls for thought to reflect 
upon its own activities and content and to decipher its own standards 
by which nature becomes DEtERMINABLE. The last term is selected 
to suggest that thought being prior to nature is not determined by any-
thing and hence can determine nature in many ways, dependent upon 
the WILL. This is to say, if thought is the starting principle irrespective 
of the “height” of its transcendence, the nature is determinable by it in 
more than one way. 
There appears a peculiar reversal: the logos, with its enduring 
strength against which all powers were temporary and contingent now 
is forced to be contingent and unnecessary, as being dependent on the 
transcending thought which is deemed necessary and incontestable. 
The latter is the stable power that can determine the way that nature 
will be reconstructed. Here the emperor and its nomadic power, i.e. 
a will that needs not respect the logos, returns in a new guise, except 
now as a supreme ruler. Within this reflexive context the human finds 
itself in a position of transcendence over nature, in a position of being 
a source of all the law that, while not yet in total command of nature, 
is in a position to establish such a command. This is to say, nature can 
be regarded as dependent upon thought, not in some ontological sense, 
but perhaps more fundamentally, in a practical sense, i.e. in a sense of 
being “made” in human image. 
A fascinating syndrome appears that usually remains if not hid-
den, at least unexpressed: the very way that the human thinks first ap-
pears not as its own thinking and understanding, but as something 
cosmic and encompassing. The same could be said of the human posit-
ing of its own reflection as more fundamental than the logos of nature: 
the primacy of reflective thought is first attributed to a cosmic thought 
and only subsequently is there an admittance that such thought is hu-
man. Thus the discovery by modernity of the ego that thinks its own 
thoughts, and knowledge as identical to power, is a discovery of a com-
position that was already invented and, so to speak, waiting in the wings 
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to be recognized and appropriated. The structure of the priority of re-
flective thought and the power of the creative will was accomplished in 
Western theological metaphysics before the human would accept and 
recognize this structure as his own. 
The priority of an already taken for granted primacy of thought 
as the creative power also permits the priority of will as that which can 
choose what sort of creation occurs. Thus the once necessary nature, 
with its own logos, has to be subsumed under a power that is capable of 
dominating and altering nature and in principle making nature contin-
gent. This is to say the necessity shifts to the will and its creative power 
leaving nature exposed to arbitrary rule. Indeed, without an imposition 
of an order by the will nature would be without reason and form, with-
out value and goodness. The composition here allows thought and will 
to have a direct influence and control over all, such that the latter be-
comes contingent and dependent on will and thought. This distinction 
appears at the dawn of the modern age; it is claimed that while for some 
ultimate reality or being 2 + 2 = 4 need not hold, for us it is sufficiently 
certain, and resultantly we need not concern ourselves with questions 
for which answers are inaccessible. This is to say, the composition of 
the ultimate creation of nature by the ultimate will is at the same time 
excluded as irrelevant for the human knowledge and assumed by the 
human as his own composition of knowledge and will. Knowledge and 
will are taken, nonetheless, to be prior and transcendent to nature and 
hence capable of imposing an order on an otherwise irrational mate-
rial nature. What comes along with this structure from the cosmic as-
sumption of the absolute power and its creation of nature is the shift of 
power toward human thought and will over nature. Thought and will, 
logic and valuation become the necessary conditions for the being of 
the world for man, while nature becomes, to speak with Kant, blind 
phenomena.
First result is the appearance of the initial syndrome of arbitrary 
power with respect to nature, except now in the guise of the subject 
who is “everyman”, i.e. any individual is in a position to be the mas-
ter of his own destiny by his own thought, will and ability to make 
the surroundings in his own “image”. He neither has a nature, nor a 
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nature to settle; he can become, with respect to the environment and 
geographic topography, NOMADIC. This is to say, he is free from any 
place and can remake nature in his own image anywhere he decides to 
settle - an image of the rape of Gaia has here become a reality. Modern 
western modernity is the nomadic power of the unchained rule over 
nature, appearing both in the guises of capitalism and marxism. The 
land of the peasant, the endurer of seasons and of natural rhythms, and 
the local settler, regardless of space-place, are now exposed to become 
raw material and labor power for the technological edicts controlled 
by unknown “emperors” in distant regions. Although such emperors 
are most interesting insofar as they seem to possess what the current 
designation would call “economic power”, the more interesting factor 
is the breakdown of traditional legitimation of power by birthright and 
demanded legitimation by “the people”. But the latter are either “labor 
power” to be constructed in accordance with the needs of production, 
or are mobile individuals capable of settling where there are not yet ex-
ploited “raw materials” for production - this is to say colonization. to 
understand this transience it is necessary to decipher the constitution 
of direct Western modern modernity in its nomadic form, specifically 
with regard to technologization that led to the establishment of vast 
bureaucratic machinery of experts comprising a privileged elitism. 
NOMAdIc MOdERNITY
How is it that one becomes detached from a place, community, 
and can look upon the environment and others with indifference? What 
sort of consciencia is granted that has a consciousness, an intentional-
ity toward the world, also justified by conscience of detached indiffer-
ence? In the following the arguments of Western modern modernity 
will open up two intentionalities that subtend this global moderniza-
tion and its type of anarchism. 
If not deliberate, there is a specific “bracketing” that is enacted by 
the philosophies and sciences of the modern age that allows the attribu-
tion of power primarily to the linguistic articulations. While at first sight 
outlandish, this claim will be more than justified by the subsequent analy-
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ses of modern ontology and its metaphysically laden scientific method. 
Our approach will trace out this “bracketing” and show what phenomena 
become discarded and what “phenomena” remain in order to be con-
stitutive of legitimate discourses and nomadic colonialism. It is hoped 
that the result of this investigation will reveal specific formations which 
belong to no one and yet comprise transformative power of signs in mod-
ern multi discursivity and awareness. What is meant here by “awareness” 
consists of specific activities correlated to specific forms of objectivities 
lending such activities their anarchistic detachment and indifference. The 
latter is expressed in numerous ways across various socio-political, eco-
nomic and scientific formations, aims, and imageries. It lends an appear-
ance of arbitrariness to the activities at all levels. The concept of “activity” 
includes what the human actually does in her various relationships to the 
world of objects and events of whatever type.
All this rests on a specific constitution of the given: it is regard as 
“transcendence”, beyond experience and inaccessible to sense percep-
tion. The composition of the given requires an exclusion of qualitative 
awareness and hence the construction of a modern subject that contains 
all such qualities in its immanence. This immanence is subsequently 
designated in terms of mind-reason, psychology and physiology. This 
form of exclusion can be called the Cartesian skepticism. As has been 
shown in numerous works, the modern revolution deems reality to be a 
material extension of atomic parts that are inaccessible to sense experi-
ence, although manageable by a method of quantitative manipulation. 
Following this, the entire modern view is borne by a prejudgment that 
what is beyond doubt is a constitution of a precise reflective method 
capable of “univocal, universal, impartial, and objective” access to a 
specifically constituted “reality”. It is presumed that the latter consists 
equally of an univocal, universal and impartial rationality correlative to 
the precise structure of methodology. There is a need to show the ways 
in which both, the methodology, and the “reality” are constituted, cor-
related, and assumed to be isomorphic. For modernity mathematical 
or quantitative procedures are not only methodological, but founding 
for all theoretical thought. The specific composition of such procedures 
suggests that no intuitive, that is perceptual content is correlated to 
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them. They contain structures and rules which can be formulated with-
out any relation to perceptual qualities. Moreover, any concrete func-
tion such structures acquire, is not dictated by these structures. In other 
words, the function is a matter of will, but in such a way that the will 
is not compelled by such structures; they have no causal force. It must 
be understood, at the outset, that the notion of “will” is not a discovery 
but one constructed aspect to fill the gap between the mathematical and 
the material. In order for these procedures and structures to acquire 
any validity, the “objective” world must be constituted in accordance 
with these procedures. First, the procedures are indifferent with respect 
to perceptual intuition; they treat all events as if they were essentially 
homogeneous. Second, the perceptual domain of intuition, directly 
present to live awareness, is transcended in favor of theoretically-meth-
odologically posited homogeneity, i.e. posited in accordance with the 
methodological requirements.
The transcendence in this context is minimally double: first, it is 
required that one disregards the awareness of the qualitative sphere, 
deemed to be subjective and, second, one must regard the homogene-
ous domain as transcendence, as a reality in itself and independent of 
the perceiver. Thus awareness has no access to this transcendence. Its 
“reality” can be secured by a theoretical and methodological postula-
tion. The latter is the source of the conception of mathematically ideal-
ized nature as a homogeneous mathematical manifold. We should not 
be misled by the concept of homogeneity. The latter seems to have geo-
metric associations, and hence accessible to perception. The problem 
revolves around the substitution of geometric formations, the transla-
tion of the forms into a mathematical set of signs which do not offer 
any semblance or intuitive comparison to the geometric domain. The 
geometric understanding would still offer a field posited as “matter”, 
yet with mathematization of geometry, and if one were to take a next 
step toward formalization of mathematics, one would be able to regard 
the geometric as quanta, as numerical points, sums, and divisions, ar-
ranged in accordance with formal structures. Irrespective of the levels of 
quantitative-formal constitution, there is posited only one fundamen-
tal-transcendent reality. The problematics of the constitutive processes 
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both of the theoretical-methodological domain, and the transcendent 
domain, lead to a particular contradiction which cannot be solved with-
in the limits of the theoretical-methodological framework. The method 
is proclaimed to be universal, all-inclusive, and thus able to subsume all 
phenomena “objectively”. Thus the subject who calculates, and formal-
izes must be either subsumed under the method, or be the condition for 
the constitution of the method. If the former assumption is accepted, 
then the method must assume a position of supremacy over the subject, 
i.e. be objective; yet this very method permits only one kind of “reality”: 
homogeneous matter. The method is not “matter” but “ideality” and 
indeed a necessary ideality. And yet, if the latter is taken for granted, 
i.e. that the subject too is to be submitted under the method, then the 
ideality of the method has no “place” in the subject, since the subject 
must be contingent and thus cannot be a basis for the methodological 
mathematical and formal necessities. 
In either case, the theoretical-methodological composition is 
something other than the posited transcendent reality, and the latter 
is not something given. In fact, the morphologically constituted and 
directly given world, a world of shapes, pathways axes for practical 
activity, multi-leveled interconnections, is regarded as complex phe-
nomena that are not identical with the strict homogeneous reality. This 
non-identity precludes the possibility of deriving the theoretical-meth-
odological formations from the phenomenal-morphological composi-
tion of the lived world. As a result, the former are neither correlative to 
the intuited morphological world and its interconnections, inclusive of 
the “real” subject, nor are they abstractable from the posited homoge-
neous world and above all its physicalistic discourse. On these terms, 
the transcendent world, the world of theoretical objectivity, is not given 
and cannot be a source of theoretical-methodological compositions. 
The morphological world is GIVEN, and yet it too is not a source 
for the understanding of the transcendent world, and neither can ac-
count for the theory and method of the modern sciences and the positing 
of the world of transcendent and perceptually inaccessible homogene-
ous world. yet the theoretical-methodological composition is regarded 
as GIVEN, and indeed with full evidential necessity. What kind of ne-
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cessity? Purely quantitative and formal constructs, having their own 
rules and procedures, where the morphological or the “material” side 
is completely contingent and arbitrary. With respect to the rules of the 
formal domain, the morphological and intuitive side of shapes, sizes, 
relationships, is arbitrarily selectable and changeable. This is one of the 
more fundamental and initial designations of the formal discourses as 
necessary and the material discourse as arbitrary. This suggests that 
the connection between them is not direct, not immediate or GIVEN, 
but must be INtENDED by an entirely different act. While it is pos-
sible to posit perceptual acts, and even motives, that can constitute this 
connection, such as interest, they are excluded a priori. There must be, 
therefore, a specific act that has to be deciphered in its own right. This 
act is concerned with the conjunction of two radically distinct domains 
and discourses: the theoretical-methodological and the transcendent. 
to repeat, the former is regarded as necessary and GIVEN, while the 
latter is regarded as transcendent, material and contingent, although 
NOt GIVEN.
As already noted, the theoretical-methodological, or termed oth-
erwise, the quantitative-formal, is not within the domain of the contin-
gent world, posited as transcendent. It is not found even in the directly 
intuited morphological composition of the lived world. It is regarded as 
different from the discourses of these domains. Not having any other 
locus for the formal, the thinkers of the modern age invented a contain-
er called “mind” in which these quantitative and formal components 
reside. Just as the qualitative and the morphological discourses, they 
too belong to the immanence of the subject. The immanence assumes 
an ambiguous status: it is the container of the theoretical-methodolog-
ical formal necessities, and yet it is factually contingent substance. This 
contingency is expressed in Cartesianism in two ways: first, the formal 
composition, with respect to a posited absolute being, cannot be re-
garded as necessary. This is to say, the absolute being can will different 
formal systems; this is an analogical expression of a conception which 
offers an initial indication as to the arbitrariness of the formal. Second, 
the formal is seen as capable of continuous analyses; any break in the 
analyses is a matter of decision. In this sense, the formal domain swings 
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in the transition between necessity and will, rules and choice. The im-
portance of this transition consists precisely in the option to either re-
gard the formal as a priori given or as a construct of the subject. 
Various expressions are offered at the dawn of the modern age to 
indicate the shift toward the latter option. The notions of nature as cre-
ated in accordance with mathematical laws comprise one such expres-
sion. When this notion is coupled with the view that even the mathe-
matical-formal domain is subject to an absolute will, then the result is 
obvious: the emphasis is on the primacy of construction of the formal 
discursive systems. They too are chosen, although they cannot be regard-
ed as contingent in the sense of the contingency of the material world. 
Their emergence requires unique intentions that have to be regarded as 
capable of formal construction and of arbitrary signification. Moreover, 
such intentionalities must include the possibility of extending and prolif-
erating formal compositions and divisions at will, and of disregarding the 
perceptual content and its discourses. And yet anyone dealing with scien-
tific issues of observation, assumes a transition from the signitive to the 
morphological modes of signification. This transitional domain is an un-
announced background that provides a silent nexus between otherwise 
disconnected domains. What this background is cannot yet be stated. 
Being inaccessible, it must be posited in accordance with the for-
mal definitions and procedures whose necessity would provide a MOD-
EL of explanation not for the perceptual components, but of POSSIBLE 
PROCESSES DESIGNAtED AS MAtERIAL. The contingent is so des-
ignated because its necessity comes from another, and in two senses. 
First, from the formal articulations presumed to be correlative to the 
posited transcendent reality, and second, from a presumed act of an ab-
solute creation (Galileo) such that the theoretical and methodological 
composition is the very way in which reality is created. This is the legiti-
mating support designated to necessitate the functioning of this reality 
and to guarantee that our theoretical-methodological forms constitute 
adequate descriptions of reality. This persistent insistence on securing 
legitimation for necessity of the processes of the transcendent reality 
indicates a fundamental realization that left to itself such a reality is 
contingent, unless it acquires its necessity from elsewhere. This is to say 
that an appeal to an absolute geometrician is not an attempt to placate 
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the ecclesiastics, but a symbolic effort to legitimate the necessity of an 
otherwise contingently construed reality and the correlative necessity 
of the presumed objective theory and method.
If we were to exclude such a symbolism, we would be left with 
a contingent reality whose necessity would come from another and 
this is to say from the theoretical-methodology. This opens the door 
to the notion of an access to this reality in terms of POSSIBILIty. 
This is to say, since what IS cannot be perceived, and since its being 
posited as transcendent reality does not offer any necessity for its 
composition, then it can be accessed and dealt with in accordance 
with theoretical-methodological formal possibilities. This is precisely 
the juncture at which it becomes necessary to regard this transcend-
ent reality in accordance with what it can possibly be. Continuing 
this line of constitution, it is advisable to trace the first moment 
which offers itself through the phenomena articulated so far.
There is no necessary connection between the formalisms, or their 
signitive discourses, and the transcendent “physical” reality. The con-
nection is arbitrary. This is to say, it requires a specific intentionality 
which is not necessitated by any real compulsion or law to connect the 
formal signitive discourses to the posited discourses of material reality. 
The arbitrariness appears under various guises: the application of the-
ory to praxis, the most lyrically stressed intoxication that the purpose 
of all science is its reshaping of the environment in accordance with 
human designs, the humanistic efforts to humanize nature and the hu-
man animal, the aims of improving nature, and the exclamations that 
something is good because we say it is good in accordance with our own 
tablets, etc. In principle, the intentional connection between the formal 
domain and the posited reality has no hold in anything, and it need not 
respect any prescription and qualitative discourses of the lived world. 
And yet it is a required nexus. After all, the signitive formal discourses 
do not point to anything that would be visibly similar to them. In this 
sense arbitrary selection of formal components for possible correlation 
to the homogeneous quantified world offers no other option apart from 
the imposition of the formally constituted methods on the material. 
Such a connecting intentionality is empty and hence can shift from the 
formal to the material; its primary fulfillment is modal discursivity that 
has no specific attachment to any qualitative aspects of human life. It 
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IS A PRIORI NOMADIC, and ANARCHIStIC. In principle, one is in 
a position of a pure metaphysics of will to constantly violate both the 
formal, and the material worlds.
While this might seem obvious, there appears a background phe-
nomenon required for the second level fulfillment of various possibi-
lizing transitions: corporeal activities. Such activities are directed by 
projected choices of what is materially possible. The formal composi-
tions require active interventions to construct the posited homogene-
ous world in accordance with the formal discourses. Since the latter 
are constructs, they too are invented for the sake of the reconstruction 
of the material reality in accordance with our willed projects. All this 
seems to rest on nothing. Indeed, Fink has argued very cogently that 
modernity emerges as if out of nothing. This is to say that the “inten-
tion” to control the environment under whatever guise is not a power 
aim of Bacon, Descartes, Galileo, Buffon, the capitalists or the Marxists, 
but the constitution of the possibility of arbitrariness with respect to the 
connection between theory and “reality”, an arbitrariness that allows 
volitional (currently psychologized into “desire”) activity to subtend 
reason and nature.
The intentionality emerging here between the theoretical and the 
“real” swings between two possibilizing structures: the formal discur-
sive possibilities, operating purely with arbitrarily selected signs, and a 
realization that the formal processes are also arbitrarily constructed and 
hence can be reconstructed at will. These formally designed possibilities 
are also in a position to align the transcendent reality toward intuitive 
fulfillment by human intervention into the processes of the lived world 
and, by disregarding the given perceptual morphologies of that world, 
to shape the presumed underlying homogeneous matter in accord with 
arbitrary discourses. This shaping comprises the source of both, the 
labor theory of value and life - the primacy of homo laborans - and 
technology, inclusive of the appearance of political technocracies which 
promise to redesign the “environment”, and the “human” in line with 
the theoretical-methodological discourses: a world produced by scien-
tific technology that can wander everywhere and use the indifferent-ho-
mogeneous material - including the human - as resource. Some schol-
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ars in fact suggest that the modern world has two intentional histories: 
one, that is completely unstructured world of autonomous individuals, 
and two, a complete redesigning of the world in accordance with the 
formal discourses we ourselves posit. yet in either case arbitrariness is 
assumed and the intentionality of will that swings between the formal 
and the transcendent is the decisive arbiter - without precedents and 
without ground, although it comprises the ground of postmodernity 
within modernity.
This intentionality is not identical with Kantian autonomous will 
and with Nietzsche’s will to power. Its engagement is with contingent 
constituents both at the formal and the material levels. The contingent 
can be possibilized in terms of formal variations and differentiations of 
processes into discourses and sub-discourses, until the sub-discourses 
can become distinct sciences, carving out their own fields and accessing 
the environment in accordance with their formal requirements. Both, 
the formally designed discourses and the transcendent material reality, 
comprise a detachment from the lived world and allow an arbitrary cor-
relation between them. One can treat everything from a vantage point of 
detached formalism and regard qualitative and perceptual distinctions 
with indifference. The formal indifferent and disconnected discourses 
lend themselves to a horizontal division and increased formalization of 
language in such a way that there emerge increased formal differentia-
tions of formal systems themselves. Correlatively, the material world 
can be increasingly differentiated and reconstructed along more com-
plex and yet more distinct technical masteries and controls of the trans-
cendent reality. In short, an incrementation of formal complexities and 
differences is coextensive with an increase in the contingency of the 
material domain, leading to more possible rearrangements of the indif-
ferent material nature. The lateral differentiation of formal discourses 
and their correlative material structuration, provide a basis for disci-
pline differentiations, each having its own formal discourses and each 
capable of possible construction of material realizations. Thus the more 
one fragments the formal discourses into increasingly refined signs, the 
more one is able to criss-cross the material by technical procedures in 
terms of the formal definitions. In this sense, the very languages of dis-
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ciplines are coextensive with the power of shaping the indifferent mate-
rial in accordance with definitory requirements. One could argue that 
this continuous division and formalization of discourses is coextensive 
with a militarization of language and society. Each increasing refine-
ment is also a transition from signs to signals resulting in a restriction 
of human processes to reactions to precise and efficient embodied ma-
terial codes. In this sense the discursive power to make leads in two 
directions: the making of the environment and the human, and the vio-
lation and destruction of all lifeworlds. In general terms, this process of 
militarization is one of the bases for the emergent language of war. We 
are at war with each other, with the environment, with poverty, with 
affluence, and with our own fragmented selves. 
What appears here is a trace of anarchistic CONSCIENCIA. All 
events must be destroyed in accordance with the multiple formal dis-
courses in order to remake them into something other. The lifeworlds 
of peoples everywhere must be disregarded and transformed.
While this CONSCIENCIA requires the adherence to its princi-
ples of formal and material detachments, it “progresses” toward a dif-
ferentiated inclusion of all events, both “natural” and cultural, and thus 
constitutes a formally differentiated world where semi-independent 
spheres call for semi-independent functions and work. What is relevant 
in human life depends and is contingent upon the manner in which 
the formal discourses divide the human “material”: the human is an 
intersection of economic, social, chemical, genetic, physiological, psy-
chological, biological, etc. set of differentiated discourses, each semi in-
dependent on the others. It would be redundant to analyze the obvious: 
the transitional intentionality, expressed as the power of these differ-
entiations, comprises also the separations of social functions and tasks, 
leading to a society of semi-independent groupings of experts, each pos-
sessing a discursive power to make what his/her discipline constructs as 
reality. yet what each expertise produces within its own sphere has no 
necessary connection with other spheres. This multi discursivity does 
not seem to offer any common world. Hence the results of “research” in 
a specific domain, can be picked up by military or by art. For the experts 
of each domain there is no recourse to any external criterion concern-
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ing the intentionalities which would correlate the results as possibilities 
in another domain. This is to say, the material, i.e. technically produced 
forces can be selected at will, arbitrarily by other social domains, such 
as politics or cosmetics for possible “application”. Such a lateral dif-
ferentiation decentralizes responsibility and increases the contingency 
and the power of the transitional intentionality, appearing here in the 
image of arbitrariness. Every formal discourse and every material result 
become totally arbitrary. Each is empowered to go anywhere and make 
reality. This is MODERN NOMADISM. This means that there are no 
restrictions for the “making of truth”. After all, such a making has lost 
any boundary and any distinction between knowledge and object. All 
appear in the nomadic production, such that the transitional intention-
ality becomes self-warranting anarchistic enactment by ANyONE. Re-
gardless of the domain there is no reason to stop the proliferation of its 
own form of praxis. There are no physical reasons to cease proliferating 
more physical experiments and refinements, no economic reasons to 
stop the economic “growth”, no biological reasons to remould the liv-
ing processes along new combinations, etc. Any restriction is regarded 
as an infringement on the autonomy of research. Any science, which 
would proclaim that it has become complete, would cease to be a sci-
ence in the context depicted above. 
Given the key intentionality (sometimes exemplified as autono-
mous will) which swings without any essential necessitation between 
the theoretical methodological discourses and the transcendent homo-
geneous domains, there emerges the attendant factor which is perma-
nent: PROGRESS. It must be without regression, without death, and all 
formal discourses and all transformations of the lived world must be 
remade to maintain this permanent structure. What is peculiar about 
progress is that it has no subject that would progress. Its aim and its 
subject is itself and thus it is self-referential. Progress is its own destiny: 
PROGRESS FOR tHE SAKE OF PROGRESS. It constitutes its own in-
creasing formal refinements, efficiencies and “perfectabilities” without 
of course attaining perfection. No attained construction is left with-
out possibilizing and hence “improvement”. But this suggests that its 
presence cannot be deconstructed, since in its self-referentiality it has 
no direction, no purpose, and hence every effort to deconstruct it will, 
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perforce, enhance its self referentiality. The prevalent deconstructivist 
theology, as writerly, is premised on this self referentiality of progress 
without death.
The human is also subsumed under an arbitrariness which in-
cludes his/her own operations. That is, the human also functions in 
this modern intentionality and treats, or at least is exposed in principle 
to treat everything arbitrarily, i.e violently. Arbitrariness is a “power” 
which opens an initial experience of violation. But this violation cannot 
be avoided within the context of modern ANARCHIStIC CONSCIEN-
CIA: ALL tHAt IS GIVEN IS IN PRINCIPLE tO BE VIOLAtED 
tO yIELD PROGRESS. PROGRESS AS SELF WARRANtING CAN 
NEVER BE FULFILLED; It IS RULED By AN ARBItRARy WILL 
WHOSE ONLy AIM IN RECONStRUCtION IS CONtINUOUS 
DEStRUCtION WItHOUt A FINAL JUStIFICAtION. WILLED 
SELF WARRANtING PROGRESS IS ALSO VIOLENCE FOR tHE 
SAKE OF VIOLENCE. 
While this form of consiencia comprises the ground of colonialism, 
the acceptance of it by indigenous peoples through educational process-
es, comprises neo-colonialist consciencia. This is to say, the universal 
effort by the “underdeveloped” nations calls upon their youth to attend 
Western universities and become versed in the instrumental-technical 
reason in order to bring progress. Thus, the local peoples become in-
adequate and must be brought into “universal” material world history 
and hence be treated as a homogeneous labor power to be shaped tech-
nically by “education” to become adequate producers of commodities 
for the “world market”. In this sense, the elites, the local “bright lights” 
who get their “superior” technical knowledge in the West, the knowl-
edge that is at base colonial, become neo-colonials by imposing this ac-
quired knowledge as a standard for their own populations. This type 
of imposition is deemed to be a way of dealing with indigenous issues 
“objectively”. In this sense, the West need not engage in exporting its 
colonial structure; it is imported by the educated elites as neo-colonial 
masters. The power to rule will be distributed among those who possess 
the technical, instrumental rationality. Their skills are a condition for 
the running and/or “progressing” of the entire society. This includes 
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pedagogical retransformation of the local populations toward produc-
tivity and ability to “humanize” the homogeneous environment. But 
this also means that the population will be released from its “logocen-
tric” qualitative culture, its belonging to a region, an environment, and 
will become nomadic - in search of materials for productive use and 
consumption. One outcome of this colonial neo-colonialism is the well 
known language of commodification and consumption. This conscien-
cia enmeshed in scientific technocracies and self-legitimating progress, 
cannot permit any other conception of the human apart from efficient 
producer, colonizer, and a nomad that is calculating and calculated. 
The qualitative worlds of various communities around the globe, what 
they have to offer, are of local and not global value, specifically if such 
qualitative aspects cannot become nomadic, circulated for global con-
sumption. Progress offers technical means for anyone and anywhere 
to become an image of modernity: to enhance oneself and to make of 
oneself what one wills, to obtain the “ideal” image, to listen to the “lat-
est” rhythms, to become sensuous body, obtainable in any drug-store, 
beauty parlor, grocery outlet, and exercise places. Moreover, there is a 
skin-deep equalization in numerous domains lending the appearance 
of increasing material equality. Everyone can have similar foods, spices, 
drinks, even similar dress and walk. While there might remain vast dif-
ferences in social class distinctions, economic and political power in-
equities, at the surface level there seems to be an apparent equitable 
fulfillment. Everyone is “enjoying” an apparent equality in terms of the 
socially proliferated ideals and looks. “She looks like a million” and this 
despite the fact that she is working on a global assembly line. The satu-
ration of all domains with the images, tastes, sounds, conceptualities of 
the good life, submit to the power of anarchistic consciencia in “flesh”. 
This is to say, idealities to be achieved are no longer a matter of 
consciousness reflecting the material-economic or technical conditions, 
but are inscriptions in the body, in the images, the passions and desires 
appearing directly as modes of bodily comportment. The idealities are 
coextensive with daily discourses, daily imagery, mass-media, sounds 
and tastes, architecture, popular arts carried by vast systems of circula-
tion that make any art-form accessible and “popular”, globally com-
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modified and thus nomadic. The anarchistic consciencia, at this level, 
stems from the very progress that posits tHE IDEAL that can never be 
achieved, and hence a point forever deferred. One is never adequate, 
and hence is exposed to violation and continuous self-violation - ter-
rorism of the body, inscription of the “latest” that will be immediately 
outdated by the “improved”, ad infinitum. From mechanical through 
electronic to bio-technologies as transcendental conditions, one can be-
come any image, any shape, and anyone.
TRANScENdENTAL WILL
What has been argued so far leads to the variants of anarchistic 
consciencia, specifically in relationship to modern Western moderni-
ty and its multi-discursive postmodernity in their globalizing sweep. 
First, it was noted that PROGRESS is self warranting and requires, for 
its continuity constant violence and destruction without either verti-
cal or horizontal legitimation. Any legitimation would be another story 
among stories, each designed to invent its own reality. Subtending both 
progress and its multiple legitimations is a transcendental will that 
functions without criteria – a will that wills its own groundlessness. If 
it had a ground, it would be limited by some ontological-essential ex-
perience. yet such an experience is unavailable both for modernity and 
its postmodernity. Since no morphology offers any resistance to such a 
will, it has a total distance to both methods and ontologies, and does its 
selections as pure inventions. In this sense, it comprises an anarchistic 
consciencia whose consciousness is FLUX ENHANCING FLUX, and 
continuously destructive, and whose conscience is radical indiffer-
ence. As contemporary children like to say: WE ARE CHILLy tO tHE 
MAX – continuous destruction for the sake of destruction. Second, 
such a metaphysical will is premised on the assumption that “scien-
tific” discourses are empowered to make and remake the environment 
and hence that to speak is identical with “to make.” But the latter must 
constantly violate all that has been made. Here a formal-material global 
anarchistic consciencia is at play. Any opposition to it in terms of the 
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same formal-material logic is, at this level, equally anarchistic. Hence 
from the first to the fourth world cultures, attempting to maintain their 
identities by this very anarchistic logic, will be part of it. What will ap-
pear here are anarchies in collision. Such anarchies may assume various 
shapes, such as capitalism, communism, fascism, yet assume a priori 
the transcendental conditions of modern consciencia: formal-material 
logic. What has to be added is a brief discussion of civilizational con-
sciencia and their efforts to resist the Western modern – postmodern 
globalization, with its nomadic personalities. 
We have already mentioned some modifications that may be in 
collision with the modern and postmodern Western anarchistic con-
sciencia. At the outset there were suggestions of these types, but it is 
now appropriate under what transcendental rules they play out their 
destinies. First, the resistance to globalization by other cultures will not 
allow us to grasp them at the level at which they attempt to resist glo-
balization. After all, the latter walks in with every car, every television, 
beauty cream, web-site, walking style, and breakfast cereal. It is nec-
essary to treat such resistance in civilizational terms. It is understood 
that to engage in multi-culturality may be an aspect of one civilization. 
But other civilizations may regard such an aspect as chaotic, requir-
ing strict rules – a Hitler, a Jahw, an Allah, a Market – to insure order. 
The suggestion here is that particular type of civilization (not bound by 
geography) promotes multiplicity, while other civilizations suppress it. 
Civilizational scholars from Sorokin through Dumont, to Kavolis, have 
argued that civilization is the broadest symbolic architectonic of con-
scious life, expressed in various cultural terms. A given architectonic 
may not respect cultural boundaries, such as language, arts, religions, 
and even economies. Hence Chinese tao is more akin to Greek Demos, 
and Lockean-Kantian individualism than both to various Christian, 
Judaic, Islamic, and Hindu fundamentalisms. In brief, these affinities 
suggest a civilizational consciencia that does not respect geographic 
borders, but has a global topography. 
If this state of affairs is plausible, then it is possible to speak of 
a specific civilizational consciencia that would disagree radically with 
modern-postmodern Western globalization. It is not feasible to articu-
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late a number of such civilizational consciencia (what elsewhere I called 
“civilizational architectonics”), but one very visible and vocal conscien-
cia goes under the title FUNDAMENtALISMS, appearing in various 
parts of the globe. Irrespective of their differences, they have a con-
sciousness that includes some forms of essentialism, basically claiming 
that the human is bound by specific limits derived from some supreme 
authority. The maintainance of those limits requires a conscience that 
calls for the destruction of all who transgress such limits since (a) the 
limits are expressions of human nature, (b) they signify the very pres-
ence of the ultimate personality that established such limits. Hence any-
one who disrupts such limits has an evil conscience and false conscious-
ness. If one wishes to be authentic, one is duty bound not only to resist 
the disruptors, but to destroy them. In turn, one is also duty bound to 
spread the one and only truth and good by any means (one cultural 
means is holy war) in order to maintain such a truth and a good. In 
brief, the virulent activity is required to bring the word of the supreme 
authority to this world and make everyone subject to it. 
This subjection will, nonetheless, require endless violation with-
out a a temporal future 
justification for such violation. This is a consciencia that requires 
continuous destruction to maintain its permanence enhancement with-
out qualifications. yet, its consciencia, at the level of enactment, will be 
in collision with that of modern – postmodern Western, and for the fol-
lowing reasons. First, because it is multi – discursive and hence open to 
diverse truths. Such a diversity cannot be tolerated in face of the claim 
that there is only one truth and one good. All other claims are false and 
evil and are destined for destruction. Second, since the world has been 
established by supreme authority and its will, then the modern trans-
formation and deessentializing of all events is a disruption of supreme 
will. Hence the rule of consciencia of modern-postmodern modernity 
for the FUNDAMENtALISt consciencia is FLUX AS PERMANENCE 
DISRUPtION At VARIOUS LEVELS: It is the work of the devil. After 
all, it violates all the metaphysical and theological structures and edicts 
imposed by supreme will. Third, the authenticity of this theocratic con-
sciencia calls for the destruction of this demonic-secular, this-worldly 
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process. There is no need to enter into discussion of the origins of this 
conception; all that has to be pointed out is the designation of the hu-
manistic tradition as unwarranted pride. 
These two types of consciencia are in collision, since they cannot 
be accommodated one to the other – despite both being anarchistic. 
The modern-postmodern modernity comprises an architectonic of 
FLUX AS FLUX ENHANCING WItHOUt PURPOSE, while the vari-
ous global moves of sacralizing consciencia are CONtINUOUS VIO-
LAtION IN AS FLUX OF PERMANENCE ENHANCEMENt. Both 
may be similar to the extent that the world is premised on the arbitrary 
metaphysics of will.
ThE MIddLE PATh
Various political suggestions can be offered to confront the anar-
chistic consciencia; what is the basic configuration that would not al-
low either anarchistic consciencia to have their total sway is this: first, 
permanence is required for any awareness, as well as dynamics, flux. 
yet the permanence that is required is one that MAINtAINS AND 
ENHANCES FLUX. This permanence has been regarded as a public 
domain wherein every member of society is both equal and autono-
mous. yet it is to be understood that such a domain is not a given; it is a 
phenomenon that must be permanently maintained by activity, partici-
pation, and engagement. One cannot simply say that there IS A PUB-
LIC DOMAIN; rather it vanishes as soon as the members of a political 
society cease to maintain it by virtue of their activities. In this sense, a 
participatory requirement is a principle which disallows any group to 
leave this domain without forfeiting and indeed destroying it. It must 
be argued, further, that the permanence of this domain includes rules 
allowing to change this domain. yet the very changes are a matter of 
public concern and cannot be relegated to some old or new divinities 
such as tHE MARKEt. The latter, as permanent, is actually FLUX SU-
PRESSING, since it fails to take into account rational considerations 
concerning the insatiable metaphysics of the will that subtends the 
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MARKEt ECONOMy. It is quite obvious that the permanent market 
is also enhanced and maintained by human activities, but is only one 
form of the modern-postmodern anarchistic consciencia. It is a public 
matter to what extent it may run wild and to what extent the permanent 
public domain, if it is maintained and enhanced, will establish rules to 
adjudicate this new divinity. 
What has been said with these brief remarks is an effort to point 
out that the various Anarchistic consciencia, including the market, are 
phenomena; they do not grow on trees, nor are they derivable from 
some ineffable will. We enact them and we can reenact them differently. 
yet the reenactment of this difference requires an entirely new concep-
tion of “world”. It must be argued that the types of anarchistic conscien-
cia articulated so far are worldless. In this sense specific civilizations, 
intent on articulating modern Western modernity with a view toward 
maintaining their own identities, can counter such a modernity at the 




OLd ANd NEW WORLdS
INTROdUcTION
There is a conflation of terminologies concerning immigrants, refu-
gees, and at times refugees who change to immigrants. Immigrants are 
persons who leave a particular country in order to seek a place regarded 
as more acceptable or promising. They are usually allowed to come to the 
new country legally and obtain some modicum of legal protection and, in 
time, citizenship. This is the case with most of the immigrants from East-
ern Europe during late 19th and early 20th centuries. They were coming 
to the promised land in waves, with no demands, upon arrival, from legal 
hacks for protection for their universal human rights or clever designs 
for welfare support. They knew that only hard work for pay awaited them 
and they gladly accepted the chance offered them. 
Refugees are persons who are thrown out of their homes by wars 
or persecution for expressing unacceptable views, or for some trans-
gression of laws and an inevitable punishment. They leave for a tempo-
rary duration with a constant search for ways of returning back to their 
homeland. Hence they do not immigrate to another country, but may 
be accepted for “safe keeping” till the danger to their lives is over and 
the door is open for return. In a sense, they do not specifically know 
where they are going, as long as they escape with their skin: as a say-
ing from Eastern Europe goes: I am running where my eyes lead me. 
In most cases, they leave everything with the hope that someday upon 
returning back all that will be regained.
Refugee-immigrants are persons who first are forced to leave by 
some cataclysm, usually a war, and unable to return to their home coun-
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try immediately. They will seek legal status as immigrants, or seek other 
countries which would accept them as legal immigrants. Hence, they 
cease to be refugees and acquire a status of immigrants. Such groups 
tend to come in waves and are also grateful for a chance to make a life in 
a new country, yet they tend to maintain hopes of returning home once 
the social or political conditions would permit. More recently, there is 
a category that is used to cover a peculiar combination of motives: eco-
nomic refugees. In their own countries they survive and are not perse-
cuted or become victims of wars, but regard their means of subsistence 
as unacceptable and seek a better life elsewhere. They tend to move as 
families or individuals or small groups, and tend to enter the host coun-
tries illegally. They tend to regard their countries of origin as their real 
home and point of self identity, and are in the host country to make 
a living. Indeed, this living is not just for them but for their extended 
families. This group is more current and in part is relevant for a desig-
nation of waves of Eastern Europeans in the aftermath of the collapse 
of the Soviet Union. This chapter will consider all three waves and their 
main attitudes toward the melting pot. It could be stated that the melt-
ing pot was not even a question for most immigrants. They expressed 
their belonging, exclusion, or self-exclusion by their actions and com-
mitments, by their words, their pride, dreams, hopes, disappointments, 
and aspirations. 
WAvES FROM ThE OLd cOUNTRY
The wave of immigrants from Eastern Europe at the end of 19th 
and the dawn of 20th centuries consisted of peoples basically from the 
land. The Poles, Ukrainians, Balts hardly knew the wider place of their 
origin, and only a story, a mystical place of destination – the land where 
streets are paved with gold. They might have known their village, or 
even a provincial town, and perhaps that they were from Russian em-
pire. yet these did not spell a nation or provide a national identity to 
inspire pride, commitment, patriotism and sacrifice. They might have 
fled from 25 years of military service in an army whose commands and 
edicts were in a language they did not understand. But mainly they left 
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places that were replete with degradation, misery and pain. Day after 
day, season after season, life returned in cycles of repeated subjection 
and exploitation by the big pan (master), gospadin (proprietor) and the 
extended hand of a priest to be kissed on one’s knees. Their reflection 
upon the conditions consisted on the impossibility of being a pan or a 
gospadin, or a “father” since all of these positions were reserved to those 
with birthright of being most valuable, highest in social rank, while the 
eternal peasant could not even imagine being born into such positions 
or having concerns about her nation. It would be against divine order 
itself. He was born to be a muzhik, a serf-peasant whose position was 
eternally fixed. This suggests that they did not immigrate as economic 
refugees or those seeking political asylum from oppressive rulers or 
rulers who denied universal human rights. They were illiterate and 
hence oblivious to such lofty concepts. Their situation was ontological-
essential. Their reflection from the others, the Misters and Masters, the 
Lords and Gods, the tzar as Father-God positioned them ontologically 
to be essentially tied to the hard toil, to be illiterate, to live in the same 
log cabins and straw roofs with their beasts of burden, and at times to 
be treated as lesser than them. Hence, their leaving was not identical 
with economic refugees seeking more money, better life, but a totalizing 
move to drop their ontological identities, their degraded positions and 
to be able to be addressed and to address one another in terms of what 
they only heard reflectively: mister, master of my own domain, and a 
proprietor of my work. Here we should not introduce such psychologi-
cal “wisdom” of envy, greed, rebellion, and even pride. In plain terms, 
they could not afford such psychological complexities. In principle, 
they wanted to be humans and live like humans.
The immigrant from the land had another reflexive awareness. His 
position on the land was sanctioned by a terminology that constantly 
appealed to a tradition, to a past: through all the ages and their eternity, 
as it was in the past so shall it be forever. This is almost a Hegelian dia-
lectics with a slight modification: the essence is what has been, and yet 
the essence is repeated as the future. For the Eastern European muzhik 
the move to the new world was also a move away from the past and the 
tradition that inscribed him with indelible ontological mark of restric-
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tions, while the future consisted of the new world with very different, 
and mainly unknown prospects. yet precisely such an open future, as 
an aspect of the peasant’s awareness, comprised a reflexive horizon that 
revealed the limitations of the old world as past, as an essence that has 
been, a frozen and changeless position without prospects, without be-
ing able to be a Mister and his wife a Missis, a Lady. This temporal and 
in turn essential interreflexivity was the constitution of awareness that 
pitted ontology against its temporal dissolution, and hence toward a 
radical rearticulation of the peasant who will become a worker for his 
own living and with prospects to be equal to any other Mister, indeed to 
be a human, and above all human. After all, the “father” calls us human 
from the pulpit, and yet we live with, and as beasts.
This wave of immigrants knew that hard work awaits the illiterate 
and linguistically mute in the new world. Not only their old language 
skills were limited to the tasks appropriate for land labor, but also the 
new world’s language was beyond their ken. This aspect compelled these 
immigrants to form their own linguistic communities, concentrated 
around centers of production requiring heavy and menial labor. These 
enclaves comprised a context for acquiring a national identity that was 
broader than the village and narrower than the distant empire they left 
behind. They were from other villages and, at times towns, and yet spoke 
a similar language. This is to say, the identity appeared as a reflexively 
constituted recognition of us as distinct from the Americans and from 
the Russians, the Ukrainians we are Lithuanians, thus positioning us as 
distinct from others. The same can be said of the Ukrainians, the Rus-
sians, the Poles and others. They too acquired reflexive identities and 
became different from other enclaves. It must be noted that the term 
American was reserved to designate the others, the American speaking 
yankees who were literate, at ease in their world and even superior. 
Indeed, they had a different religion and regarded it as enlightened and 
far above the Catholic and the Orthodox religions of Eastern European 
immigrants. The latter could hardly count as Christians. 
Here, the new immigrant was placed in various ambiguities. She 
was in America: equal being among all others, and yet not an American 
in contrast to the real Americans. She lived in an enclave among her 
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linguistic neighbors and indeed had acquired a national identity that be-
longed to the old country and at the same time defined her community in 
the new world. She lived in a Lithuanian neighborhood, and contributed 
to the maintenance of that community by donating hard earned funds to 
build a parish and even a club. The building of ties to the community was 
dramatically enhanced by the clergy who came with the waves of im-
migrants to tend to the flock. The clergy were educated and literate and 
hence enjoyed a similar status that they had in the old country. As in the 
old country, they commanded respect and exercised authority. Moreo-
ver, they played a mediating role between an ethnic community and the 
American world, to the extent that they were literate and could even read 
American newspapers and documents. Hence, they were positioned 
both as opening the immigrant to the American world, and as a barrier 
that prevented the immigrant of speedy integration. From their position, 
the clergy also provided a powerful reflexive aspect toward establishing 
national identities among the illiterate immigrants. The latter were told 
that they are not just from a village or some gubernija, (governorship) 
but from a country with borders, usually extended to include the broad-
est geographic area derived from historical records. Hence, a Lithuanian 
from a village or some gubernija, perhaps was aware that he also belongs 
to the empire of tsar Alexander, but not that he is residing in Lithuania. 
yet as an immigrant in the new world, he is building a community and 
a church, and acquires an identity as Lithuanian through the talks with 
the clergy who also point out that Lithuania once ruled from the Baltic to 
the Black sea, and that the tsars trembled before the Lithuanian rulers. 
While constituting a national identity in the new world and retroactively 
acquiring a vague sense of the nation left in the old world, the immigrant 
tended to regard the latter as past, while the new world of America as a 
place for his future. 
Apart from parishes and churches from which radiated the lin-
guistic boundaries and national identity and acceptance of the im-
migrant, there were established clubs which were basically pubs with 
dance floors, and a few piece band that could play the old country tunes 
and rhythms. At times a kitchen for old country foods was also added 
and thus enhanced ones national identity, and also a separation from 
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the American world. The church basement, as well as the club, were 
the gathering places that allowed for community organizational work, 
specifically concerned with aiding each other to find jobs, places to live, 
meeting of available marital partners, and mutual support to open eth-
nic businesses, such as grocery stores, barber shops, shoe repairs, and 
even production of ethnic food commodities, such as sausages, breads, 
and cheeses. No doubt, such increase in self-sufficiency tended to block 
integration into the main stream America. yet it is also no doubt that 
the new immigrant regarded herself as American, specifically in man-
ners and efforts to speak American. It must be understood that most 
jobs were outside of such ethnic communities: steel mills, coal mines, 
slaughter houses, doing laundry and cleaning homes of the yankees. 
Each of these occupations required a specific, although very limited 
American vocabulary. For the immigrant yankees did not speak Eng-
lish; they spoke American. Such a vocabulary consisted of greetings, 
calling out names that had been modified or Americanized, and terms 
required for the performing of jobs. “Au you?” “Purty gut”. “Kep your 
missis?”, “Vai you standin, no vorkin?” etc. yet this vocabulary was im-
mediately brought into the ethnic community and became a common 
mode of conversation mixed with the immigrants’ ethnic language. In 
many cases American words were given ethnic endings resulting in a 
unique language worthy of linguistic studies. “Paidiom stritovat”, (lets 
go for a walk) with street modified to streetovat as a verb. Or, “Gi mi 
ames” (Give me ham). Such usage was also regarded as a sign of being 
American. 
Other signs of being equal to Americans consisted of attire and 
addressing others by Mister and Missis. One bought a suit, a hat, a vest 
with a watch chain across the middrift, a dress with somber or flowery 
patterns, and was able to say on Sunday church gatherings that I am just 
as good as the boss, he wears a suit, and so do I. The yankee lady wears a 
flowery dress and a bonnet, so do I. The boss is Mister, and so am I; his 
wife is Missis, and so is mine. The latter case is very pronounced. The 
men did not speak of wives; they would rather ask “au you missis”, and 
the women would not speak of husbands but ask “au you mister”. (How 
is your missis, and how is your mister). Such designations and attires 
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were not even on a horizon in the old country. In this sense, they were 
becoming Americans, even if symbolically. But the symbolism for them 
was the reality of being American, wherein the old country was sinking 
into the past, while the new world was becoming almost the sole future. 
This symbolism became dramatically enhanced when the immi-
grant went back to the old country to visit relatives and former neigh-
bors. In that setting he was an American. He wore his suit, she wore her 
dress and bonnet, and the whole village would come out to gape at The 
Americans. He was now addressed as pan or gospadin and even the local 
priest or landlord would seat him and her at the table and treat them as 
equals. In this setting there was no question that he and she are no longer 
muzhiks but members of another society that was regarded as superior. 
Being members of the new world, they too were higher in rank than what 
they were when they left. This aspect also comprised a reflexive moment 
that allowed the immigrants to identify themselves with the new world 
and upon returning to it to be proud of their new identity. They proudly 
proclaimed to those who just landed on the shores of the new world 
that “ash Amerikons”. And no doubt, despite the back breaking labor, 
the long hours, they scrounged and acquired homes, and their future, 
appearing in the new generation, was radically different from the past 
of the old country. Thus they melted into the melting pot but in quite 
a unique way. While constantly reminded of their difference manifest 
from language through religion, music, illiteracy, through endurance 
and patience, they strove to surround themselves with paraphernalia 
of normal American life: Protestant work ethic, saving money, frugal-
ity, private property, children in schools preparing for good jobs, and, 
of course, becoming more patriotic than the real Americans. This was 
indeed in contrast to the reserved yankees who did not wear their pat-
riotism on their sleeves. The pride would increase even more when the 
clergy would organize parish fund raising for relief in the old country. 
“We Americans can afford to do the job, while those in the old country 
can’t dig themselves out of their holes”. 
One aspect that cannot be overlooked is the emergent workers 
movements and the left wing politics. Being members of working class, 
these immigrants were easy targets not only of left wing politics, but 
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in many cases of communist organizations. Leaders of such organiza-
tions found fertile ground among these workers, and held meetings 
in ethnic clubs to explain the workers position in the world of capital. 
Indeed, while not engaged in radical activities, these working persons, 
many of whom have become citizens, supported left wing democratic 
candidates. They did not regard such activities as un-American, revo-
lutionary, or destructive of America, but a continuation of their hopes 
and dreams in America. After all, in the old country they could not 
assemble and organize, demand changes, and even help elect repre-
sentatives. The latter would be empowered to speak with the voice and 
power of the people and establish laws and programs for the people. 
For example, Roosevelt was a president who established social security 
and other benefits for workers and he was regarded as the best there 
ever was. Reaching retirement years, these immigrants were now secure 
and this security was equally given by America. Meanwhile, following 
our theme of individual self worth, the immigrants gained self respect 
for their achievements on their own, and in their left wing politics, they 
regarded their activities as genuinely American – all are equal, and if the 
company and the owners think that they are not, we must tell them oth-
erwise. It is important to note that the self respect was not yet founded 
on modern notion of being valuable to society, country, or politics, but 
primarily, of being one’s own person. This is their tacit awareness of 
self worth, manifesting itself actively with reflection on the difference 
between the old and new worlds. The old was past and bad, and the new 
was future and good, and thus the immigrants “human essence” was 
confirmed as action and doing with an open future. 
A brief note concerning the real tug of war to join real Americans 
comes with the second generation. While the parishes tended to estab-
lish schools and newspapers, they were basically parochial, with an em-
phasis on maintaining ethnic and religious identities, the public schools 
were a battle ground for the second generation. The battle consisted of 
many levels. The youngsters were made to be ashamed in public schools 
of being different on the basis of strange names, at times accents, shy 
and unsure manners, and lesser wealth. Hence, they did their level best 
to become, the best they could, Americans. This also comprised a war 
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at home: the parents were ignorant, did not know how to speak, had 
no manners, and hence objects of shame. One could not bring such 
parents to a public school. One was ashamed of them and would be 
exposed to ridicule – even by teachers. At home, the children knew eve-
rything better than their parents, and their manners were American in 
contrast to the moralities that the parents wanted to impose. “Look ma, 
I can come home anytime I like; this is America and not the old coun-
try”. While growing up, this second generation of Eastern Europeans 
tended to Americanize their names by shortening, or even completely 
adopting American names. Thus, from Adamkiewitzch one becomes 
Adams, from Ivan one becomes John, from Stankevichius one becomes 
Stankus, and from Stanislav one turns to Stan. In brief, this generation 
ran from the customs and language of their parents, and indeed from 
the enclaves in order to erase their ethnicity and be normal Americans 
without any other trace. It is only by third and fourth generations that 
this effort became redundant and one was born American and names, 
if they still lingered in some families, no longer signified shame, being 
outsider, or even degraded. The immigrant grandparents, for the third 
generation, were not objects of shame or avoidance, but at most of cu-
riosity: “Mom, how come grandpa talks funny?”
ThE WAvES FROM TOWNS
The second wave of Eastern European immigrants stemmed, in the 
main, from towns and cities. This wave is a result of the Second World 
War. to understand this type of immigrant, a brief context has to be 
delineated. After gaining independence from the Russian empire, and 
others having established national boundaries, there emerged a sense of 
national identity among peoples of this region. Whether a peasant or a 
doctor, one knew that she was Polish, Latvian, Lithuanian, Czechoslo-
vakian, Estonian, etc. More importantly, education was established for 
all, and became extolled as the highest good. One reason for education 
was the growing industrialization, trade, and a need for various ser-
vices, from teachers through doctors, engineers, and officers. Another 
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reason was a need for an avenue to reduce agrarian populations in or-
der to avoid the division of land into increasingly smaller lots among 
children and grandchildren. One son, usually the first born, inherits 
the land, and perhaps one daughter can be provided with a good dowry 
for marriage, but others have to go and make their way in the world 
through education. These factors provided a split between town-city 
as populated by cultured, educated, more prosperous members – the 
elite – and the agrarian population that, while literate, nonetheless not 
highly educated. High education was a prestige and those in such posi-
tions were cultural and national leaders. Of course, their interests were 
not only to have such positions, but also to insure them through the 
maintenance of national integrity. Although stemming from agrarian 
backgrounds, the educated looked upon agrarian life and people from 
a distance of a position in town-city, and a hierarchy of well rewarded 
professions. They were addressed as “ponas”, in short as Mister or Sir. 
Indeed, their spouses were also entitled to the titles: they were Missis 
Engineer, Missis Doctor, Missis General, Missis minister, Missis profes-
sor, etc. and demanded deference from the lower ones, including their 
servants. They premised their being on their value position in society; 
they were not yet Western in the previously articulated sense.
There is no need to speak of various World War two battles and 
territorial redistributions among the warring powers; what is impor-
tant is that the Soviet Union was acquiring Eastern Europe. It is also 
an a priori truth, that for Soviet Union any educated elite was regarded 
as the most dangerous threat to absolute dictatorship and hence to be 
eliminated first. Whether it is the murder of 10.000 Polish officers at 
Katyn, or the rounding up of tens of thousands of educated persons, 
from teachers, through doctors, lawyers, to priests and officers during 
the first Soviet invasion of Baltics in 1940, it was the educated group that 
bore the brunt of being transported in cattle cars to the Gulag. Hence, 
the final invasion of Soviet Union on the heels of retreating German 
armies spelled the death of any educated person who would decide to 
stay in the home land. Very few chose that fate and hence fled in mass 
toward the West as refugees. Obviously they were not immigrating, but 
simply running toward any safe haven from the red terror. This very 
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designation they used already suggests that they were mostly conserva-
tive and that anything, resembling communism under whatever guise, 
would be an enemy. This is not to say that their anti-communism was 
unfounded – after all, thousands of their colleagues, friends, and family 
members were tortured and murdered or sent to concentration camps 
and death. The main populations staying at home were farmers who 
later also bore the violence of the red terror for owning property, their 
farms, and hence being bourgeois and exploiters of the working class. 
At any rate, the national elite, the head of various nations of Eastern 
Europe left. 
Most ended up in refugee camps in what then was called West 
Germany. Despite hardships, there was no lack of enthusiasm for edu-
cation. In such camps schools were formed and education of their chil-
dren, disrupted by war, resumed at all levels. While the range was from 
first grade through gymnasium (high school), the teachers included 
university professors and thus added to the high level of educational 
preparation for the children of the refugees. At the same time they knew 
and extolled their national identities, and knew the enemy in the East 
that was enslaving our people. The point is that these refugees built up 
strong immunity against being totally integrated into a society of their 
next destination. The latter was still unknown and it took a number of 
years for them to be invited to immigrate to Australia and to the Ameri-
cas. For most, the latter were narrowed down to North America and 
most preferably to U.S.A. The choice of the U.S.A. was not by chance. 
The Eastern European immigrants from the first wave, were still alive – 
even if old and some already retired; hence they were contacted through 
parishes and were called upon to invite relatives – even if remote – to 
their communities by agreeing to provide contracts of support. Hope-
fully the support would be short and jobs would be found for the new 
immigrants through contacts by the old immigrants and specifically 
through parishes and organizations. This also located the new immi-
grants in the enclaves already established by the first wave and, at the 
very outset, provided a national setting. 
The new world offered jobs similar to those occupied by the first 
wave – menial labor, factory work, store and restaurant attendants, and 
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even servants. Their elite positions of the old country were disquali-
fied for obvious reasons: first, high level professions, such as law, medi-
cine, diplomacy, generalhood, teaching required sophisticated language 
skills; second, even if one had good language background in English, 
the professions required very different preparation and also legal con-
ditions: one had to engage in a protracted reeducation in order to pass 
examinations required by laws of the new world. Hence an unavoidable 
dilemma for the mostly middle aged immigrants with families: have to 
work to earn a living for the family, and have to try to obtain reeduca-
tion in the profession acquired in the old country. Few made it. Thus, 
concentration on the next generation: young persons were pushed 
to go for higher education at any cost. Due to their good educational 
preparation in camps, the youth of the new immigrants finished high 
schools with a breeze and entered universities in unprecedented num-
bers of any other group. It is regarded that up to eighty percent of this 
youth earned university degrees – mainly in practical disciplines, such 
as business, medicine, engineering, physics, mathematics, etc. At the 
same time, such professions, even among Americans, were peopled by 
persons of conservative ilk. Very few entered such things as humanities 
and liberal arts. Such professions were deemed leftist, intellectual, and 
suspicious – at least pink if not red.
But what of the push to melt into the melting pot? The situation 
is somewhat complex. We must understand the relationship of the new 
wave with the old one. The latter received the new immigrants from 
a position of superiority; after all, they were Americans giving aid to 
those from the old country, those who do not understand what it is 
to be a Mister and Missis, and to speak American. After all, the new 
immigrants were backward, from a country which the old immigrants 
long since left behind and regarded as being more or less the same as 
their memories have retained. They have established their lives in the 
new world and were proud of being citizens of this world. Meanwhile, 
the new immigrants regarded themselves educated, with high positions, 
elite of their nation, and hence far superior to the old wave immigrants. 
The latter were seen as simple, though good hearted, and to be toler-
ated but not taken seriously. After all, they did not realize how much 
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things have changed in the old world, and hence hardly partners in any 
intelligent conversation. Moreover, and most importantly, the old im-
migrants were a lost cause. They had no nationalistic (apart from be-
ing American) passion and could not be counted upon to join ranks 
to help liberate their true home land in the old world. In addition, the 
old immigrants and even their children, were left leaning. As pointed 
out above, they were working class people and Roosevelt was the man 
who provided all sorts of social benefits. If the old country is commu-
nist, and if communists take care of working people, then there was no 
reason for anyone to leave. Why did these people run away; the best 
thing for them was to go back, unless they were real enemies of the peo-
ple. This was a very sore spot between the old and the new immigrants. 
For the new, Roosevelt was the worst thing that happened to Eastern 
Europe. Hence the positive adoration of this president by the old im-
migrants was incomprehensible, antinationalistic and to be rejected. 
The new immigrants, meanwhile, were in the new world for a short 
duration. The West, no doubt, will come to its senses, people will elect 
leaders who will not tolerate the red terror spreading its enslavement 
across the world. Indeed it will be stopped and rolled back. This is just 
a matter of few years and then....we shall go back and resume our posi-
tions, returning as rightful national elite. This means that there was not 
even a desire to enter the melting pot. Of course, we must work to live, 
and even strive to advance in our jobs, but only for now.
What one added to insure one’s return as untainted as possible 
is immediate forming of organizations, and taking over of schools and 
mass media that were established by the first wave immigrant clergy 
and religious orders. teachers from the new wave took over instruction 
in parochial schools and organized language classes to insure that the 
children of the new immigrants would be fluent in their ethnic tongue, 
culture, geography, history, and all the glorious kings, princes, and he-
roes. At the same time the clubs were expanded, meetings and lectures 
organized to solve all sorts of national problems and to organize pres-
sure on governments for liberating the home nation. In these organiza-
tions the new educated immigrants, while working in factories in the 
daytime, called themselves by old titles: Mr. ambassador, Mr. engineer, 
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Mr. doctor, and their ladies, packing cookies in factories during the day, 
called each other Missis doctor, Missis professor, etc. They not only car-
ried their national identities, but also their elite positions within those 
nations. In their clubs, and the youth buildings they built with libraries, 
they held meetings and balls to which they came dressed as best they 
could to look regal and extolled their old titles. There were hardly any 
of the simple, good hearted first wave immigrants who were invited or 
wanted to attend.
Meanwhile the children of the new wave were also organized, na-
tionalized and positioned to go back to their country and help revive it 
after the red terror had completely distorted it. Hence, all sorts of youth 
organizations, summer camps, schools for language and history, and 
even summer courses at the university level for ethnic groups taught by 
ethnic professors for credit – all designed to revive, instill, and maintain 
national identity, pride and separation from the main stream Ameri-
can culture. As mentioned above, the young flocked to universities and 
were instilled with the notion that they were smarter, of higher cul-
ture and class. Part time menial jobs were acceptable only as temporary 
support for their education. After work and/or school, they gathered in 
their ethnic clubs, restaurants, youth buildings to discuss in their ethnic 
languages all issues, to listen to poets, diplomats, professors, to watch 
theater and listen to opera – and all performed in their languages by 
ethnic artists. Marriage too was expected to be with partners from the 
same ethnic group. After all, next generations had to continue the na-
tional line and to return home to take up their rightful place that the 
parents, and even grandparents had occupied. Moreover, all the illegal 
misappropriation of property by communist governments will be re-
versed and we shall hold legal titles to such properties. In contrast to the 
first wave, the second wave idealized the old country as the best, most 
cultured, and historically most significant.
In contrast to the first wave immigrants who could not join the 
main stream because of linguistic, literacy, religious, and educational 
barriers, yet who prided themselves of being Americans, the second 
wave overcame those barriers due to their literacy, high level of educa-
tion and the presumption of their own elite status, and yet closed them-
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selves off from American life. The latter was to be of short duration and 
will be left behind once we return home. But the return home began to 
demand all sorts of activities, chief among them the organized efforts 
to insure that the West, and specifically the American government, re-
fuse to recognize the illegal occupation and incorporation of the home 
nations into the Soviet empire or satellite status. This means that par-
ticipation in American politics was keen and conservative. Roosevelt, 
the arch-liberal, the red, sold Eastern Europe to communism, while the 
conservatives regard communism as the ultimate enemy. Hence politi-
cal organization to support conservative American politicians, not nec-
essarily from one’s own nationality, but perhaps someone from Eastern 
European origin and conservative ideology. As already mentioned, this 
political stance provided a rift between the old and the new immigrant 
waves. The only thing they had in common was religion. yet even here, 
the clergy of the new wave immigrants set a conservative political tone. 
It is impossible to go to all the varieties of the rift between old and new, 
but it may be interesting to point out some aberrations forming among 
the new immigrants, specifically among intellectuals in human sciences.
Intellectual groups, formed by academicians in humanities, had a 
unique position as immigrants. They became more integrated in Amer-
ican world for a unique reason: liberalism. It is liberalism that provides 
arguments for tolerance of ethnic differences and hence for the possibil-
ity of maintaining ethnic and national identities in North America. In 
this sense such groups seemed to be counter to the conservative majori-
ties which regarded the liberals as reds. In turn, just as the conservatives 
called for the liberation of the old nations from communist yoke, the 
liberals argued on the basis of universal rights of nations to self determi-
nation, and at the same time of universal rights of members of different 
societies to political freedoms. But this meant that in principle, even 
communist views must be tolerated if they are not imposed by force. 
Hence, if we go home again, we will have to tolerate peoples’ choices 
of political parties and governments, even if they choose communists. 
Such liberal views were branded as unpatriotic, to be stamped out, and 
not to be allowed when we get back. Liberal and democrat, we recall, 
was associated by the majority of the second wave with red. In a pecu-
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liar reversal, the liberals were contributing to the liberation of thought 
in Eastern Europe by simply being intellectually interested to read liter-
atures, humanities, philosophies of the academicians, writers, and poets 
in their home lands. This led to the establishment of personal contacts 
and careful dialogues. Western views appeared, even if underground, 
with increasing frequency and impacted Eastern European intellectual 
life, helping in its liberalization and at the same time of slow distanc-
ing from the Soviet empire and gaining greater national identity. This 
impact was admitted much later – after the collapse of the Soviet Union. 
It is obvious that the conservative majority regarded such intellectual 
contacts as being worse than sacrilege: complete sellout of country to 
the reds.
AS TIME GOES BY
While initially unwilling to be Americanized, the new immigrants 
acquired an American way of practical life: middle class, property, and 
even reputation among the Americans as being equal professionals 
and solid citizens. Indeed, not only good Americans, but perhaps even 
better than the naive and careless locals who did not understand the 
dangers posed to America by world communism. Here, their conserva-
tivism extended to American patriotism against communism – specifi-
cally in the context of the Cold War. America and we Americans stand 
against communism. Those who do not stand with us are not worthy 
Americans. This bifurcation of the world also allowed one to think that 
after all those generations in the old country brought up under com-
munist rule must surely be communist. As just mentioned, any contact 
with them is a sellout not only of one’s nation but also of America. East-
ern European countries are written off and the new aging immigrant 
becomes better American than the real Americans. After all, prospects 
of going home are dimming, the positions which one once had are not 
only gone, but also one is getting too old for any position, apart for 
retirement and social security provided by America. While supporting 
and maintaining the newspapers, book publishing, radio and even tel-
evision programs (in larger centers), the more interesting and relevant 
229
Chapter VIII. Old and New Worlds
news come from American media; more interesting programs (includ-
ing high culture) are better done on American television, American 
movies, and American opera. Of course, we still belong to the elite, but 
we discover that America contains cultural options unavailable any-
where else. Those poor folks at home, under communism, have nothing 
cultural in comparison to us Americans. Those admitted for a visit to 
Soviet Union and Eastern Europe would point out to their acquaint-
ances in the old country what great culture, science, creativity America 
possesses, and, of course, I am American. If you could come and visit, 
you would not believe your eyes. It became an indirect, reflexive aware-
ness from the old country that constituted a moment of practical and 
psychological immersion into the melting pot. Now their concern with 
the old country shifted toward Westernization and even liberalization 
through cultural, even if initially narrow, channels. The old country has 
to be Americanized in order to be able someday to join civilization. This 
effort was enhanced by the collapse of the Soviet Empire.
GOING hOME
This event, for the now aged immigrants, was a sign of the cor-
rectness of their conservativism that was exhibited by the conserva-
tive government in Washington. Moreover, this correctness was also 
confirmed by their conviction that it is Eastern Europe, and above all 
Lithuania, that finally cracked the iron curtain and forced the collapse 
of the Soviet Union. The most significant demonstration of acceptance 
of America by the aged immigrants was the refusal to return home to 
live; yet now they returned as American tourists to meet the members 
of their families who speak with Russian accents, and have manners 
that belong to enslaved people. The time for the Americans has come to 
undo the damage and to bring back the nationalism they have cherished 
for fifty years of exile. yet what they brought was and continues to be 
America. Customs, manners, behavior, political demands, commerce, 
education, privatization, and even language were American. We shall 
teach them not to look over their shoulder if anyone is watching; we 
shall show them how to speak freely and without fear in public gather-
230
Algis Mickunas. SOCIAL VALUE AND INDIVIDUAL WORTH
ings – each individual in her own name. We shall bring back the true 
nation that was there before Soviet empire. Of course, this would mean 
forgetting that in numerous cases the pre-Soviet governments did not 
allow free speech without police supervision, and did not allow chal-
lenges to petty dictators who were continuing in their offices for the 
benefit of the country. This simply suggests that these returning na-
tionalists have been completely integrated into the melting pot, even 
if they still maintained their enclaves, clubs, and parishes. This is more 
so valid of the young children of the second wave: well educated and 
experienced, they also joined in the Americanization of East European 
nations. Indeed, the indigenous populations formed an ambivalent at-
titude toward them. These returning nationals were temporary visitors 
who spoke the local language with an accent, but condemned the Rus-
sian linguistic acquisitions, accents, and terminological mixtures, and 
did their level best to replace such borrowing, yet this time by American 
terms that were deemed normal. Indeed, such normalizing began to be 
regarded, in the old country, as Americanization and indeed leading 
away from nationalism and toward cosmopolitanism. There are notable 
shifts in attitudes among the common people, although not the elite 
and young educated groups toward the tourists. The former regard the 
returning visitors as foreigners, with curious manners and attitudes, in-
deed, unsettling liberalism. The latter are all for becoming Westerners 
and indeed Americans. Both aspects comprise a reflection upon the vis-
iting immigrants and their offspring that they are genuine Americans. 
This brief sketch suggests that melting pot does not prohibit the immi-
grant from forming its communities and maintaining her old country 
nationality, yet also indicates that enculturation is equally inevitable. 
yet such nationality, for the first immigrant waves, was basically 
formed in America. For it the only identifiable nation they inhabited was 
America. The reflexive forming of the old country nation was remote, 
and the experience of it in the past. This is to say, they were American 
nationals at their present while the birth place, that was not a nation, 
was, as a nation in their imagination, but not in their past experience. 
Hence it would seem that to be American national was much easier 
for them. For the second wave, the nation was experienced and main-
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tained in immigration; the problem was that it had vanished into Soviet 
Empire or its sphere of dominance without national sovereignty, and 
hence the immigrants had to become the sole bearers of these nations 
as separate and independent entities. This reversal from the first wave 
consciousness called upon the second wave to maintain the authentic-
ity of their nationalities. This factor added another tension between the 
returning Americans to visit their old nations (freed from Soviet Em-
pire) and the indigenous populations. The latter, after all, have assumed 
Soviet nationality, ways of thinking and pervasive Russification. Hence, 
such a population was tainted and the returning visitors had no qualms 
in claiming that they are the true bearers of old country nationalities. 
But as already suggested, they were Americans despite themselves, and 
they brought a nationality from fifty years ago that no longer made 
much sense in contemporary setting. Indeed, what they regarded as 
their separate national identity, brought with them to the new world, 
became only a memory of comfortable Americans fifty years later. 
yet their Americanism, paraded in the old countries, also pro-
vided a catalyst for the younger and more daring members to seek the 
good life in the West. In contrast to the Soviet shabby life, they were of-
fered instant images of material abundance, leisurely life, unimaginable 
variety of commodities, and easy money. Coupled with newly elected 
governments who still operated in the old Soviet style – inefficient, 
completely removed from daily concerns of citizens, bureaucratic, and 
dictatorial – the only option was and is to leave. This new, post Soviet 
wave consists of educated professionals who have not yet become na-
tionalistic, but who have a view of life as opportunistic. Partially this op-
portunistic view stems from their Soviet education where the West was 
constantly depicted as capitalistic anarchy, where anything goes as long 
as you make money. If you make money, you will be respected and have 
a good, although alienated and decadent life, and the making of money 
has no rules. Resultantly, the current wave does not come to bring its 
nationality and its preservation, but to exploit any opportunity – and 
in many cases criminal – to enrich themselves. This does not mean that 
they are economic refugees whose home life is almost unbearable, al-
most on the verge of starvation. They want what is paraded from the 
232
Algis Mickunas. SOCIAL VALUE AND INDIVIDUAL WORTH
West in advertisements, in luxuries, fun, and immediate gratifications. 
While educated in specific professions, they take any job, or engage in 
any activity that gives them the good life. There is one specific concep-
tion that is quite complex and quite common. They come to the West, 
and in the main to America, to make money. They know all the latest 
styles and would be insulted if offered hand me downs from previous 
immigrants. They also know all the legal and social tricks and can find 
immediately all sorts of loopholes in order to circumvent legal require-
ments for their stay. They also claim that apart from making money 
life in America is low, mean, brutal, uncultured; hence, once we enrich 
ourselves, we shall go back home. They follow the Soviet saying that in 
America one has everything, but one has no life. Upon returning, we 
shall have everything and life. The reason for this view stems from the 
inherited attitude toward work in Soviet period. Most received equal 
pay, with most other amenities guaranteed, and work was very mini-
mal: do as little as possible, enjoy being with others over a bottle of vod-
ka, and let the government take care of the rest. In short, no hustle, no 
rush, no worries. In America, in contrast, there is no time for leisure, for 
friendly gatherings; one must run from morning till night and become 
spiritually exhausted. At the end of all that one is given a fare of dull, 
unintelligent, television programs. yet if they return to their homeland 
it is for more gratifications and not to build or extol their nation. Upon 
returning, the latter is equally bad in contrast to the fun one could have 
on the beaches of Florida, gambling casinos in Las Vegas, and Jazz in 
New Orleans. In all fairness, this wave of immigrants does not have to 
be concerned with its nation, since anyone can go back anytime without 
serious restrictions. Thus there is no need to be patriotic and, above all, 
culturally interested in their tradition. Their culture, now, is global. 
Another, and perhaps usually overlooked aspect, is that the re-
gaining of national autonomy occurred as a resistance against a for-
eigner that has restricted ethnic and national “showinism” (except for 
Russian), and barred all contacts with the rest of the world. One could 
enjoy the “great country” the vast reaches of the Soviet Union and hence 
forget one’s ethnicity. After autonomy, Lithuanians found themselves 
open to sudden transformation, to unimaginable “playthings”, to mu-
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sic, arts, sports, and none of these wondrous things were imposed upon 
them. If you wanted, you could be nationalistic, Budhistic, sun worshi-
per, and do so as a citizen of the West. The release from oppression was 
also release from being concerned with ones culture or national iden-
tity. After all, Lithuania is there, we can come and go as we please, and 
if we fail to maintain our ethnic identity in the West, the folks at home 
can do that. Of course, to join the West is equivalent to obtaining “valu-
able” skills that are in demand somewhere – this, as already mentioned, 
is the creation of a nomadic civilization of “unattached experts”.
There is a tension between the second wave, old immigrants and 
the new opportunists who are not committed to their home nation 
as nation, and care less for American liberties and individual worth. 
Hence, they are regarded, in the main, as freed Soviets who think that 
freedom means everything goes and that no civilized or civic rules are 
to be respected. The difficulty that this immigrant has stems from a lack 
of identity. She has learned not to trust governments, since the Soviet 
government was a priori oppressive and devious, and hence one had to 
learn devious ways of circumventing authority. yet after the breakdown 
of Soviet empire, the newly and freely elected governments came from 
the ranks of the former communist ruling elites and, once in power, 
behaved in the old ways – with one exception: the members of govern-
ments became unabashedly corrupt and, as the saying goes, they did 
not establish democracy but cleptocracy. If such governments are rep-
resentative of new national identities, then there is nothing new from 
the old system apart from setting an example how the rest should live 
a corrupt life. As immigrants, they do not pay attention to legitimate 
authority, since for them all authority must be corrupt and not heeded. 
Thus illegal immigration, false visas, criminal activity are taken as nor-
mal. In principle, for the most part, the post-Soviet wave of immigrants 
will not be melted into anything, be proud of belonging to a specific 
nationality, have allegiance to a flag, or to any specific conviction. It is 
unabashed self interest, and any means, any country will do as long as it 
serves as many interests as possible. 
It might be the case that this group is in transition and may be 
regarded as an aspect of globalization. The latter, after all, is abolishing 
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national boundaries, even of identifiable national and powerful entities 
such as the U.S.A., nations of Western Europe, and draws into its sphere 
areas that have hardly began to form their national identities. Such 
identities are being easily dissolved in the sweep of organizations that 
have no borders. If we couple this phenomenon with the immigrants 
from the newly proclaimed (or recouped) nations of Eastern Europe, 
we can see that the immigrants might never have experienced their cur-
rently emergent nationalities as points of their identity. Soviet Union, 
and by extension its satellites formed, more or less, a country wherein 
they were safe and at home. They could travel (with permission) across 
vast regions, from the Baltic to the Black sea, to Irkutsk, Ural mountains 
to ski, Kazakstan, Uzbekistan, and Prague as one continuous nation. 
Persons brought up in this expanse regarded it as bolshaya strana (the 
grand country) and, apart from Russian linguistic chauvinism (a uni-
versally mandatory language) regarded it as their own. In this sense, 
while the break-up of the Soviet Union led to an establishment and 
reestablishment of nationalities, the immediate incursion of the West 
and globalization offered no window of opportunity to obtain a strong 
national identity. Apart from opportunism, they may be regarded as 
nomads without any serious search for, and adherence to, any national 
identity. They would melt into the pot if it suited them, but without 
proclaiming that we are proud to be American. One notable aspect of 
their psychological attitude is irony, scepticism, and cynicism. Wheth-
er this is a passing fad is to be seen with the next generation both, in 
the old world and the new. After all, some, who come to America only 
temporarily, settle down, acquire property, raise children who attend 
American schools, wear the latest teenage styles, and, while well versed 
in the old world languages, answer their parents in English while being 
addressed in their parents native tongue. If they visit the old world with 
their parents, they regard themselves as tourists who must get home 
before the start of school. 
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POSTScRIPT
This essay comprises a compact disclosure of the essential aspects 
of awareness of the Eastern Europeans in the contexts of their own ori-
gins and their appearance in America. The essential aspects were expli-
cated in terms of variants of different waves of immigrants in order to 
show the ways that these waves coped with their experience, what they 
brought with them, what they found, and what they retained and dis-
carded. What appeared across the variants (apart from the latest, post-
Soviet wave) is the reflexive positioning of the immigrant as Ameri-
can, despite the efforts to maintain some semblance of former national 
identity. The reflexive awareness comprised a transcendental condition 
for the immigrant to see herself in terms of the other, for example the 
other who has become part of the Soviet Empire and hence no longer a 
member of the nation that the immigrant cherished. She then became 
real American in contrast to the Soviet Empire, and in turn the only one 
who has the right to speak about the rights to self determination of all 
peoples. But such rights are, for this immigrant, American. In this sense 
our offered variations had a focus: in what ways did the immigrants be-
came Americans, despite their psychological, rhetorical, and even po-
litical claims. It is hoped that some light has been shed how the melting 
pot functions and the ways that it cannot be avoided. This unavoidance, 
for these immigrants, is restricted to North America, and specifically 
to the United States. The latter, after all, allows one to maintain and 
even extol one’s national identity, and hence this very permission by 
America and acceptance by the immigrant is being American.
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